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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The aim of this study is to examine how the historical genealogy of Islamic educational 
tradition, particularly the tradition of teaching and learning, has contributed to the 
development of Islamic education in Indonesia. By drawing together in an analytic way a 
historically based description of the social and political circumstances surrounding 
Indonesian Islamic education, the study discusses some significant issues concerning the 
religious base, knowledge base, structural form, and the pedagogical approach of 
Indonesian Islamic education, all of which are important to the development of a modern 
form of Islamic education.   
 
The argument of the thesis is that the existing values of the Islamic tradition in education, 
particularly evident in Madrasah schools, provide a valuable basis for further developing 
and reconstructing an effective Islamic education system in Indonesia. However, there is 
also a strong need to construct an Islamic education curriculum in Indonesia that can 
meet the challenge posed by the circumstances generally understood as ‘modernity’. The 
quality of teaching and learning in the Madrasah are very much influenced by the quality 
of the wider Islamic education programme. Any change in the curriculum of Islamic 
education will thus have significant effects on the quality of the Madrasah schools in 
Indonesia. This thesis will thus conclude by suggesting some implications for further 
development of Islamic education that arise from the study. 
 
This is a qualitative study using an historical genealogical approach to discover, 
understand and analyze the challenges currently facing Islamic education In Indonesia. 
The techniques for collecting data involved, primarily, a critical reading of historical and 
contemporary policy documents. Primary and secondary sources were also collected, 
studied and subjected to a critical reading in the production of this account of Indonesian 
Islamic education. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Indonesian cultural identity has emerged from a long and complex history. It derived 
influences from many sources, such as: local and indigenous traditions, Chinese, Hindu, 
Buddhist, Islamic and Western traditions. These traditions have contributed significantly to 
the establishment of the current Indonesian cultural identity. The Chinese culture introduced 
a way of life based on home settlement and a culture of planting rice seeds to the Indonesian 
people. The Indian culture taught how to obtain writing skills. Concurrently, the Islamic 
culture brought an understanding of how to have a monotheistic belief and related Islamic 
knowledge. In addition, Western culture acquainted the Indonesian people with the 
prospects of a better life by using Western knowledge and technology. Koentjaraningrat 
(1987) suggested that Hindu and Buddhist, Islam and Western culture became the important 
traditions, which influenced the current form of Indonesian cultural identity. Therefore, the 
nature of the Indonesian education is similarly likely to be influenced by these traditions.  
 
Before the coming of Islam, the nature of Indonesian education was influenced strongly by 
Hindu and Buddhist traditions. It was characterized by an exclusive system in which 
education belonged to a high class society, particularly those families who were close to the 
ruling class (King). During the Dutch colonial era, education (government education) was 
only provided for Dutch, Chinese and Indonesian noble families, especially those who were 
able to work collaboratively with the Colonial Government. Meanwhile, the ordinary 
Indonesian people did not have the opportunity to enter the Dutch colonial school and most 
of them did not attend school. Nonetheless, some of them, notably from Moslem families, 
sent their children to study at Islamic educational institutions, such as: Pesantren1 
                                                 
1 Zamakhsyari Dhofir in his book: Pesantren Tradition, Study of Kiyai’s way of life (1982) described that 
Pesantren are traditional Islamic boarding schools in which santri (students) lived and learned together under 
the supervision of one or more Kiyai (religious leader). The student dormitory is a special characteristic of the 
Pesantren tradition and took place in the Pesantren complex and close to the Kiyai. In this area also can be 
found a mosque for doing salat (prayer), room for learning, teachers’ houses and many other religious 
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(Traditional Islamic Boarding School) or Madrasah2 (Islamic School), which focus 
specifically on Islamic teaching (Steenbrink, 1986). 
 
Islamic education and its intellectual tradition 
Islamic education in Indonesia has a long history. The arrival of Islam in the 7th century 
heralded a starting point for the establishment of Islamic education in Indonesia. Nurcholish 
Madjid in his book Our Indonesia (2004) argued that “Moslem traders from Persia, Gujarat 
(India) and later Arabia played a significant role in spreading Islam and in contributing to 
the formation of an Islamic Kingdom in the Indonesian archipelago. Aside from being 
traders, they also played a role as ‘religious teachers’ for the wider society. Their trade 
places or homes (inns) had become a place for teaching, called ‘Pondok’, where people 
came “to get religious advice” (p.13). From this time onwards, these Pondok developed to 
become our Islamic educational institutions in their current form ‘Pondok Pesantren’, with a 
set of distinctive Indonesian characteristics. Similar institutions in different places have 
different names, such as: Surau in West Sumatra, Dayah or Meunasah in Aceh and 
Pesantren in Jawa. Subsequently, from such institutions emerged a new classical form of 
Islamic educational institution called Madrasah (Azra, 1999). For many Moslem traders 
who spread the ideas of Islam, teaching became a core part of their Islamic duties. As the 
prophet Muhammad said: ‘Teach, even though it is only one word’. Based on this principle, 
(religious) teaching became an important duty for every Moslem, because this duty becomes 
part of his or her submission to Allah (God). 
 
The ultimate aim of Islamic education lies in the realization of complete submission to 
Allah (God). As Khusro (1979) has pointed out, the basic feature of Islamic tradition is the 
belief in Allah, the faith in the prophet Muhammad, in which the basic attitude of all human 
activity is based on the teaching of Allah. In this context, every Moslem should remain fully 
                                                                                                                                                     
activities. Very commonly, the Pesantren area belonged to the Kiyai and was separated from other society 
settlements (p.9).    
  
2 The word madrasah came from the Arabic language, which meant: ‘reading and learning’ or ‘place for 
learning’. When it is translated into Indonesian language it comes to mean school. However, actually in 
Indonesia, madrasah does not exactly equate with school, rather it has a specific meaning as a religious school 
in which students are taught many aspects of Islam and Islamic religious tradition (Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, 2004). 
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committed to the Quran and the Sunnah (tradition), which is the fundamental tenet of Islam. 
The Quran and Sunnah are the perennial foundation for the Islamic system, legislation, 
social and economic organizations, and the basis of both religious and general education 
(Al-Saud, 1979). Islamic education is based on the principles and cultural climate of Islamic 
values and norms. Both the Quran and the Sunnah are fundamental sources in developing 
Islamic Education. Furthermore, the Quran and the Sunnah played a dual role in creating 
and developing knowledge. First, every Moslem believed that the Quran and Sunnah 
(Traditions) contain the entire principles of knowledge. Second, the Quran and the Sunnah 
created a conducive climate for developing knowledge by highlighting teaching and 
learning as a main priority in Moslem life.  One of the most prominent of Allah’s statement 
in the Quran is, Surah Al-‘Alaq, Verses 1 to 5, that is:  
(In Arabic Language) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation: 
In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. 
1. Read! In the name of the Lord and Cherisher, Who created… 
2. Created man, out of a (mere) clot of congealed blood. 
3. Read! And the Lord is most Bountiful. 
4. He who taught the Pen. 
5. Taught man that which he knew not. 
 
From this perspective, all metaphysical and cosmological knowledge that emerged from the 
Quran and Sunnah provides the basic foundation for enhancing Islamic knowledge. Both the 
Quran and the Sunnah created a special atmosphere that aims to drive intellectual activity in 
conformity with the Islamic spirit (Azra, 1999). In Islam, teaching and learning become part 
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of submission to Allah. Teaching and learning is a form of worship by which all Moslems 
are brought into closer contact with Allah. Thus, Islamic tradition in education has its own 
aims and mechanisms. For many Moslems, the teaching and learning tradition thus becomes 
a prominent obligation for them everywhere they live. This commitment provides the basis 
for developing a religious and knowledge base, that is the intellectual tradition of Islam.  
 
There are many expositions on the nature of knowledge in Islam. This is due to the 
preeminent position and paramount role accorded to al’ilm (knowledge) by God in the 
Quran. These expositions range from the works on exegeses and commentaries of the Quran 
and Sunnah, the works on law and jurisprudence, the works on Islamic theology, 
particularly by Mu’tazilah, and the works on Tassauf (Mysticism). From an Islamic 
perspective, knowledge can be divided into two kinds. The first is a revealed knowledge 
given by God through revelation to the prophet Muhammad, and this refers to the Quran and 
Sunnah. The second kind is scientific knowledge, which is acquired through experience, 
observation, and research.  Both knowledges have to be acquired through conscious amal 
(action). There is no useful knowledge without action resulting from it; and there is no 
worthwhile action without knowledge (Al-Attas, 1979). 
 
From this point of view, a Moslem never loses sight of his/her relation to God, and 
education for him/her is an unfolding of sensibilities which draws him/her nearer to God. In 
Islam, the aims of education are to train young Moslems to have a strong mental discipline 
and to acquire knowledge, both revealed and scientific knowledge. It is not merely to 
develop intellectual curiosity but also to develop as rational, righteous beings who can 
contribute to the spiritual, moral and physical welfare of family, community and mankind 
and who are governed by the spiritual and deeply felt ethical values of Islam. The ethical 
values and tradition of Islam are embodied as an essential and comprehensive concept, 
which sustains a self-contained, unique and distinctive feature of Islamic education. 
Therefore the aims of Islamic education are to develop a balance between the ethical and the 
intellectual through training of the human spirit, intellect, rationality, feelings, and practical 
knowledge, both at the individual and the collective level to achieve goodness and 
perfection (Husain and Ashraf, 1979).   
 4
 Islamic education within the national educational system 
The administration of the Indonesian educational system, before 1999, was characterized by 
a highly centralized approach. The main responsibilities were shared between the Ministry 
of National Education (MoNE) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA). MoNE has 
responsibility for general education, MoRA for religious education – a complete educational 
system from primary level to university level that makes up 17 % of the national system 
(Maksum, 1999). The general pattern of Indonesia’s schooling is the 6 – 3 – 3 model. That 
is: six years primary level, three years Junior Secondary level, and three years Senior 
Secondary level, (the latter offers a general academic track). At the post secondary level are 
the University, Academies, and Institutes. Aside from these general structures, there are 
various experimental initiatives of formal and non-formal education that supplement and 
support formal education (Asian Development Bank, 1992). Meanwhile, on the MoRA side, 
there are: Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI) at primary level, Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) at level 
junior secondary level, and Madrasah Aliyah (MA) at level senior secondary level. At the 
tertiary level, there are: Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam/STAIN (State of Islamic Studies 
College), Institute Agama Islam Negeri/IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies), and 
Universitas Islam Negeri/UIN (State Islamic University) (PT. Amythas Experts and 
Associates, 2003). 
 
There are thus two types of schooling system in Indonesia: secular and religious education. 
The secular system refers to general education. It emerged from western tradition and was 
introduced as a formal schooling system by the Dutch colonial government. After the 
Indonesian proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945, the new Indonesian 
government adopted it as the mainstream of the national educational system. The religious 
system refers to the Islamic educational system, which emerged from the Islamic tradition in 
the 13th century. During the colonial era, the Dutch government did not support these 
institutions and so they became isolated from the mainstream of colonial government 
policy. This created an educational dichotomy: a secular and a religious education. After the 
Indonesian proclamation on 17 August 1945, the dichotomy continued, because the new 
Indonesian government adopted the secular schooling system as the mainstream national 
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form of schooling system and allowed the Islamic education to operate Pesantren and 
Madrasah as autonomous institutions (Zakaria, 2002). 
 
During the Old Order or Soekarno regime (1945-1965) and the New Order or Soeharto 
regime (1968-1998), the administration of the Indonesian educational system was fairly 
fragmented in term of policy and practice, and responsibilities within a highly centralized 
approach. This approach had a strong effect on the Islamic educational system, particularly 
the Madrasah system. Madrasah have been faced with a growing number of educational 
problems resulting from lack of policies and strategies, inequities in management, from too 
few human and material resources, and from lack of commitment and willingness to 
improve the quality of the Islamic educational system (Azra, 2002). However, the 
implementation of the Act 22 and 25 of 1999 concerning the autonomy of the education 
system had changed radically the nature of the Indonesian educational policy, from a 
centralized approach to decentralized approach (Tilaar, 2000). 
 
Rationale of the study 
There are two principal reasons for conducting this study: 
First, Islamic education has played a significant role in educating Indonesian peoples. The 
Islamic educational institutions, such as: Surau, Meunasah, Dayah, Pesantren, Madrasah and 
other Islamic institutions have been recognized by the Indonesian government and society 
as the first educational system, established long before the Dutch’s colonial government and 
Christian missionaries introduced a schooling system. The growth in recognition of the 
Islamic education system, particularly Pesantren and Madrasah education, has brought new 
expectations and challenges for all stakeholders of Islamic institutions to improve the 
quality of the Islamic school (Pesantren and Madrasah) in order to face the demands of 
modern Indonesian society (Azra, 1999). In order to meet this demand, the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (MoRA) along with all stakeholders, needs to maintain and develop the 
religious and knowledge base (intellectual tradition) of Islam - that is, educational spirit, 
motivation and responsibility - through constructing an appropriate Islamic educational 
system. By examining the positive values of Islamic tradition in education in this respect, it 
is hoped that a modern form of Islamic education can be established in Indonesia.  
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 Second, Islamic education is now facing the challenge of modern life (modernity). In order 
to meet the current demands of modern life there is an urgent need to reform the Madrasah 
school curriculum. The Madrasah schooling system has an opportunity to become an 
alternative schooling system in modern Indonesian society, if the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs (MoRA) as the main stakeholder has a strong commitment to develop the Madrasah 
educational system as a center of teaching and learning, providing young Moslems with a 
religious and knowledge base.  Abdullah (2004) recently argued, “religion (Islam) provides 
a right measurement tool of knowledge (true and false), how to produce knowledge (right 
and wrong), and the knowledge aims (benefit and risk). All of this knowledge is derived 
from Islam and can thus be regarded as objective knowledge by its adherents” (p22).  One 
way of understanding the knowledge base of Islamic education is to examine the social, 
historical and political background of Islamic tradition by exploring the intellectual tradition 
within Islamic education. This is what this current study attempts to do. 
 
1.2 The study path 
 
The focus of this study is to overview the history of the Indonesian Islamic education 
system. The study discusses how the genealogy of Islamic tradition in education has 
occurred in this context, particularly focusing on the tradition of teaching and learning that 
has contributed to the development of the Islamic intellectual tradition, Al-Quran, for 
example, has provided several significant principles for education such as respecting human 
intellect, providing academic guidance, recognizing human nature, and maintaining social 
needs and benefits (Langgulung, 1980). From these educational principles, Moslem society 
has been able to develop an Islamic educational system, which has its own characteristics. 
Azra (1999) has argued that the first characteristic of Islamic education is its emphasis on 
the seeking, acquiring and developing of knowledge, this duty being part of submission to 
Allah. Hence, the seeking, acquiring and developing of knowledge in Islam should place 
emphasis on moral values. In this context, honesty, modesty, and respect for knowledge 
sources all become important principles to guide a knowledge seeker.  The second 
characteristic of Islamic education is the recognition of human potential and capability to 
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create one’s own personality and to actualize oneself. The third characteristic of Islamic 
education is that the implementation of knowledge must be based on a strong commitment 
to Allah and humanity. This is the ultimate aim of Islamic education. As Mastuhu (1988) 
has pointed out, “the ultimate goal of Islamic education is looking for an Islamic wisdom, 
that is helping young learners to have a great understanding about their life and existence, 
role and responsibility in their collective life (society)” (p.280).   
 
All these educational principles and characteristics are embedded and developed in Islamic 
educational institutions, especially in the Pesantren and Madrasah educational system. In the 
Pesantren or Madrasah educational system, a Kiyai (Master teacher) or Kepala Madrasah 
(Head Master) plays a multiple role as a transmitter of knowledge, teacher, counselor, 
advisor and father: a person who has a strong sense of responsibility and commitment to 
teach their students. They play a role as resource both of knowledge and of morality. They 
are identified as a role model in reference to knowledge and morality whose conduct 
learners try to adopt and follow. Therefore, they must be a committed person imbued with 
the right kind of moral outlook, possessed of a warm personality and capable of inspiring 
enthusiasm among the learners for what is being taught and practiced (Husain and Ashraf, 
1979). 
 
From an Islamic viewpoint, the profession of teaching in Islam is a sacred mission and a 
most central theme of Islam. In the nature of Islamic education, it is not enough for someone 
to be a ‘good teacher’ in just academic terms. A good teacher has both “academic” 
qualifications and “good moral character”. The main duty of a teacher is to construct the 
character and morality of learners according to Islamic values and conducts. As Husein and 
Ashraf (1979) state, ‘in the context of Moslem society the teacher has to be a person deeply 
committed to Islam, not only outwardly but also inwardly. He or she must be a virtuous 
person, a person of piety who considers it his responsibility to train his pupil to be a good 
Moslem’ (p. 107).  
 
This study discusses some significant issues in the development of a modern form of 
Islamic education in Indonesia. These include the religious base, knowledge base, structural 
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form and pedagogical approach of Islamic education there. This requires, in turn, an 
examination of the social, historical and political background of Islamic education in 
Indonesia. The study thus begins by exploring the intellectual tradition within the Islamic 
education system, particularly in the Pesantren and Madrasah school system.  It then 
identifies some significant Islamic values and norms embedded within the Quran, Sunnah, 
and intellectual tradition of Islam in order to have an understanding of the religious and 
knowledge base of Islamic education. Next, the study evaluates how Islamic education fits 
into the educational system in Indonesia and examines some of the problems created by 
recent changes in government policy in Education. Finally, the study suggests some 
practical implications of this background for developing effective Islamic Teacher 
Education in Indonesia in the future.  
 
1.3 Aim of the Study 
There are two significant aims for conducting of this study:  
 
First, analyzing the historical perspective of Islamic education as the intellectual tradition of 
Islam will portray the conditions and challenges associated with developing the Islamic 
educational system, particularly the Madrasah educational system, in Indonesia. Also, this 
study will portray the dichotomy of education in Indonesia – thati is, Islamic education and 
General education. This portrayal will provide valuable input to bridge the gap between the 
two forms of educational system. 
Second, drawing together a historical description of the social, historical and political 
background of Islamic education will provide valuable input concerning the religious and 
knowledge base of Islamic education with a view to the development of a new structural 
form and pedagogical approach for Islamic education in the future.   
 
1.4  Methodology 
This is a qualitative study using an historical perspective to discover, understand and 
analyze the problems in Islamic education, particularly in the context of Indonesian Islamic 
education. The focus of study is to examine how the historical genealogy of Islamic 
tradition, particularly the tradition of teaching and learning, can contribute to the 
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development of Islamic education in Indonesia.  The chosen method for this study is 
historical research. The values of historical research have been categorized by Hill and 
Kerber as follow: (1) it enables solutions to contemporary problems to be sought in the past; 
(2) it throws light on present and future trends; (3) it stresses the relative importance and the 
effect of the various interactions that are to be found within all cultures; (4) it allows for the 
revaluation of data in relation to select hypotheses and generalizations presently held  about 
the past (cited in Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). 
 
To achieve this, an intensive study of relevant materials, information, evidence and 
documents has been conducted through examining the social, historical and political 
background of Indonesian Islamic education. Materials have been collected, particularly 
from secondary sources, such as books, thesis, journal articles about topic, and from 
documents such as: government reports, newspaper, and courses of study. In  the course of 
analysis, the quality of information sources and the meaningfulness of material contents 
have been considered carefully. The act of reconstruction of materials is here undertaken in 
a spirit of critical inquiry designed to achieve faithful representation of a previous age 
(Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).  
 
Theoretical Approach 
There are two reasons for employing the historical perspective as the theoretical basis for 
exploring this study. First, since the beginning, the Madrasah and Pesantren have played a 
significant part in the establishment of the intellectual tradition of Islam in Indonesia. As 
Langgulung (1988) points out: 
 
Pesantren and Madrasah grew and developed together with their communities [for] the last three 
hundred years. Hence, Pesantren and Madrasah are not accepted culturally, but they contributed actively 
in forming and constructing the nature of social life of the Indonesian Moslem, that is a moderate 
Moslem (p.110).  
 
Second, The education provided in Pesantren and Madrasah is more focused on Islamic 
knowledge and norms, a circumstance which leads to particular, local and  regional 
characteristics, and even to the exclusion of certain forms of knowledge. As Abdullah 
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(2004) argues, “the teaching of religious subjects in Madrasah or Pesantren is characterized 
by a textual and normative approach. This teaching method had a significant impact on the 
Moslem thought and attitude. The Islamic teaching stayed away from the development of 
social sciences, economy, law, humanistic, and religious studies” (p.26).  
 
It would thus seem that an historical perspective would be appropriate as a theoretical 
approach for exploring Indonesian Islamic education. There are two key issues that need to 
be considered in particular: 
 
First, The Pesantren and Madrasah educational system faces two significant challenges. 
First, the challenge of modernity, particularly the challenge of globalization as a result of 
the development of knowledge and technology. Secondly, the need to improve the quality of 
the Madrasah and Pesantren education in order to produce a graduate who is ready to face 
the future demands of Indonesian society and the challenge of modernity.  To achieve this, 
there is the need to develop a strategic educational policy to reconstruct a new structural 
form and pedagogical approach for Islamic education in the future.   
 
Second, There is a large difference between Islamic education and General education in 
Indonesia. Most of teaching and learning in Islamic education refers to the Middle East 
tradition but the General education has emerged from the Western tradition. The main focus 
of the General school is on transferring knowledge and skills, whereas Islamic education is 
more focused on embedding moral outlook.  However, it is argued that a new model of 
Indonesia education can be developed to encompass both these traditions. At present, the 
notion of integrating the most valuable aspects of Islamic education with the most valuable 
aspects of the General education, particularly with its intellectual and methodological 
approach, is being discussed. 
 
Strategy for collecting and analyzing information 
The research techniques used in the study are critical reading and document analysis.  
Critical reading involves reading and thinking critically, discovering the underlying 
assumption of an arguments, understanding and assessing arguments, and using them for 
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analyzing a problem (Bartl, 1998). In the context of the study, the critical reading technique 
has been used to two main areas: 
 
First, there is a review of the historical, political and social background of the Islamic 
community, including the nature of Indonesian society, of the nation state, of government 
policy on the Islamic education, and the current change climate in Indonesian educational 
policy on Islamic education. This also deals with the development of the intellectual 
tradition of Islam in an Indonesian context; the influence of the Minangkabau reformers and 
the Dutch colonial government; and recent developments in Indonesian Islamic education. 
 
Second, there is an overview of Islamic education, including the nature and aims of Islamic 
education, with a particular focus on Islamic teacher education within the wider Indonesian 
educational reform movement. This also deals with discourses about Islam and modernity, 
including academic debates on Islam and modernity, Muslim academic responses to Islam 
and modernity, and debates about Islamic education. 
 
The documents used for looking at and confirming a policy direction on the Islamic 
education were official reports, official letters and records, and policy guidelines.  The 
analysis is concerned with seeking a new model of Islamic education that is congruent with 
modernity in an Indonesian context.  
 
1.5  Outline of the thesis 
 
The study consists of five chapters, each divided into several sections: 
Chapter 1 describes the context of the study, including the background of the study, the 
study path, aims of the study, and the outline of chapters. Some aspects of methodology also 
are discussed here. 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the historical, social and political background of Indonesia, including the 
nature of Indonesian society and state, the influence of Islamic tradition, the influence of the 
Minangkabau movement, and the Dutch colonial contribution. 
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 Chapter 3 discusses the issue of Islam and modernity as a theoretical framework 
underpinning the development of the study. Four main issues are examined, including 
academic debates on Islam and modernity focusing on Weber, Marx, and Liberal and Neo-
Liberalism, the contemporary pressure on Islam, and the Muslim responses on modernity 
from Islam modernism, traditionalism, and fundamentalism. Also, the issues of secularism 
and educational democracy are discussed.  
 
Chapter 4 presents a brief review of the Islamic educational system, the history of the 
Indonesian Islamic education, the Indonesian Islamic education reform movement, the 
nature of government policy on Islamic education system, the current development of 
Islamic education.  
 
Finally, Chapter 5 presents concluding remarks through exploring some significant issues 
and policy implications for developing an Indonesian Islamic education in and for the 
future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SOCIAL, HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACK GROUND 
OF INDONESIAN ISLAMIC EDUCATION 
 
This chapter deals with the social, historical and political context of the development 
of Islamic education within Indonesia. Four main issues will be discussed. First, the 
nature of Indonesian society and state, focusing on the central role of Islam in shaping 
the development of Indonesian political, cultural and social life. From this, the 
development of Indonesian Islamic education as part of the nation’s and state’s life 
will also be explored. Second is the influence of Islamic tradition. This section will 
discuss the particular historical and political connection between Indonesia and the 
Middle East. Third is the influence of Minangkabau reformers in driving the Islamic 
movement from the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. 
The fourth is the Dutch colonial contribution in introducing the schooling system and 
its implications for the traditional Islamic educational system.   
 
2.1 The Nature of Indonesian Society and State 
 
Indonesian Society 
It is believed that Indonesia may have existed during the Pleistocene period (4 million 
year BC) when it was linked with the present Asian mainland. At this time, the South 
East Asia land, particularly the Sunda plateau (Indonesia) was probably still part of 
the Asian continent1.  During this period (3000-500 BC), Indonesia was inhabited by 
migrants from Asia who later inter-married with the indigenous people. Later 
(1000BC) inter-marriage occurred with Indo-Arian migrants from the South Asian 
sub-continental of India. The first Indian migrants came primarily from Gujarat in 
South East India during the first Christian era. All these migrants came to the two 
prominent islands, Sumatra and Java islands, and later spread out to other islands 
                                                 
1 Koentjaraningrat in his book “Human Being and Culture in Indonesia (1987) argues that the Sunda 
plateau (Indonesia) during the Pleistocene period was still connected with the Asian continent (p.4).  
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(Departemen of Information (DOI)/National Communication Iinformation Bureau 
(NCIB), 2000).  
 
At the beginning of Indonesia, the South Asian culture successfully came to dominate 
the Indonesian culture. This is shown by the introduction of the Sanskrit language and 
Pallawa script by Indian Prince Aji Saka (78 AD). This language and script, called 
the Kawi language, were adopted by Javanese people (DOI/NCIB, 2000). The 
prominent Hindu/Buddhist Indonesian kingdom of Sriwidjaya and Majapahit also had 
a strong relationship with the Nalanda kingdom in South Asia. The role of the 
Sriwidjaya and Majapahit Kingdom, as a key political power at that time, played a 
significant part in developing cross-cultural fertilization between India and Indonesia. 
There are consequently many similarities between Indonesian and Indian culture 
which can still be recognized from cosmopolitan elements of both cultures (Madjid, 
2004). Many forms of cross cultural fertilization also occurred as the result of the 
impact of extensive regional trade interaction.  
  
During the 7th – 13th centuries, Islam entered Indonesia through the Arabian Muslim 
traders. Muslim traders had apparently been present in some parts of Indonesia for 
several centuries before Islam became established within the local communities. 
Some of them settled permanently in several areas of Indonesia, intermarried and 
adopted the local lifestyle. Most of them were successfully assimilated with the 
indigenous people and there was no significant tension with the indigenous peoples. 
Why did assimilation and following Islamization occur so smoothly?   It would 
appear that foreign Muslims from many areas and Indonesian Muslims themselves all 
played important roles in socializing Islam. One example is Malik Ibrahim, a Muslim 
trader from Gujarat, North West India who was believed to have helped spread Islam 
in Indonesia in the fourteen century, particularly in North Sumatra and the Northern 
coast of Java (Ricklefs, 2001).  
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Between the sixteen and the seventeenth centuries, the European peoples arrived in 
the Indonesian archipelago. It began with the Portuguese in 1511, the Dutch (1596), 
and the Spanish (1606). The first two, the Portuguese and the Dutch, successfully 
embedded their political and cultural impact, such as in North Sumatra, North 
Sulawesi, in some Maluku islands, and East Timor (Ricklefs, 2005). In these areas it 
is easy to distinguish European heritage and heredity. Most of the people in these 
areas were converted to Christianity as a result of European occupation and the 
activity of the Christian missions. Other foreign traders included the Chinese who 
have been present in Indonesia for many centuries. The connection between China 
and Indonesia began in the Sriwidjaya era (700). In the Dutch colonial era, the 
number of Chinese increased rapidly, because they had been the important economic 
counterparts of VOC (The Dutch colonial enterprise). By 1740, the total Chinese 
population of Batavia city (Jakarta) was no less than 15 000. This was at least 17% of 
the total population of Batavia at that time (Ricklefs, 2001). Currently, the Indonesian 
Chinese represent about four percent of the population and are a sizable and 
economically powerful minority in most cities throughout Indonesia (Liddle, 1996). 
 
Indonesia, from Aceh (North Sumatra) to Merauke (West Papua), has a multiethnic 
population. There are about 350 ethnic groups, with the most prominent ethnic groups 
being the Javanese, Sundanese, Maduranese, Minangkabau, Batak, Aceh and Melayu 
in the west part of Indonesia; and the Bugis, Makasar, Manado, Bali, Dayak, Toraja, 
Bima, Ambon, and Papua in the East part of Indonesia.  The Javanese are the largest 
ethnic group who live in Central Java, East Java and Madura Island and comprise 
almost 60% of the total Indonesian population (DOI/NCIB, 2000). It is also the most 
influential group in the Indonesian political and social arena.  Most of the previous 
national secular leaders came from this ethnic group. Meanwhile, the Minangkabau 
ethnic group, who live in the west coast of the Sumatra Island and comprise 6 % of 
the Indonesian population, has also been an important resource for previous national 
leaders, particularly Islamic scholars. At the beginning of the Indonesian movement, 
this ethnic group, together with the other groups, has played a significant role in and 
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contribution towards establishing the new Indonesian state. Therefore, since its 
beginnings, the Indonesian movement was characterized by a diversity of ethnic 
groups. As Bachtiar (1974) points out “since the establishment of the republic, the 
highest executive authority in the state, the cabinet, has always been ethnically 
heterogeneous, an important factor which has proved to be greatly instrumental in 
contributing to the formation of an Indonesian nation” (p.40). 
 
Religious pluralism is also an important dimension of diversity. Nearly 90 percent of 
the population is Muslim, making Indonesia the world’s largest Muslim country. 
Beside Muslims, there are Christians, both Catholic and Protestant, Hindus and 
Buddhists. During the historical period of modern Indonesia, there was no significant 
religious conflict because it’s new state ideology: Pancasila and the Indonesian 
cultural pattern: “ Bhineka Tunggal Ika” (Unity in Diversity) has been successful in 
maintaining a permanent balance between the one (dominant) and the many 
(minorities) (Liddle, 1996). This cultural pattern was introduced into the Indonesian 
constitution of 1945 within article 29 which stated that every Indonesian citizen has 
the right to perform his/her religious duties (DOI/NCIB, 2000). 
 
 The Indonesian constitution has provided a great umbrella to create religious 
harmony and every government has tried to maintain the harmony of religious life 
between different religious adherents. Sometimes, however, there are still emerging 
conflicts caused by internal factors or external factors. From internal factors, the issue 
of proselytization – something the first Islam-Christian dialogue in 1967 failed to 
agree on - and the issue of Christianization or Islamization, have become latent 
religious problems in Indonesia. Among external factors, the government policy on 
religious affairs often created a conflict situation. For example, two controversial 
regulations were released by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1978. The first 
regulation deals with the ethics of religious proselytization and the second with the 
requirement for government approval of any foreign support for religious activities. 
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These regulations were applauded by the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Islam) but 
for obvious reasons, strongly resented by the Christians (Abdullah, 1981). 
 
Another important aspect of religious pluralism is apparent in the cultural dimension. 
Clifford Geertz2 divided Muslim Indonesia, particularly Javanese Muslim, into three 
categories: Priayi for the aristocratic class based on Hindu traditions and kingdoms; 
Santri for devout Muslims, and Abangan for the syncretism of these and other 
influences. In this context, two-thirds of the ethnic Javanese’s devout Islam beliefs 
and practices are mixed with pre-Islamic Hinduism and indigenous animism as to 
constitute virtually a separate religion (Liddle, 1996). This Geertz categorization has 
been criticized by some Indonesian scholars because he had created unbalanced 
categories. Priayi cannot constitute a parallel stand with the categories of the Santri 
and Abangan. The appropriate parallel for Priayi is “Wong cilik” or a common 
People3. Other critics, such as Suparlan (1976), Koentjaraninggrat (1963) and 
Nakamura (1984), point out the inadequacy of the abangan-santri-priyayi theoretical 
framework and its use as a clear cut device to categorize Javanese society (Mudzhar, 
et.al, 2004). However, from an anthropological perspective, this categorization still 
can be used as an analytical tool to understand the plural dimension of Indonesian 
Muslim peoples, particularly the Javanese Muslim as a dominant culture of the 
Indonesian society.  
 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the Indonesian society emerged from 
multiple ethnic groups and languages; different historical, social, political, and 
religious backgrounds. In this context, Islam had had a significant contribution to 
make in forming an Indonesian society. It is evident in that almost 90% of the current 
Indonesian population is Moslem with moderate views. This strand emerged from a 
long struggle and commitment of Moslem leaders in developing Islamic tradition 
within Indonesian society.   
                                                 
2 Geerzt, C. (1981) Abangan, Santri dan Priyayi (Translation of Religion of Java), Jakarta, Pustaka 
Jaya. 
3 See Azra (1999) and Mudzhar, et.al. (2004). 
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Indonesian State 
The Republic of Indonesia was founded on 17 August 1945 when its independence 
was proclaimed after a long occupation by the Dutch colonial government for three 
hundred years and by the Japanese for three and half years. Pancasila (the Five 
Principles) became the state ideology and philosophical basis of the new republic and 
on August 18, 1945 the constitution was adopted as the basic law of the country 
(DOI/NCIB), 2000). The Five Principles, or Silas of Pancasila, are general 
statements, which take on meaning as they are elaborated and expanded in the daily 
lives of the Indonesian people. They are:  
1. Belief in one God or one supreme being 
2. Just and civilized humanity or a commitment to internationalism 
3. Unity of Indonesia (Nationalism) 
4. Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberations amongst representatives or wisdom in deliberation/ 
representation 
5. Social Justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia 
 
These principles are virtually both a national ideology and civil religion. In its 
simplest interpretation, Sila (Principle) One means that all religions are contained and 
rightfully justified in Indonesia --- Islam, Christianity (Protestant and Catholic), 
Buddhism, Hinduism4. Although Indonesia is 87% Muslim, Islam is not the official 
state religion of Indonesia. Sila Two expresses a desire for an outward forum for 
discussion and an interest in fairness and justice. Discussants are initially freed from 
negative judgments. Sila Three is an energetic enterprise of uniting, bringing people 
together from 350 distinct ethnic groups spread across 3,500 miles in an archipelago 
between the Indian and Pacific oceans at the Equator. Indonesia is the largest 
archipelago in the world with a total number of 17,508 islands and a population of 
                                                 
4 Since 2001, the Indonesian Government, --- under President Abdurrahman Wahid -- has also 
recognized Kong Hu Chu as a religion. 
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225 million in 2005, with 583 languages and dialects spoken, which the government 
tries to reach through social order, literacy programmes, health education, and 
instruction in Bahasa Indonesia (The Indonesian language) as a national language. 
Sila Four is immediately visible in the structure of the Indonesian government. The 
president and vice president are elected by a majority vote of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the president is responsible only to that Assembly. 
The Assembly consists of the 364 members of the House of Representatives plus 
another 96 delegates appointed by the government who represent regions, functional 
groups, and political parties in proportion to the result of the general election. But 
since the election of 2004, the system has been changed to the direct election of the 
members of the House of Representatives and President/Vice president, one person 
for one vote. Sila Five is an equity principle that ideally manifests itself in fair 
judicial treatment. This equity concept protects cultural diversity as long as the 
diversity is synchronized with the nationalism in Sila Three, although in reality it is 
not always easy to achieve. Established as a free and sovereign state, Indonesia’s 
symbolic shield contains the coat of arms, is supported by the Garuda, the golden 
eagle of Indonesia mythology, and bears the motto “Bhineka Tunggal Ika”, unity in 
diversity (Anshari, 1985).    
 
Pancasila is the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state. It was originally proposed 
by Soekarno (Indonesia’s first post-independence president) in his speech on June 1, 
1945 in front of the meeting of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian 
Independence (PUPKI) as a way of determining a basic ideology of the Indonesian 
state.  Soekarno laid out his doctrine of Pancasila, the ‘Five Principles’, which were 
to become the official philosophy of an independent Indonesia. These principles were 
sufficiently acceptable and relatively ambiguous as to be generally accepted (Ma’arif, 
1985). However, Islamic leaders were unhappy because Islam seemed to play no 
significant role, although even they accepted a compromise, called the Piagam Jakarta 
(Jakarta Charter), which said that the state was to be based upon ‘belief in God, with 
the obligation for adherence of Islam to carry out Islamic law’. What this implied for 
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the relationship between Islam and the state was to be a source of disagreement in 
coming years. This PUPKI finished its work by drafting Indonesia’s first constitution, 
called the Undang-Undang 1945 (the constitution of 1945) which, appealed for a 
unitary republic with an extremely powerful Presidency (Ricklefs, 2001). 
 
According to the constitution of 1945, the structure of the unitary Republic of 
Indonesia comprised a central government, provincial, district, and sub-district 
government, which were connected by a strong hierarchical relationship. At the 
national government or the central level, there are six organs of the state: (1) The 
People’s Consultative Assembly, (2) The Presidency, (3) The House of 
Representatives, (4) The Supreme Advisory Council, (5) The State Audit Board, and 
(6) The Supreme Court. The Assembly holds the supreme power in the state; the 
people voice their political and social aspirations through this body. Meanwhile, the 
President is both head of state and chief executive, and also the Mandatory of the 
People’s Consultative  Assembly. He/she must execute his/her duties in compliance 
with the Guideline of State Policy as decreed by the Assembly. As the chief 
executive, he/she works with cabinet ministers and the House of Representatives 
where the government enacts laws and determines the national budget. Similarly, at 
the provincial level, the Governor is the chief executive and works with a staff of 
regional officials. Alongside this is the provincial legislature with whom the regional 
government concurs on regional legislation and decisions on the provincial budget. 
On the district (Kabupaten) and municipal (Kotamadya) levels, the chief executives 
are respectively, the district head (Bupati) and the municipal head (Mayor). They 
concur with the local legislative on matters relating to local government regulation 
and the budget. Below the district or municipal level are the sub-district 
administration (Kecamatan) and the village administration (Kelurahan or Desa) 
(DOI/NCIB), 2000). 
 
During the Old order or Soekarno era (1945-1966), as well as the New Order (under 
Soeharto, 1968-1998), the nature of government was extremely centralized. All 
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national political decisions were made from Jakarta (central government). Provincial 
government just followed and implemented what Jakarta provided and instructed 
them. This political culture dominated the nature of the relationship between the 
central and local government. In the Old Order or Soekarno era, there are several 
instances of resistance to Jakarta (the central government) such as in Java Island: the 
Indonesian Communist Party rebellion (1948) in Madiun East Java; The 
Kartosuwiryo or Darul Islam rebellion in West Java (1948), followed by Aceh and 
South Sulawesi; and the RMS rebellion (1949) in Ambon, Maluku. In Sumatra, the 
PRRI rebellion (1958-1961) was followed by the Permesta rebellion (1958) in 
Sulawesi5. Almost all these rebellions were caused by ethnic and regional sentiments. 
The Sundanese of West Java protested against the Javanese who by weight of 
numbers dominated many aspects of national life. Some outer islanders were 
dissatisfied with the number of Javanese appointed to strategic government posts6. 
However, by promising to maintain the unity of the Republic of Indonesia, Soekarno 
gained support from the central army and therefore was always successful in 
defeating all opposition to the central government. At the end of 1950, there was a 
major development in the consolidation of the ascendancy of Java over the outer 
islands and the army over other political forces.  Any regional rebellion was made 
difficult by the stationing of Siliwangi (West Java Army), Diponegoro (Central Java 
Army) and Brawijaya (the East Java Army) division officers and units in the outer 
islands even though regional commanders were only tenuously controlled by the 
central command (Ricklefs, 2001). 
 
In the New Order of the Soeharto government (1968-1998) there were no significant 
rebellions and resistance, although some small opposition occurred due to ethnic and 
regional sentiments. As Liddle (1996) describes, Soeharto was successful in 
eliminating the provincial and ethnic resistance by creating a society characterized by 
a benevolent ruler and obedient populace which encouraged statism in the attitudes of 
                                                 
5 See Maarif (1985), Kahin (1999), and Ricklefs (2001)  
6 See Ricklefs (2001, 2005) 
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bureaucrats towards the society. Soeharto was also successful in maintaining social 
stability through creating a policy of rice price stability for 25 years. Another political 
concept was the Village Law of 1979. This was a greater administrative homogeneity 
adopted from Javanese terminology for villages and hamlets. Thus, a structure of 
centralized hierarchical government control was progressively imposed on villages 
across the nation. However, the law was virtually unintelligible and unenforceable in 
most of the outer islands. But the most significant political concept of the New Order 
was Pancasila (the state philosophy). Soeharto used it as an ideological weapon to 
delimit the boundaries of acceptable political contestation (Ricklefs, 2001). This 
political pattern reflected extreme governmental centralization and uniformity. All 
important policy decisions were made in the center (by central government) rather 
than by the regions (local governments). Implementation instructions rarely took 
account of regional differences and demands (Liddle, 1996). 
 
The relationship between Islam and the state manifested itself in the form of 
governments. At the beginning of independence, there was a significant debate about 
the issue of the form of state. In the Old Order government or Soekarno era (1945-
1966) the relationship between Islam and state was apparent within a political 
struggle about the most appropriate form of state. At the beginning some Islamic 
leaders preferred to propose Islam as the form of state but were opposed by some 
nationalist leaders and Christian groups, particularly from East Indonesia. 
Fortunately, there was a general consensus that democracy was desirable and all 
leaders committed to create a democratic state (Maarif, 1985). For this, all leaders 
agreed to impose the ‘Pancasila’ with emphasis on principle one: belief in one God as 
the main principle, which underpinned the other principles and all aspects of nation 
and state life. To achieve this, since 1950 the Old Order adopted the parliamentary 
system which set the president in his constitutional position as figurehead of the state.  
 
For Soekarno, as the first post-independence President, appeals to nationalism and to 
unity in the cause of nationalism meant that other doctrines must be subordinated to a 
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set of ideas which denied the need for Islamic dominance, and focused on the social 
struggle within Indonesian society to reject colonial rule. This political philosophy 
was almost wholly devoid of any framework for unification post independence once 
independence had been won. In 1926, Soekarno had published a series of articles 
which argued that Islam, Marxism and Nationalism should be united in the cause of 
independence. This political attitude influenced strongly his political style when he 
took office as the first Indonesian president (Ricklefs, 2001).  
 
In the years of anti colonialism, war and revolution (1945-1950), Indonesian leaders 
had not had the time or the opportunity to confront the fundamental issue of nation 
building. But after the political revolution was complete, it was clear that the 
implication of independence would be to address the many social, religious, 
communal, ethnic, cultural and economic questions that remained. The fundamental 
issue was how to create an Indonesian democratic state that could provide a balanced 
political service for all group representatives, such as Islamic and non-Islamic groups, 
Javanese groups and outer island groups. This issue became a prominent concern for 
leaders of Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu groups. For Islamic leaders, the 
fundamental issue was how the Indonesian state could accommodate the political, 
cultural and social aspirations of Indonesian Muslim society based on its 
representation as the dominant population of the Indonesian state (Ricklefs, 2001). 
 
The issues of power sharing dominated political discourse during the Soekarno era. 
Several political experiments were implemented, such as shifting the form of the 
government system from Republican Unitarian to the Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia or federal systems. This did not survive and was terminated on August 17, 
1950 because of the lack of support from provincial leaders who were still committed 
to the Republican Unitarian system. In 1950, the Jakarta politician (central 
government) introduced the parliamentary system. Many parliamentary cabinets were 
formed from that time. Unfortunately, this system failed to establish a strong 
 24
government, because each cabinet failed to build a base of support either in or outside 
the parliament. 
 
By 1957 this democratic experiment collapsed in political crisis (Ricklefs, 2001). On 
5 July 1959, as a response to the political crisis, Soekarno in alliance with the Army, 
dissolved the Constituent Assembly and restored the old constitution (the 
Constitution of 1945). One month later on Independence Day, 19 August of 1957, he 
presented his ideology of guided democracy, later named ‘Manipol’ (Political 
Manifesto; (see Safi’i Maarif, 1985)) which consisted of: standing for the 1945 
constitution, Indonesian socialism, guided democracy, guided economy, and 
Indonesian identity. The Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) accepted the idea of guided democracy but the Masyumi 
Party maintained its inflexible opposition to this concept. As a result, in 1960 
Soekarno banned Masyumi and the PSI who had also opposed ‘guided democracy’ 
and their involvement in PRRI rebellion (Ricklefs, 2001). This marked not only the 
failure of a democratic experiment but it also represented a political failure to solve 
the fundamental issues of the Indonesian state. From that time, Soekarno became 
more authoritarian. By denying the legitimacy of representation of religious and 
ethnic cleavages, he turned the political balance between Islam and Nationalist and 
between the Java islands and outer islands (Liddle, 1996). 
 
In this context, Soekarno became the first Indonesian president who gained the 
benefit of using Pancasila and Undang-Undang 1945 as a ‘state power’ for 
maintaining his power. By using this power, he was able to defeat his opponents. In 
August 1960, based on Undang-Undang 1945, which provided the President’s 
institution with strong power to run a state under the provision of Presidential right, 
Soekarno banned the Masyumi and PSI party in order to eliminate their opposition to 
the government policies (Ricklefs, 2001). 
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Despite the unstable political conditions during the Soekarno period, education was 
given high priority and the number of educational institutions expanded dramatically. 
Between 1953 and 1960 the number of entrants to primary schools rose from 1,7 
million to 2,5 million. State and private high school and university level institutions 
sprang up everywhere, especially in the Java islands. Many of these achieved high 
standards, such as the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, the University of Gajah 
Mada in Yogyakarta and the Institute of Technology Bandung in West Java. Also, in 
order to accommodate the aspirations of  Muslim people, in 1947, the new Indonesian 
government established the Islamic High School (STI) in Jogyakarta which later 
developed into the University of Islamic Indonesia (UII). From the faculty of 
Religion in this University, the government in 1960 established the State Institute of 
Islamic Studies in Yogyakarta. This policy initiative showed that the government 
wanted to accommodate Muslim aspirations (Azra, 1999). 
 
The nature of the centralized approach is also strongly apparent in administering the 
educational sector. The Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) has the main 
responsibility for administering Indonesia’s schooling system from primary to 
university levels, but based on historical and political factors, the Ministry of 
Education and Culture delegates its responsibility for administering the Islamic 
educational system to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), which also runs a 
complete educational system parallel to the MoEC system. To run this system, both 
Ministries (MoEC and MoRA) established their representative central body at the 
provincial and district levels. Most of the government policies in education had a top 
down approach with planning, managing, and controlling of schooling being 
centralized. As a result, there was several anomalies, such as reducing the meaning of 
education to “schooling”, while the education sector was also understood as a ‘state 
business’ (non-profitable). Meanwhile the state had limited financial resources, and 
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the national educational system had focused more on ‘supply’ rather than ‘ demand’7 
(Tilaar, 2000). 
 
Within this context, educational praxis was dominated by paternalism and uniformity. 
Most of the main policies came from Jakarta (the Ministry of Education and Culture 
or the Ministry of Religious Affairs). Local governments or schools followed these 
strict policies to the extent that they always asked for ‘official guidelines’ in 
implementing those policies. Thus, the nature of educational praxis was characterized 
strongly by a highly bureaucratic approach and quantity targeting. Local governments 
and schools competed with each other in order to achieve a quantity target. As a 
result ,educational aims were not oriented to achieving quality education for the 
young generation but were mostly employed as a political tool of the regime to 
maintain its power (Tilaar, 2000).  
   
In contrast to the Soekarno era, in the early of Soeharto era (1968-1970), the 
relationship between Islam and the state seemed to have been reestablished, 
particularly since, when he became the President, Soeharto had wide support from 
Islamic modern groups, such as the former Masyumi party leaders, the Islamic 
Student Association (HMI)8. However, this relationship was weakened in the next 
few years when the New Order government tried to eliminate the political 
opportunities of Islamic modern groups who wanted to reestablish the Islamic party 
in the New Order era. For example, in 1970, Soeharto refused to allow a 
rehabilitation of the Masyumi Party but he allowed the creation of a new party, later 
called Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim Party). The Parmusi’s party congress in 1969 
selected Mohammad Room and Luqman Harun, activists of Masyumi, as new 
leaders. Unfortunately, Soeharto refused to recognize them. In 1970, he imposed a 
politically reliable chairman upon Parmusi in the person of H. Moh. Syafaat 
                                                 
7 By these are meant that the government policies on education are based on the need to implement the 
state programme rather than to the real need of society on the form of education. 
8 See Tanya (1982), Sitompul (2002). 
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Mintaredja. This political intervention led to discontent among the Islamic modern 
groups (Ramage, 1995).  
 
But the most crucial event was when Soeharto imposed Pancasila as a dominant 
ideology. In April 1980, Soeharto mentioned that it had been decided that Pancasila 
would be the state and national ideology. All social and political forces should be 
based on this ideology (Suryadinata, 1981). Why did Soeharto impose these 
principles? According to Munawir Syadzali, his former Minister of Religious Affairs 
(1983-1993), the ultimate purpose of imposing Pancasila as the base ideology for all 
political and social organization was to be sure there would be no Islamic state and 
that neither a theocratic nor secular state would emerge in the future. After the 
successful enactment of Pancasila as the Asas Tunggal (One base ideology), the 
psychological and political problem of a potential Islamic state no longer existed 
(Ramage, 1995)  
 
However, the relationship between the state and Islam changed again from the early 
1990s. In December 1990, the New Order government sponsored the establishment of 
the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association (ICMI), a most consequential 
political event, because it had a profound impact on political and ideological 
discourse. ICMI is the only major Islamic organization established during the New 
Order. It changed the political and religious context in Indonesia. It represented a 
reconciliation between the state and the Modernist Muslim which would have been 
unthinkable a decade before (Ricklefs, 2001). Douglas E. Ramage in his work, 
Politics in Indonesia (1995), argued that three concurrent developments must be 
considered. The first development includes both the cultural revival of Islam and 
related political decisions by Muslim figures not to dispute Pancasila. Since all 
Muslim groups accepted ‘Pancasila’ as the only base of national ideology, the 
government had no reason to be suspicious of Islamic groups, particularly Islamic 
modern groups, such as Muhammadiyah. The second, a general set of conditions and 
developments revolves around the perceptions of President Soeharto and his 
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challenging political needs vis-à-vis Islam and the armed forces. In order to gain a 
new political support and a political balance, Soeharto since the 1990s played the 
Muslim card by approving the establishment of ICMI (a modern Muslim intellectual 
organization). This shifting policy encouraged civilian political forces opposed to the 
Army’s role in power (Vatikiotis, 1998). The third development is the split in the 
Islamic movement by the late 1980s, particularly in terms of Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
(the leader of traditional groups/NU) opposition to government policy to 
accommodate Islamic interests imposed by the Modernist Islamic groups. Wahid, 
however, refused to support the government and consistently condemned ICMI as an 
elitist and sectarian organization which posed a threat to a pluralistic Indonesia 
(Ricklefs, 2001). 
 
As well as in the political sector, the New Order of the Soeharto government made 
rapid progress in education, as shown by the increase in net primary enrolment ratios 
for both male and female students. In 1980, these ratios were already quite high as a 
result of large government investment in the expansion of primary education, 
particularly in rural areas. These were made possible by the oil boom income gains of 
the 1970s.  Also during the New Order, Islamic educational institutions developed 
rapidly. In contrast to the secular schooling system (administered by the Ministry of 
Education and Culture; MOEC), which is fully funded by the government, the 
parallel Madrasah system (Islamic schools; administered by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs; MORA) in the main (85%) are established and developed by the Muslim 
community (see Chapter 4 for further discussion). Also, during this era, the nature of 
the educational system was centralized. Most government policies in education had a 
top down approach and were administered within tight uniformity (Azra, 2002).   
 
From the above discussion, we can note that, despite its lack of formal state 
recognition, Islam in Indonesia had nonetheless played a significant role in shaping 
the social and cultural dimensions of the Indonesian nation. It is evident that the 
Indonesian state recognized the contribution of Islamic institutions in educating 
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Indonesian peoples with moderate views, even though the development of Islamic 
education still much depends on the nature of relationship between Islam and state.  
  
2.2 The Influence of Islamic Tradition 
 
The historical and political connection 
The emergence of Islam in the Indonesia archipelago is one of the most significant 
processes of Indonesian Islamic history. From the eighth century, Moslem traders 
from Arabia began to have contact with China. This contact was maintained primarily 
via the sea routes through Indonesian waters. Moslem traders, such as Arabs, Indians 
and Chinese played a significant role in spreading Islam throughout the Indonesian 
archipelago and for the formation of an Islamic kingdom in the Indonesian territory. 
The first evidence of Indonesian Moslems was apparent in the northern part of 
Sumatra. The graveyard of Lamreh contains the gravestones of Sultan Sulaiman bin 
Al-Basir, who died in 1211. Further gravestones of the first Moslem ruler of the 
Samudra kingdom, Sultan Malik as-Shalih, were found in 1297 (Ricklefs, 2005). This 
is the first evidence of the existence of an Islamic kingdom in Indonesian territory.   
 
The emergence of an Islamic Kingdom 
The political history of the Indonesian Islamic state in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries is also not well known. One major state clearly dominated these periods, 
that is the Malacca kingdom. But the earliest state is Samudra Pasai, with the first 
Muslim ruler of this state being Sultan Malik as-Shalih (1297) (Abdullah, 1987). In 
the late fifteen century this state was occupied by Sultan Ali Mughayat Syah of the 
Acehnese Dynasty. The Acehnese Kingdom became one of the most powerful 
Indonesian Islamic states of the Malay – Indonesia area beside Malacca, particularly 
under the rule of Iskandar Muda in the seventeenth century. At the same time, a 
Malacca kingdom was developed in the Malay Peninsula. It was founded by 
Parameswara, the prince of the Palembang kingdom who fled to Malacca after the 
Majapahit attacked in 1377. There he found a good fort and proceeded to establish 
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Malacca as a major international port by establishing reliable facilities for 
warehousing and trade to passing ships. At the beginning, Parameswara was a Hindu-
Buddhist king but later he converted to Islam and adopted the name Iskandar Syah. 
He was followed by his two successors, Megat Iskandar Syah and Muhammad Syah 
(Ricklefs, 2005). After the defeat of Majapahit, the Hindu-Buddhist Empire, Demak, 
became the first Islamic state in Java. All these prominent Indonesian Islamic states 
have played a significant role in spreading Islam throughout the Indonesian 
archipelago9. From that time, the position of Acehnese in north Sumatra, Malacca in 
Malay Peninsula, and Demak in the north coast of Java as Indonesian Islamic states 
was unchallenged until the arrival of the Portuguese and the Dutch in the sixteenth 
century. 
   
Religio-Intellectual connection 
The connection between Indonesia and the Middle East occurred from the time Islam 
came to the Indonesian archipelago. The spread of Islam throughout the Indonesian 
archipelago and the forming of Indonesian Islamic states during the fifteenth and 
sixteen centuries were an essential foundation for developing a valuable connection 
with Middle East tradition. But as Azra (2002) points out, the most intense religious-
intellectual contact and connection between Malay-Indonesian students and ‘ulama’ 
(scholars) occurred from the seventeenth century onwards. This contact had a vivid 
reforming impact on the course of Islam in Indonesia. Returning students and 
scholars implanted a more shariah-oriented Islam in the Malay-Indonesia 
archipelago. 
 
Mecca and Medina: the first center of global connection 
The center of the global connection between Islam Indonesia and the Middle East 
were the two protected cities, Mecca and Medina. Both these cities played a 
significant role in the development of a religious – intellectual contact, because both 
                                                 
9 M.C. Ricklefs (2005) argued that Islam established itself in the Indonesia archipelago from the end of 
the 13th century until early in the 16th century. Its growing adherence began from north of Sumatra, 
West part of Indonesia and then spread out to Mollucous, the East part of Indonesia.  
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Mecca and Medina were not only the holy cities for taking haj pilgrims but they also 
were a primary source of Islamic knowledge, particularly the rise of ‘scriptural 
orthodoxy’ in Indonesia. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries many 
Indonesian students and scholars went to Mecca and Medina and spent several years 
studying Islam there. The most important scholars were Nur al-Din al-Raniri. ‘Abd. 
Rauf al-Sinkili, Muhammad Yusuf al-Maqasari, Abd. Samad al-Palembangi, 
Muhammad Arshad al-Banjari, and Dawud bin Abd al-Patani (Azra, 2002). All these 
scholars played a significant role in spreading Islam in the Indonesia archipelago, 
particularly in spreading the Islam orthodoxy strand. These scholars became famous 
religious leaders who had a large following throughout the Indonesian archipelago. 
Most of the next wave of Indonesian students who went to Saudi Arabia had strong 
links with these leaders (Steenbrink, 1986).  
 
One of the previous prominent groups from this orthodox strand was ‘Kaum Paderi’ 
(a religious group) in Minangkabau in West Sumatra. This group became the first 
major Islamic revival movement of Indonesia. Different from other revival 
movements in other regions, which had a royal family background, the Kaum Paderi 
emerged from religious teachers. The main Paderi leaders were accorded the 
Minangkabau title of respect for a religious teacher, ‘Tuanku”. Historically, the 
movement emerged from a group of three hajjis (pilgrims) who, returning to 
Minangkabau in 1803, were inspired by the puritanical Wahabi reformers in Saudi 
Arabia (Kahin, 2005). The Padri movement opposed gambling, cock fighting, the use 
of opium, strong drink and some aspects of the local matriarchal customary law, 
especially concerning inheritance. The most prominent leader among them was 
Tuanku Imam Bonjol. This movement led to conflict in terms of Islam versus ‘adat’ 
(customary law) or of ‘Tuanku’ (religious leader) versus ‘penghulu’ (clan head or 
secular leaders) (Azra, 1999).  
 
In the course of the civil war in 1819, the Dutch colonial administration became 
involved by standing for the ‘adat’ side. This alliance created the Padri war between 
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the Dutch and Kaum Paderi from 1821-1837. At the same time, opposition from other 
regions also emerged, such as the Diponegoro war (1825-1830) in Java, Batak war 
(1872-1895) and Aceh war (1873-1904) (Ricklefs, 2001, 2005). Most of these wars 
were unsuccessful in displacing the Dutch. Therefore, learning from these failures, 
since the early twentieth century, the form of Islamic revival movements in Indonesia 
has moved from a territorial to a predominantly cultural focus, particularly in the 
educational area. Meanwhile, Dutch colonial policy changed radically from the policy 
of exploitation to the welfare of Indonesia, called the ‘Ethical Policy’ (Ricklefs, 
2001). This situation created a favorable environment for an emerging Islamic 
educational movement in the early twentieth century. This issue will be explored in 
the next section. 
 
Egypt: the second center of global connection 
Egypt was the other center of the Islamic global connection since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. This new wave has been termed by many observers as “Islamic 
modernism’ (Eliraz, 2002). The movement was heavily indebted to the strong 
influence of modernist Muslim thinkers like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 
Abduh. Both of them had significant influence in the emergence of the Indonesian 
religious movement in the early decades of the twentieth century. Muhammad Abduh 
in particular had a significant influence in encouraging the modernist movement 
which crystallized in the establishment of such modernist organizations as the 
Muhammadiyah (1912), al-Irsyad (1913) and Persis in the early 1920s (Azra, 2002). 
These organizations focused on educational reform and were successful in 
introducing modern methods of teaching. There were two reasons for focusing on an 
educational movement. First, the Islamic world realized that its culture was lagging 
behind Western culture. This had been evident since the early eighteenth century 
when there was contact between Islam and the Western world, particularly between 
the Ottoman Empire and the French, followed by the Napoleon Bonaparte expedition 
to Egypt. This situation created a strong consciousness among Muslim leaders from 
many Islamic countries to improve the quality of Muslim society. Second, by the 
 33
early twentieth century almost all Islamic countries were under the influence of 
Western colonization. These occupations had a significant impact on the development 
of Muslim society. The political exploitation of Muslim countries as a result of 
Western colonialism had been successful in weakening Islamic countries and 
societies. Since the failure of the Indonesian Islamic kingdoms to oppose the Dutch 
colonial power, the Muslim leaders changed their approach in opposition to the Dutch 
colonial regime from a political struggle to a cultural struggle (Azra, 1999). 
 
Both of these centers, Haramayin and Egypt were global connections between Malay-
Indonesia and the Middle East, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. At this time, the relationship between Malay-Indonesia and the Middle East 
became strong through a religio-intellectual connection (MoRA, 1999, Azra, 2002). 
During this time, many Indonesian Muslims went to these centers for a haj pilgrim or 
to study Islam. After living in these centers for several years they returned to their 
home country and tried to introduce the ideas of Islamic reform, particularly the 
influence of Mohammad Abduh’s thinking.  The first wave was apparent when many 
of the Islamic reformers who had returned from Haramayin and Egypt founded a 
modern Islamic school. One early modernist school was the Adabiyah School in 
Padang West Sumatra, founded in 1906 by Abdullah Ahmad. This was followed by 
other Islamic reformers, such as Zainuddin Labay El-Yunusi, who founded the 
Madrasah Diniyah in Padang Panjang in 1916 (Noer, 1973). The same wave emerged 
in Java island from the early twentieth century, when many Islamic reform 
organizations, such as Jamiatul Khair (1905) Muhammadiyah (1912), Al-Irsyad 
(1913), and Persis (1920) were involved in developing the modern Islamic education 
institutions (Azra, 1999). 
 
The influence of Islamic reformers 
Jamal al Din Al-Afghani (1839-1897). Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani was born in Iran but 
spent his life overseas, particularly in Egypt, India and Turkey.  He was a pioneer of 
Islamic modernism and especially of anti-imperialist activism. His notion of Pan-
 34
Islam had a strong influence in motivating Muslim people to liberate themselves from 
colonial (western) control. For this, he was the first of a line of Islamic ideological 
modernizers. His notion of Pan-Islam had a significant impact on an Islamic 
movement (Azra, 2002, Eliraz, 2002). In the early twentieth century a significant 
Islamic movement for liberating the Muslim countries from colonial annexation 
emerged. After World War Two, many Muslim countries were liberated from western 
colonialism. But Afghani’s main influence may be traced to his theological 
perspectives. He always claimed to be a Sunni but recent scholarly biographies 
demonstrate that Afghani was born in Iran and had a Shi’i education. He received his 
classical religious studies at Najaf and Karbala, the hub of shi’i thought and education 
(Rahnema, 1994).   
 
Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905.) Mohammad Abduh was born in Nile, the region of 
Egypt in 1849.  He came from a family which had a strong commitment to learning 
and religion (Hadad, 1994) In contrast with Afghani, who was concerned with 
political issues, particularly an issue of anti imperialism, Mohammad Abduh focused 
his attention on the problem of the decline of the Muslim ‘ummah’ or the quality of 
Muslim peoples. According to Abduh, the decline of Muslim ummah was due 
primarily to the Islamic disputes that had led to a lack of initiative in Muslim people 
to build a civilization and compete in a changing world. Muslims had lost their ability 
to determine their own destiny, directly caused by occupation or the hegemony of 
foreign influence. To solve this situation, he proposed that the world of Islam needed 
to have a plan for political and social reform through reinterpreting the Qur’an for the 
modern world. The Muslim ummah needed to return to the original Qur’anic text. For 
Abduh, the underlying principle for the resurrection of the nation was the basic belief 
that the Quranic message is universal and is addressed to all humanity. Thus the basic 
foundation of the reform is the Qur’an.  Another significant issue that he focused on 
throughout his life and career was the reform of education. Part of his concern was to 
find an alternative to the kind of stagnation of Islamic education, best typified by his 
education at Al-Azhar University and elsewhere (Hadad, 1994). In this respect, 
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Abduh was aware of the weaknesses in traditional Islamic education because it was 
still concentrating on memorization of texts without much comprehension of their 
meaning (Watt, 1988). 
 
For Indonesia, the influence of both thinkers, particularly Mohammad Abduh, is very 
significant. Since the end of the nineteenth century many Indonesian Muslim students 
studied in Saudi Arabia and Egypt and brought the ideas of Afghani and Abduh to 
Indonesia. According to Taufik Abdullah (1981) the most prominent among these 
were Abdullah Ahmad in Padang Panjang, M. Djamil Djambek in Bukittinggi, Haji 
Rasul in Maninjau and Padang Panjang, and Syech Thaib Umar in Batusangkar. 
These reformers argued that belief (iman) if based on taqlid (uncritical acceptance of 
the textual authority) was wrong, because the real sources of religious law were the 
Quran and the Hadits. Their purification movement was greatly influenced by the 
Egyptian reformer, Syech Mohammad Abduh (Khan, 1993). More detail of this 
movement will be presented in the next section, particularly with respect to 
education.  
 
At the organizational level, the influence of Afghani and Abduh was apparent through 
the Indonesian Islamic modern organizations. The first examples were Djamiátul 
Khair and Al-Irsyad, but the most well known was Muhamadiyah, founded by K.H. 
Ahmad Dahlan at Yogyakarta, Central Java in 1912 (Ricklefs, 2005). This 
organization became a prominent vehicle of reform, by adopting and actualizing fully 
Abduh’s ideas of Islamic reform. This movement was followed subsequently by 
Jamiatul Wasliyah in North Sumatra and Nahdlatul Ulama in East Java in 1927  
(Azra, 1999). 
 
2.3 The Influence of the Minangkabau Movement  
 
As mentioned previously, the West Sumatra or Minangkabau reformers played an 
important role in the beginning of the Islamic movement in Indonesia, particularly 
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from the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century10. An 
interesting question is how the Minangkabau people who live on the west coast 
developed this strong modernist tradition? This section will discuss several key 
issues, which contributed to the influence of the Minangkabau reformers in the 
Indonesian Muslim movement, and particularly their influence on the Islamic 
educational reform movement in Indonesia.  
 
The Minangkabau Culture 
The prominent characteristics of the Minangkabau people are individualism, 
rationalism and egalitarianism11. These characteristics emerge from their traditional 
system of social organization. Central to its social group are ‘Suku” (Tribal) and 
Matriarchal forms which constituted principles of kinship and clanship. Every family 
belongs to its particular ‘suku’ led by ‘Penghulu’ (Tribal Heads) who run and 
maintain the rule of the matriarchal system. The other central image of Minangkabau 
culture places greater emphasis on basic territorial units encapsulated within 
autonomous rules called ‘Nagari’ (village republics); governed by ‘balai adat’ 
(councils) containing representatives of different groups (suku) within nagari 
(villages).   Therefore, the image of the Minangkabau culture can be characterized 
through both a kinship-based and village-based society (Khan, 1993).  
 
These images of the Minangkabau tradition contain and appear within its traditional 
economic activities. The most prominent of these is the cultivation of rice and 
‘sawah’ (rain-fed terraces). Rice land is controlled by the ‘Suku’, and passes from 
mother to daughter (matriarchal system); meanwhile the forestland is traditionally the 
province of the ‘Nagari’. In these models, therefore, production, distribution and 
                                                 
10 M.C. Recklefs (2005), in his book “A history of modern Indonesia”, argued that the first Islamic 
modern schools had been established in West Sumatera, such as:  Adabiah School in Padang in 1909; 
Thawalib Schoo (1914), Diniyah School (1915). All these schools introduced a secular subject 
(history, geography, and foreign language) alongside religious subjects. In 1911, Syech Abdullah 
Ahmad established  “Al-Manar in Padang, as the first modern Islamic Newspaper. Through these 
activities, the notion of Islamic reform spread out to other islands, particularly to Java Island. 
11  See Audrey Kahin, Rebellion to integration, West Sumatra and the Indonesian polity 1926-1927, 
p.2-3.  
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consumption are all embedded within a traditional sociopolitical unit, whether these 
be households, clans or villages. As a result, Minangkabau came to be viewed as the 
location of truly traditional tradition, a society of peasant communities and village 
republics with matriarchal status hierarchies (Abdullah, 1987, Kahin, 2005). This 
culture provided a greater place for the emergence of Islamic reform movements, 
which were not fundamentalist in their hostility to non Muslim and adat (localized 
beliefs and practices), but derived their inspiration from Egypt and Turkey, and were 
wholehearted in their support for the modern ideals of education, progress and 
rationalism. The individualistic image of the Minangkabau people draws on the 
propensity of Minangkabau villagers to migrate far and ‘merantau’ (wide) in search 
of experience and opportunity, to be open to change, to have an extremely high level 
of demand for education, and to be very active in the public life of the Indonesian 
nation (Khan, 1993). In addition, the merantau tradition both enriched the local 
culture with outside influences and brought to West Sumatra a wider understanding 
of the disparate societies making up the Indonesian nation (Kahin,1999). This 
influence will be described in the next section. 
 
The political and social movement  
Since the era of Dutch colonialism until the proclamation of the Republic of 
Indonesia, West Sumatra was a principal locus of the most important revolt against 
the Dutch colonial rule12. The first wave of anti colonial struggle was led by Kaum 
Paderi, the orthodox Muslim groups who refused to accept the Dutch colonial 
occupation on the West Sumatra. The Kaum Paderi resisted the Dutch extension of 
their authority over much of the highlands, which would have lead to the destruction 
of the Islamic religious life in West Sumatra. This resistance created the Paderi War 
between the Dutch colonial government and the Paderi for almost fifteen years from 
1821-1837. It was followed by rural protest in 1908 when the rural religious leader of 
                                                 
12 According to both Kahin (2005) and Ricklefs (2005) the West Sumatra region demonstrated long- 
standing resistance to the Dutch Colonial Government, particularly from its religious leaders. This 
began with Paderi war, - for almost 14 years (1823-1837) against Dutch Colonial expansion and 
continued until the Communist rebellion in 1926-1927. 
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the Syatariah mystical Islamic brotherhood spearheaded protest against Dutch 
imposing direct taxes on the local people (Kahin, 1999). 
 
The second wave of important anti colonialism movements occurred in the early 
twentieth century in the rebellion of 1927. This rebellion was sponsored by the 
Communist Party who had been successful in inculcating its ideology among the 
Minangkabau traders and the students and teachers of the Sumatra Thawalib school. 
According to Kahin (1999) there were three main centers of the communist radical 
politics and opposition to colonial rule in West Sumatera: Padang Panjang, 
Silungkang and Padang. This political activity and the characteristics of the 
movements in each of the towns differed significantly. In Padang Panjang, Muslim 
scholars and students constituted the communist backbone and their acknowledged 
leader and inspiration was Tan Malaka.  Religious schools, such as Sumatera 
Thawalib schools, became places where religion and radical politics overlapped and 
reinforced each other in the face of opposition to unpopular Dutch policy. Two of 
Sumatera Thawalib’s brightest and most radical teachers, H. Datuk Batuah (the 
founder of the Pemandangan Islam newspaper in Padang Panjang) and Djamaluddin 
Tamin (the founder of the Islamic League of West Sumatera) became prominent 
leaders who opposed Dutch policy.  In Silungkang, the roots of the communist 
movement were sponsored by local traders, such as Sulaiman Labai and Datuk Sati.  
In 1918, Labai spearheaded protest against Dutch regulations which restricted 
transfers of rice while the people of Silungkang were suffering from hunger. Together 
with a few dozen followers, he forced the stationmaster to surrender two freight cars 
of rice from a train bound for Sawahlunto which halted in Silungkang. He distributed 
the food to the hungry people of the town. His bold act raised spirits in the town and 
attracted many new members to the Islamic League (Kahin, 1999).  
  
After the Dutch defeat in 1930, the Communist Party emerged as a political 
movement representing a merging of two cultural currents, one Islamic and the other 
nationalist. The organization base for this movement was Permi (Muslim Union of 
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Indonesia), a locally rooted political party whose leaders embraced Islam and 
nationalism as equally important elements in the anti Dutch struggle, contending that 
the religion could not be separated from the political movement (Khan, 1993). Permi 
was founded in Padang Panjang in 1930. It emerged from the Sumatra Thawalib 
Union and was established in an earlier form in November 1928 by political activists 
of the Thawalib school. Its aims were not only to improve the school system but also 
to organize activities in the political, economic, and social fields. At its third 
conference in May of 1930, this union transformed itself into the Indonesian Muslim 
Party or Permi. This new party soon became the strongest and most influential 
political party in West Sumatra, and in many ways most representative of the political 
character of the region during the late colonial period. Unlike all other nationalist 
parties of the time, it was founded on two specific principles, - Islam and Nationalism 
(Kahin, 1999). In this context, the anti colonial nationalism of West Sumatra derived 
from Minangkabau ideals of equality expressed in the social principles of ‘sitting 
equally low, standing equally high’, and egalitarian and community concepts based in 
Islam (Khan, 1993). The principle of Islam and the Muslim groups thus played a 
significant role in anti colonial struggle. It is evident that in the early twentieth 
century a simultaneity of the religious, political, social, and educational movements 
emerged in West Sumatera (Kahin, 2005).    
 
The Islamic modern movement  
At the same time, the religious and educational Islamic movement emerged. This 
movement was first initiated and sponsored by students of Syech Ahmad Chatib who 
had returned to propagate his ideas on orthodox reform in their home town in West 
Sumatra. Prominent among these were Syech M. Djamil Djambek in Bukit Tinggi, 
Haji Abdullah Ahmad in Padang and Padang Panjang, Haji Rasul in Maninjau and 
Padang Panjang, and Syech Tahib Umar in Batu Sangkar (Steenbrink, 1986). By the 
turn of the nineteenth century, they had attacked the heterodoxy of the tarekat 
(Muslim brotherhood) and opposed unauthorized innovation in religious practices. As 
discussed earlier, their purification movement was greatly influenced by the 
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nineteenth century Egyptian reformer, Syech Muhammad Abduh. These young 
reformers (Kaum Muda) had begun to denounce the conservative religious scholars 
(Kaum Tua). In this context, Islamic modernism in West Sumatera appears to have 
been at the outset a discourse concerned with progress and the triumph of reason over 
uncritical acceptance of doctrine. This movement generated conflict not just with the 
aristocratic group (Adat) who were closely associated with the Dutch, but also with 
traditional Muslim groups who hindered the development of modern knowledge. This 
led to open conflict over religious practices between supporters of the Kaum Muda 
and the Kaum Tua or conservative religious scholars (Khan, 1993). 
 
In the educational movement, West Sumatra also played a significant role in shaping 
the Islamic and nationalist movement. Central to this movement, as well as in the 
religious and political field, was Padang Panjang, a small windy town lying in the 
foothills of Mounts Merapi and Singgalang. Since the early twentieth century, Padang 
Panjang was a major crossroad for traders transporting their goods between the 
highlands and the coast, and also for political, religious and educational movements. 
From the first decade of the twentieth century, Muslim modernists in West Sumatera 
paid particular attention to the issue of education.  The Muslim modernists were very 
active in setting up a new kind of religious school in which religion was still an 
important element in the system, particularly in the curriculum (Steenbrink, 1986). 
 
Two of the early educational reformers were Abdullah Ahmad and Zainuddin Labai 
El Yunusi13. Both of them became prominent educational reformers in West Sumatra. 
Abdullah Ahmad became the first innovator for founding a modern school in 
Indonesia. In 1906, Abdullah Ahmad founded the Adabiah School, one early 
modernist school in Padang, West Sumatera. The ideas for this school came from his 
studies of the Dutch colonial school system and the influence of the ideas of 
educational reform of Tahir Djalaluddin, his close friend and classmate who had 
                                                 
13 See Azyumardi Azra (1999), Islamic education tradition and modernization towards new 
millennium, p.37-38. 
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dreamed of creating a modern school for Indonesian Muslim society (Steenbrink, 
1986). In contrast with the traditional school (Surau System), which focused solely on 
religious matters, the Adabiah School adopted a new system by using a classical 
system and introducing secular subjects, such as reading, writing, and counting, in 
addition to maintaining a focus on religious teaching. The main aim for establishing 
this school was to build a strong pillar for the modernist movement. In 1915, this 
school was recognized by the Dutch government and later accepted government 
funding (Maksum, 1999). However the initiative to establish this school was not 
given enough support from Muslim scholars and Muslim society. The initiative was 
isolated and undeveloped for a long time. But the school was successful in bringing 
the sense of a new perspective on Islamic schooling system, because it did inspire the 
next wave of Islamic educational reformers  (Steenbrink, 1986).  
 
The second innovator was Zainuddin Labai El Yunusi who was born in 1890 into a 
family of religious scholars. In 1916, while he was a student and assistant teacher in 
Surau Jembatan Besi (Traditional religious school), he founded a Diniyah School 
(Religious School) in Padang Panjang. This school differed from a Surau system 
(traditional religious school), which used an individual approach. Diniyah School 
adopted a classical system with balanced teaching focused between religious and 
secular orientations. This school taught both religious subjects and general subjects.  
This School grew rapidly throughout West Sumatra and for the next decade the 
system was adopted by many educational reformers in Sumatra Island, Malay 
Peninsula, Java and South Borneo, because it maintained a balance between religious 
and general subjects. As Kahin (1999) described, these schools did adopt Western 
teaching methods as a curriculum embracing non-religious subjects, desks, and 
graded classes. While continuing to teach religion, they introduced such secular 
subjects as history, geography, languages, and mathematics. But these borrowings 
were generally adapted to the needs of West Sumatran society. Since this time, 
Islamic education has tried to find a suitable synthesis between the Islamic traditional 
school and the newly emerging Islamic modern school. 
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 All these reformers brought an educational enlightenment to the educational field and 
provided a strong inspiration for the next waves of the educational reform movement. 
A strong consciousness emerged to modernize an Islamic education in order to meet 
modern demands (Kahin, 1999).  
 
From this perspective, we can see that the reformers from West Sumatra or 
Minangkabau played a significant part in encouraging the Indonesian education 
reform, particularly the Islamic education movement. Most of the next Islamic reform 
movements and Islamic modern schools were inspired by this reform movement. An 
example is the Pesantren Modern Gontor Ponorogo in East Java, one of the most 
famous Modern Islamic schools in Indonesia, founded by Kiyai Zarkasyi, a former 
student of Abdullah Ahmad, an Islamic reformer from West Sumatera (Steenbrink, 
1986). Therefore, the reformation process in Minangkabau had a significant influence 
in spreading ideas of Islamic educational reform to other regions throughout 
Indonesia (Azra, 1999).   
 
2.4 The Dutch Colonial Contribution 
 
The introduction of the schooling system 
Since the early seventeenth century, the Dutch colonial government, through 
Christian mission, had tried to introduce a schooling system. The first schooling 
system was founded in 1607 in Ambon, Maluku island, East Indonesia and Batavia 
(Jakarta) in 1617. This spread to other cities in which European settlement had 
already been established, such as Banten, Cirebon and Semarang (Maksum, 1999). In 
1888, the Dutch government created the ‘Sekolah Desa’ (Village school) as a formal 
initiative after it failed to assimilate and integrate Islamic education into the 
mainstream of government educational system. Since that time, Islamic education has 
been separated from the government system (Steenbrink, 1986). The establishment of 
‘Sekolah Desa’ became the first Dutch colonial government effort in providing an 
 43
education for the Indonesian people, although the early purpose was to provide the 
government with employees. A significant policy change, known as the ‘Ethical 
Policy’ occurred in the early twentieth century. After founding the Holland Inlandche 
School/HIS (Primary level), the Dutch government then established Meer Unigebried 
Lager Onderwijs/MULO (Junior Secondary level) in 1914. This was followed by the 
Algemeene Middlebare Scholen/AMS (Senior Secondary level) in 1919 in Jogyakarta 
(Maksum, 1999).  
 
The ‘Sekolah Desa’ constituted a basic education with 3 years study. Teaching was 
given in the Indonesian language (Malay language). The main aim was to give basic 
knowledge and skills to Indonesian people who lived in rural areas. Meanwhile, the 
Hollandche-Inlandche School’ (HIS) was a government school for families from 
middle class background. Schooling was for seven years. Teaching was given in the 
Dutch language. Student graduating from this school could shift to the Algemeene 
Middelbare Scholen (AMS) or to the High school in Europe (Holland). Some 
Indonesian people, particularly those from aristocratic groups, had the privileged 
opportunity to enter this school. This system later became a basic source for 
establishing the educational schooling system after Indonesian independence 
(Steenbrink, 1986). 
 
Ethical Policy 
The ‘Ethical Policy’ changed the Dutch colonial policy on education from a 
conservative approach to a liberal approach14. This change was strongly influenced 
by the emergence of the Aufklarung age, or enlightenment age, in Western countries 
in the early eighteenth century, which also affected the Dutch Hindia (Indonesia)15. 
This movement pushed the colonial government to provide a wider range of access 
                                                 
14 From the early 20th century onwards, the objective of Dutch colonial policy shifted from an 
exploitation approach to a welfare approach. The Dutch colonial government set up three prominent 
programs, namely: education, emigration/transmigration, and irrigation (Ricklefs, 2005, p. 227-228).  
15 In 1884, The Dutch colonial government, --- based on the green-light of the Queen, Wilhelmina, 
provided an educational funding (around f.2.500/years) for establishing “Sekolah Desa” (indigenous 
schools)  in Java and throughout Indonesia (Gunawan, 1986).    
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and opportunity for indigenous people to gain an education. The establishment of 
government schools, particularly ‘Sekolah Desa’, in many places throughout 
Indonesia provided several educational alternatives rather than focusing on the 
traditional education institution, such as Pesantren. The emergence of the government 
school with modern methods had a significant effect on traditional Islamic education, 
such as Pesantren, Masdjid or Langgar education (Maksum, 1999; see Chapter 3 for 
further discussion of these traditional Islamic educational models). 
 
However, the Dutch colonial education did contribute significantly to the 
development of the later Indonesian education system. The Dutch policy in 
establishing the schooling system (secular system) as the mainstream of government 
educational system on the one hand, and isolating Islamic education as an 
autonomous system on the other hand, had created a dichotomous system for 
Indonesian education. This was evident when the new Indonesian government 
continued to maintain this policy through adopting the secular system as the 
mainstream of national educational system and allowed the Islamic education system 
to operate Pesantren and Madrasah as autonomous private institutions (see chapter 4 
for further discussion). This policy had the significant impact of leaving the Islamic 
educations lagging behind the secular system (Zakaria, 2002). This policy also caused 
Islamic education to be closed off from the general educational system (Steenbrink, 
1986). 
 
From the above discussion about the social, historical and political background of 
Indonesian Islamic education, we can argue that there is a unique role for Islam in 
Indonesia. Islam is not only a religion with its belief system but it also is a distinct 
social system. As such, Soebardi and Woodcroft-Lee asserted that “any attempt to 
understand the nature of modern Indonesian society and the cultural heritage of the 
peoples of Indonesia must take into consideration the role of Islam in this society, 
both as a religious and as a socio political force” (Cited in Mudzhar, et.al, 2004, 
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p.25).  In short, the social, historical and political dimensions of Islamic education 
have thus become an integral part of the development of Indonesian state and society.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ISLAM AND MODERNITY 
 
 
This chapter deals with the issue of Islam and modernity. Interrogation of the 
relationship between Islam and modernity forms the theoretical framework 
underpinning the development of the study. Three main issues will be examined. The 
first is the academic debate on modernity and Islam, focusing on the major theories 
associated with: Weber, Marx, Liberalism and Neo Liberalism. The second issue is 
the contemporary pressures facing Islam in light of modernity. The third issue is the 
Moslem responses to modernity. This section will describe how Islam as an 
ideological system plays its role and responds to a modern world. This section will 
explore the range of responses to modernity, from a conservative to a radical 
response. Finally, attention will be turned to the debate on these contemporary issues 
in relation to Islamic education. This section will focus on how Islamic education has 
faced these trends and responded to secularization and democracy as a direct impact 
of modernity.  
 
3.1 Academic debates on Islam and modernity  
 
Before continuing this discussion of the relationship between modernity and Islam, it 
would be helpful to define briefly the concept of modernity. According to Hopwood, 
modernity (modernism) is a general term for the political and cultural processes set in 
notion by integrating new ideas, an economic system and education system into 
society; or in other words, it is a way of thought, of living in the contemporary world 
and of accepting change. It introduces us into society and the artifacts of 
contemporary life, such as railways, communications, industry, technology, and 
equipment (Hopwood, 2000). In a similar sense, Kumar (1997) has pointed out that 
modernity refers to the economic, technological, political and in many respects 
intellectual creations of Western societies in the period since the eighteenth century. 
Meanwhile, Giroux (1997), in defining modernity, argues that the concept of 
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modernity points to the progressive differentiation and rationalization of the social 
world through the process of economic growth and administrative rationalization. In 
this context, modernization may be thought to be the process by which modernity was 
brought into being, and hence made imitable by others or non-Western societies. 
However, modernity has two sides, as Boyne and Rattansi (1990) describe: as a 
maelstrom that promises adventure, joy and growth, transformation of ourselves and 
the world, but one that also threatens to destroy cherished traditions and securities. 
By great discoveries in the physical science; changing our images of the universe and 
our place; the industrialization of production, all of which transforms scientific 
knowledge into technology, creates new human environments and destroys old ones. 
 
From this definition, we can understand that modernity is the changing process which 
results from the development of technology and science (Huntington, 2005). It begins 
when a society assumes an attitude of inquiry into how people make choices, be they 
moral, personal, economic or political. One of the main beliefs of modernism is the 
capacity of humans to control and change social and natural phenomena. 
 
Islam is a universal ideology. As a universal ideology it is based upon the 
fundamental tenet that Islam is ‘ad deen’ (religion), that is, a complete way of life – 
both for the individual and for the society. At a high level of generalization, there is 
certainly a ‘map of social reality’ to which all Muslims would subscribe. Politically, 
there is the ideal of the worldwide ‘ummah’ (community). Economically, there is the 
dedication to the establishment of an economic system founded upon social justice 
and redistribution of wealth – idealized in the system of zakat (Muslim tithing 
system) and wakaf (donation for religious purposes). Legally, there is at least some 
acceptance of the syariah (Muslim legal code) as a template of social life (Siddique, 
1985). Educationally, there are the aims to train young Muslims to have strong 
mental discipline and to acquire knowledge; not merely to develop intellectual 
curiosity but also to develop as rational, righteous beings who can contribute to the 
spiritual, moral and physical welfare of family, community and mankind (Husain and 
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Ashraf, 1979). In this context, the Quran and the Sunnah are the immutable sources 
of the fundamental tenets of Islam, of its principles, ethic and culture. Both the Quran 
and the Sunnah are the fundamental sources for developing Islamic education and 
Muslim society. They provide a positive sense to the human mind, some scientific 
principles, an account of human nature, and principles for social organization (Azra, 
1999).  
 
During the classic era (from 8th – 12th century), particularly in the era of Abbasid 
dynasty, the Islamic world had attained a high level of scientific, wealth and a refined 
civilization. During this era, the Islamic world became a prominent center of cultural 
and economic development and innovation (Turner, 1974). Many Islamic scholars 
and scientists emerged during this time, including Imam Malik, Imam Abu Hanifah, 
Imam Syafii, and Imam Ibn Hanbali in the fields of law and theology; Al-Kindi, Al-
Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Maskaweh, and Ibn Rusd in the fields of theology and 
philosophy; Zunnun Al-Misri, Abu Yazid al-Bustami, al-Hallaj, and Imam al-Ghazali 
in the field of Sufism (mysticism); Ibn Haysam, Ibn Hayyan, Al-Khawarizmi, Al-
Ma’udi and Al-Razi in the field of sciences1. Their work made a significant 
contribution to the development of world knowledge and civilization at that time. 
Also, their work has been recognized as having significant impact on the 
development of world knowledge in the 12 to 14th centuries. In this context, the 
contribution of one prominent group stands out: Mu’tazilah2 who imposed a rational 
doctrine on Islam. Hence, this era represents a key time of Islamic historical tradition 
and intellectual and societal development. Many of the later Islamic reformers refer to 
this era when looking for the basic foundation of their views. They believe that this 
                                                 
1 Nasution, H. (1975) Pembaharuan dalam Islam, Sejarah Pemikiran dan Gerakan ( Reform in Islam, 
Historical Thought and Movement), Bulan Bintang, Jakarta. 
2 One of the prominent rationalist religious sects in Islam, which emerged in the eighth century 
sponsored by Wasil ibn Atta. As rationalist groups, they were in opposition to the traditionalist or 
orthodox group, such as As’ariyah or Murjiah (Rahman, 1987). Western historians have characterized 
the Mu’tazila as rationalist and as heteredox theologians. Some Muslims historians and theologians 
have judged the Mu’tazili mutakalimun more harshly. Their view that the Qur’an was created (khalq 
al-Quran) and that humans have free will and power to act on it (qadar) became the two most 
controversial Mu’tazili doctrines (Martin, et al., 1997,p.10) 
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classic era made a significant contribution to the development of knowledge in the 
next century and beyond. However, this progress was resisted strongly by Al- 
Ghazali3 (1059-1111), a prominent leader who introduced a Sufism (mysticism) 
approach with a greater focus on the religious spiritual life. Since this time rationality 
in the Islamic world has decreased slowly (Azra, 1999). 
 
 From the fifteenth or sixteenth century the center of the world economy and 
civilization moved towards Europe. Progress and innovation since the seventeenth 
century led to the modernization of European peoples. It began with industrialization 
and commercialization through economic processes whereby society had to accept 
new methods of production and distribution and abandon traditional modes of 
economic relations. Accumulation of capital became the overriding principle and 
people now began to make individual economic choices and decisions. People 
became more mobile and capable of conceiving and absorbing change. One of the 
main beliefs of modernism, in both Marxist and liberal formulations, has been its 
confidence in the capacity of people to control and change social and natural 
phenomena. Since the nineteenth century there was widespread belief (in the West) in 
the inevitability of progress and the power of reason (Hopwood, 2000). Meanwhile, 
since the seventeenth century, the Muslim countries fell under European occupation 
and colonialization which left the Islamic world in a weakened condition. The 
consolidation of the four rival legal schools in Sunni Islam, the abandoning of the 
principle of ‘ijtihad’ (innovation) and the death of philosophical enquiry 
synchronized with the emergence of the Asy’ari and Al-Ghazali’s reconciliation of 
theology and Sufism. These elements, in combination, led to a final defeat of free 
speculative thought, based on principles of rationality, in Muslim community life 
(Hanif, 1997). 
 
                                                 
3 One of the prominent Islamic scholars from the orthodox strand, who emerged in the eleventh 
century and had a strong influence in developing a religious orthodoxy in Islam communities. 
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There were many academic responses to the debate surrounding the relationship 
between Islam and modernity. Western scholars often viewed modernism as a threat 
to Islam, although this appeared to be based on a lack of understanding of Islam and 
its earlier intellectual pluralism. As Arkoun (1994) has argued ‘can one speak of [a] 
scientific understanding of Islam in the West or must one rather talk about the 
West[ern] way of imaging Islam? We can, in fact, wonder whether the Western 
understanding of Islam is valid and objective’ (p.6). In this view, Islam was also 
constructed as a theological, political and intellectual problem for the West. 
Theologically, the reintroduction of the monotheistic concept after the crucifixion and 
resurrection of God’s own son (Jesus Christ) required Christian Europe to denounce 
Islam, its prophet and its followers. Politically, when Islam arrived at Europe’s 
borders, Europe launched a series of crusades against Islam. Later, attacks were made 
intellectually when the scholarly achievements of Muslim civilization created a series 
of disciplines to contain Muslim thought and history (Sardar and Malik, 2001).  
 
In order to capture the relationship between Modernity and Islam, the next section 
will give an account of the major theories of Marxism, Weberian and Neo-Liberalism 
in terms of Islam.  
 
There are several reasons why the discussion needs to consider the ideology of 
Marxism, Weberian sociology, Liberalism and Neo Liberalism. In general, these 
ideologies played a significant role in constructing the modern society since 18th 
centuries to the present day. Specifically, Karl Marx encapsulates the repudiation of 
capitalism, the repudiation of classes; the repudiation of exploitation, the state, the 
ethics of self seeking – above all; the repudiation of human captivity - that, in his 
view, deforms man’s essential nature in the system of production and social order. He 
constructed his humanism from elements derived directly or indirectly from religion, 
mysticism, moral philosophy, and particularly from seventeenth-century humanism 
and early nineteenth century German moral socialism (Shariati, 1981).  
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Weberian sociology has been successful in explaining the relationship between 
religion and capitalism. For Weber, the ethic values of Christian protestantism, 
particularly Calvinism, created modern capitalism in the West. He argues that there is 
a strong connection between a certain kind of religious spirit and a certain kind of 
economic behavior .Islam however, did not develop a similar form of capitalism, 
because almost all of Islamic institutions are dominated by a long patrimonial 
bureaucratic system or “Feudal ethics” which is determined by the “Sultan” as 
dominating class (Abdullah, 1987).  
 
Liberalism is commonly understood as a political doctrine concerned with the 
maximization of individual liberty, particularly with the defense of that liberty against 
state interference. The liberal mode of government fosters the form of life appropriate 
to a community of such autonomous individuals. Hunt (1996) claimed that ‘liberalism 
constructs itself in the form of limits on the domain of politics and the recognition of 
a civil society outside the state’ (p. 167). Meanwhile Neo-Liberalism is a term used to 
identify a particular discourse of governance, political philosophy, and political 
prescription centered on the objective of the self-limiting state. This perspective 
places more emphasis on free enterprise and unfettered markets and desires to reduce 
state power in the economic, social and politic spheres on behalf of rational choice 
(Fitzsimons (2000). This last perspective has influenced strongly the nature of many 
governments in the world, particularly those which adopted the free market system. 
 
Marxism and Islam 
In order to capture the relationship between Marxism and Islam, we need first to 
discuss Marx’s theory of religion. His theory was transformed by his confrontation 
with Hegel and Feuerbach. For Hegel, religion, like philosophy, had an historical 
dimension. He tried to show that history was the development of human self-
consciousness; in becoming aware of the nature of historical modes of thought, 
humans are able to criticize their own conceptions and thereby transcend their 
limitations. In this context, the relationship between freedom and reason is central to 
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Hegel’s view of history. Meanwhile, for Feuerbach both Hegelianism and religion 
were merely aspects of humans’ alienation from themselves. To transcend both, 
humans have to achieve an awareness that all the qualities we attribute to God are in 
fact human. In his confrontation with Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx came to formulate 
a general theory of religion, with a limited criticism of institutional Christianity. For 
Marx, as described by Turner (1974), ‘religion is as a reflection of a corrupt world in 
which men are estranged. It is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a 
heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless situation. It is the opium the people’ 
(p.179). 
  
With respect to Islam, therefore, the very notion of Marxism is a very sensitive issue. 
Some Muslim leaders, particularly from traditional groups (conservative strand) 
refuse to recognize this ideology, because it has a potential danger to affect Islamic 
culture and even the religious life of the Muslim world. The danger of Marxism for 
Islam was the appearance of a form of Marxism with an Islamic veneer, creating a 
most tempting trap for certain simple souls. This insidious use of religion, often with 
direct political aims in mind, is in fact more dangerous than the obviously anti-
religious position and corresponds to the thoughts and attitudes of that class of people 
whom the Qurán calls the munafiqun (hypocrites)4. Therefore, to preserve Islam and 
Islamic civilization, a conscious and intellectual defense must be made through 
intellectual criticism of the modern world. Muslims cannot hope to follow the same 
path as the West and the truth must be asserted along with an intellectual defense of 
Islam wherever it is challenged (Nasr, 2002). Islam, very simply, is a philosophy of 
human liberation. Its first summons, “say ‘There is no god but God and prosper”, 
propounds tauhid as the necessary means to that end. (Shari’ati, 1981)  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The Quran in many places criticizes hypocritical behaviour, because it brings a negative sense of 
human relationship.  
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Weber and Islam 
In order to understand Weber’s` interpretation of Islam in relation to the rise of the 
modern world, we need first to know what Weber’s argument was about the 
relationship between religious belief and the emergence and persistence of capitalist 
institutions. For Weber, beliefs are independent and influential. He saw that a 
‘capitalist spirit’ has arisen from some religious impulse. In this context, the 
Protestant Ethic is a strong thesis in the argument that Calvinist beliefs caused 
modern capitalism, but Weber’s treatment and interpretation of Islam is, in fact, very 
weakly connected with the specific thesis about Calvinism. In practice, Weber’s 
discussion of Islam is in terms of patrimonial domination. For Weber, Islamic social 
structure contained elements of patrimonialism and feudalism, such as the absence of 
a cohesive landowning aristocracy, an independent legal system and autonomous 
cities which provided Weber with a term for absolute power where patrimonial 
authority lays primary stress on the sphere of arbitrary will, free of traditional 
limitations, called ‘Sultanism’ (Princesim) (Turner, 1974). 
  
Although Weber’s analysis of Islam was never completed, Islam is intrinsically 
important to Weber’s total endeavor. Weber’s study on Islam can be divided into two 
dimensions: a commentary on the ethic of Islam and an analysis of the patrimonial 
structure of Islam. In accounting for the content of the Islamic ethic, Weber 
underlined two key aspects. First, as a monotheistic religion, Islam did not develop 
into an ascetic religion because its main social carrier was a warrior group. The 
content of the religious message was transformed into a set of values compatible with 
the mundane needs of a warrior stratum. The salvation element of Islam was 
transformed into a secular quest for land; the result was that Islam became a religion 
of accommodation rather than a religion of transformation. The pristine message of 
Meccan monotheism was adulterated by Sufism, which catered for the emotional and 
orgiastic needs of the masses. The consequence was, while the warrior stratum pulled 
Islam in the direction of a militaristic ethic, the Sufi tradition drew Islam towards a 
religion of mystical flight. The point is that Islam did not contain an ethic which was 
 54
congruent with the rise of rational capitalism. As a religion of harmony, Islam 
produced an ethic which was incompatible with the spirit of capitalism. According to 
Turner (1986), this thesis is not true, because Islam, in fact, emerged and developed 
from a trading city. Mecca, since its beginning, has been a commercial city, 
dominated by merchant groups. The Quraisy tribe, the prophet of Muhammad’s tribe, 
had achieved their political position based on their domination in the trade sector. 
Also, the Quran is replete with trade terminologies. In Islam, we can find a discussion 
about a devout city and a devout nomad influenced by economic interests. However, 
Islam has been successful in integrating a trader people and nomadic people in one 
community, called “Moslem”.  
 
The second dimension of Weber’s account of Islam centers on the political and 
economic structure of later Islamic dynasties in which this structure fell under 
patrimonial bureaucracies. For Weber, the financial and political structure of dynastic 
Islam depended on the successful conquest of new lands, which were then exploited 
to maintain the central bureaucracy. This political structure hinged on a complex 
balance of social forces represented by the Sultan, the military, the ulama (Scholars) 
and the masses (Turner, 1974). Furthermore, Weber argued that the Sultan, as a 
representative of God, should maintain the power balance between all those 
stakeholders, because the failure to achieve the power balance (justice) will lead to 
the society being weakened (Abdullah, 1987). 
 
Many have criticized these accounts. Turner (1974) argued that Weber failed to make 
allowance for the persistent conflict between the pious and their rulers; the 
resentment between the legal scholars and law officials. He failed to recognize the 
social solidarities of Islamic cities, which focused on the law schools. Furthermore, 
Weber did not provide an accurate periodization of Islamic history. Also, his outline 
of the Islamic warrior ethic was tangential to his main concern with the patrimonial 
character of mediaeval Islam, and in his discussion of oriental patrimonialism, he 
duplicated an analysis of oriental society, which had already been examined by Marx 
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and Engels. But these criticisms did not diminish the main outline of Weber’s 
argument that Islam did not develop along capitalist lines because of its patrimonial 
system of domination. This system of social arrangement collapsed because it could 
not solve its own political contradiction and it was incapable of dealing with 
European capitalism and colonialism (Turner, 1974). 
  
Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Islam 
Liberalism is a relatively modern phenomenon that has had great influence in the 
Western world, particularly in England, the United States and Western Europe. 
Liberalism is one of the most important Western ideologies which underpins the 
modern West. The basic credo of classical liberalism was freedom and the right of the 
individual. As Kerlinger (1984) points out, the individual became the focus of 
attention and values; society and the government were seen as subordinate to the 
individual’s right, aspiration, and efforts. Popkewitz and Brennan (1997) described 
that, as a social theory, ‘liberalism’ refers to a legacy of nineteenth century social 
thought which underlies contemporary social and educational theory. In liberal 
thought, progress in scientific knowledge is made through managing social change 
and placing greater emphasis on individuals and the phenomenology of the subject. 
One of the central figures of liberal discourse, the ‘individual’, has a distinctly 
ambiguous ontological status.  
 
The next paragraph examines the implication of this ambiguity for the understanding 
first of liberalism as a doctrine and secondly of its relationship to other contemporary 
doctrines, including democracy, socialism and neo-liberalism. As a doctrine of 
government, liberalism is concerned with a community of autonomous persons where 
some regard the government primarily as implementing the will of the community 
and the other see government essentially as collective self-control. In this context, 
representative government and the rule of law might be described as containing the 
influence of the people within strict limits. This view of natural autonomy as political 
ideal corresponds to an understanding of government as able to operate legitimately 
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only on the basis of the agreement of those autonomous persons who are subject to its 
power. In terms of democracy, representative government could be thought to allow 
government by the people to be extended to large, geographically dispersed and 
relatively differentiated populations. Meanwhile, in terms of socialism, social 
democracy has attempted to manage economic activity while retaining both the 
commitment to representative democracy and the constitutional restraints of liberal 
democracy. It is interesting to note that liberalism and social democracy have been 
able to present themselves as competing rationalities of government. In this respect, 
the account of liberalism as acknowledging the natural autonomy of the individual 
and insisting upon a limited role for government gives rise to a misleadingly sharp set 
of demarcations between liberalism on the one hand and democracy and social 
democracy on the other. Therefore, the differences between liberalism on the one 
hand and democracy and socialism on the other appear to take a particularly clear 
form. Liberalism acknowledges the natural liberty of the person and aims to defend it 
against external obstacles, whereas democracy and socialism threaten this liberty in 
the name of what they describe as collective interest and priorities (Avnon and Shalit, 
1999).  
Despite its methodological flaws, neo-liberalism is the theoretical underpinning of the 
most recent wave of globalization. It is a term used to identify a particular discourse 
of governance, political philosophy, and political prescription centering around the 
objectives of the self-limiting state. Therefore, as Fitzsimons (2000) argues, neo-
liberalism is a substantive discourse of government that is potent precisely because of 
its capacity to combine economics, the social, and politics on behalf of rational choice 
as a legitimating principle. There are two competing models for thinking about the 
world that have become influential over recent years, the neo-classical economic 
theory and the world system theory. Neo-classical theory5, from which neo-liberalism 
                                                 
5Nesta Devine argues that Neo-classical economics derive from the ideas of the classical economists, 
as interpreted by a tradition of politically conservative economists, and dating back to Carl Menger, 
who derived it from a particular reading of Adam Smith. The view so derived is that if the government 
takes any part in the economy, it will distort the semi-mystical process of the invisible hand and 
produce inefficiencies, and thus impair the economy (1999, p. 172).  
 57
derives, has tended to become the dominant ideology of global capitalism because of 
its emphasis on a free enterprise and an unfettered market. Meanwhile, the world 
system theory argues that national development is an irrelevant concept in a 
globalised economy.  
 
With respect to Islam, the notions of liberalism and neo-liberalism are highly 
debatable. The classical Islamic orthodox groups, whose obedience is to God’s rules, 
do not have an interest in the implications of liberalism and neo-liberalism for their 
lives, because they are more focused on their spiritual life than on the social life. 
Their life is influenced by orthodox doctrines. One extreme doctrine, related to a 
political issue is the full obedience to the ‘Caliph’ or the Islamic political leaders, 
even if they are unfair. Many Muslim orthodox groups still maintain the doctrine of 
full obedience to the Caliph or Sultan. This orthodox doctrine established fourteen 
centuries ago is still kept to the present day, even though the original conditions have 
changed.  
 
In the name of Islam these classical groups challenge other political and cultural 
systems including democracy, capitalism, liberalism or neo-liberalism, imported from 
the West. According to these groups, the whole of life stands ordered solely on 
Islamic principles, since there is no other valid path except submission to Allah 
(God). All democracies, including the Western representative kinds, are evil. 
Democracy means the rule of the demos, the people or mob. Islam requires the rule of 
the umma, the community of the faithful, through a government whose duty is to 
implement the shari’a (Islamic law) (Aldridge, 2000). For these classical groups, the 
inhabited world is theologically and juridically divided between the home of Islam 
(dar al-islam) where the Divine law applies; and the land of war (dar al-harb) where 
the ‘infidel’ always threatens to substitute secular law for the true law set down in the 
time of the prophet (Arkoun, 1994). But moderate traditional groups, for instance: 
Sayyed Hossein Nasr, believed that traditional Islam is rich enough to generate an 
alternative culture through which Muslims can confront the intellectual and material 
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supremacy of the West. Nasr believed that Allah (God) who has infinite mercy will 
eventually revitalize a tradition in order to save humanity from the spiritual and 
intellectual impoverishment caused by modernity (Aslan, 1998). 
 
Modernist groups who have more tolerance with Western trends are attempting to 
harmonize Islam and Western civilization. Some contemporary ‘isms’ such as 
democracy, Marxism, socialism, capitalism, liberalism or neo-liberalism became a 
significant challenge for modernizing Islamic society. Liberal modernists, such as 
Rifa’a al-Tahtawi and Mustafa Kemal (Kemal Attarturk) believed they could lead 
Muslim societies along the same path through imitating the Western cultural model. 
For example, by launching the Western concept of secularization, Kemal Atarturk 
wanted to recreate Turkey as a modern state. He believed that it was enough to take 
the ‘prescription’ for the success of Western civilization and apply it to Muslim 
countries (Huntington, 2005). For conservative groups, this view represents the 
typical naïve state of consciousness found among Muslim intellectuals between 
1880–1940. On this view, there can be no deep harmony and accord between the 
Islamic world and the secularist West because there are no common transcendent 
principles between them. There can only be peace based upon mutual respect on the 
human level. It is necessary to assert that the question of Islam and the West 
(including Western-ism) must be cast in a new mold. Both sides must understand that 
there cannot be an integration of two diametrically opposed worldviews: Islam and 
modernity, but at best mutual tolerance on the human level (Nasr, 2002).  
 
From the discussion above we have seen that since the early nineteenth century, Islam 
was faced with the issue of its relation to modernity. It could be argued, in principle, 
that no one Islamic doctrine is opposed to modernity, because Islam is a religion with 
a comprehensive way of life. Therefore, modernity becomes a “challenger” for 
shaping and embedding Islamic values and norms in the life of Moslem society. With 
respect to modernity as a human civilization, Islam can only gain valuable experience 
in facing ‘modern’ life problems, because Islam will have the opportunity to 
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introduce its own world view. In fact, Islam cannot escape from the impact of 
modernity. Even, Islam in many aspects has gained valuable benefits from modern 
life and ‘modernity’. 
  
3.2 Contemporary Pressure on Islam 
Most Muslims believe that the initial impact of modernity on the Islamic world began 
with the transoceanic expansion of Europe in the fifteenth century. In 1498 Vasco da 
Gama opened the route to India by the Cape of Good Hope, because he could not use 
the conventional route (through the Red Sea), which was occupied by the Ottoman 
Empire. From that time, various European nations reached India and the Far East and 
engaged in trade with local rulers in East Africa, the Indian continent, and the East 
Indies. In the seventeenth century, trade led on to political involvement and finally 
full colonialism (Watt, 1988). 
 
 Colonial Pressure 
This political advance, as the outcome of a new superiority in military technology, led 
to the process of colonization of Muslim countries by Western countries. First, there 
were treaties with local rulers, then European troops were sent to protect the trading 
stations. Their role then extended to political and social affairs and govern-ship of the 
countries under colonial rule; and finally, in some areas, full-blown colonialism. On 
taking control, the colonial powers not only had the function of providing raw 
material for Europe but there was a pressure on Muslim society to adopt the practices 
of particular colonial powers. One of the significant acts of all the colonial rulers was 
to ban all Muslim institutional power, ranging from political to intellectual and 
educational activities in Muslim society. For example, when the Dutch colonialists 
took over Indonesia in the early seventeenth century, they did not only destroy the 
Islamic kingdom as the Islamic political power, but they also banned the Islamic 
educational system and replaced it with a secular system as the mainstream system. 
Meanwhile, Islamic education had been pushed to the margins of society and had 
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been ignored as the poor educational institution for native Indonesia Muslim society 
(Sardar and Malik, 2001).  
 
This colonial policy on education created a new variant of Muslim leaders who 
experienced a Western type of education. As a Western-educated class, they wanted 
to modernize their countries and achieved this by adopting many aspect of Western 
culture. Many wanted Western education for their children and supported the 
development of the new system of education by introducing Western methods of 
teaching and Western curriculum. From that time emerged several leaders and 
educational reformists, including Sultan Mahmud II and Kemal Ataturk in Turkey; as 
well as Mohammad Ali Pasha, al-Tahtawi and Mohammad Abduh who wanted to 
reform the University of Al-Azhar. In India, Sayyid Ahmad Khan founded the 
Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College. In Indonesia, reformists included Syech 
Ahmad Chotib who founded the Normal School in Padang West Sumatera; Dr. 
Wahidin Sudiro Husodo who founded STOVIA,- a medical school in Jakarta; and in 
the moderate form, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan who founded the Muhammadiyah Schooling 
system. Meanwhile, some ulamas (religious scholars) still maintained the traditional 
Islamic form of education which did not meet the contemporary demands, because its 
teaching method still focused more on the memorization of subject matters without 
deep analysis (Azra, 1999). These two types of institutions were based on completely 
different philosophies of education. As a result in most Islamic countries, two types 
of educated classes appeared who had the same ethnic background, religion, and 
language, but who were not able to understand each other because they interpreted 
the world through different prisms (Nasr, 2002). 
 
Neo-Colonial Pressure  
During the post colonial period (1920 – 1960), most Muslims saw the pervasive 
Western cultural domination of the world as a serious threat to their religion and 
identity; because they viewed the West as trying to homogenize the world with a 
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secular Western flavour6. The introduction of economic capitalism, communism, and 
Western liberalism had been successful in moderating even secularizing some 
Muslim countries. The case of Turkey and Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) is an extreme 
example. He transformed Turkey from Ottoman conservatism to modernity by 
adopting and imitating European methods, social institutions, and political models. 
He went even further by abolishing the sultanate system - the sacred rank of the 
caliphate7. He attacked the semiological universe of Muslims by replacing the Arabic 
alphabet with the Latin alphabet, the turban and the fez with the hat; and the most 
surprising move, replaced the shari’a (Islamic law) with the Swiss legal code 
(Arkoun, 1994). Many similar cases, but in a more moderate form, occurred during 
the period of colonialism and continued after these countries gained independence. 
Many of them adopted the Western political model for their schooling system. These 
influences brought the Muslim countries to modernity, but they also created a latent 
tension between the modern and the traditional groups within the Muslim society 
(Watt, 1988)8.  
 
Since the early twentieth century many Muslim countries gained their independence. 
Some gained independence by launching wars and revolts, such as the Sudanese 
revolt against the British colonialists or the Indonesian revolt against Dutch 
colonialists from 1945-1949. Some others gained independence after long 
negotiations and several concessions from the colonial rulers. Although most Muslim 
countries gained independence after World War II, they were not fully freed from 
Western influence. Their poor economic condition and lack of education and 
technology meant they were heavily dependent upon leading Western countries, 
particularly the USA, United Kingdom, French and Germany. For example, most of 
                                                 
6 Salmi, R.H., et.al (1998) Islam and conflict resolution, Lanham – New York – Oxford, University 
Press of America.  
7 Caliphate is a traditional form of Islamic political rule.  
8 W. Montgomery Watt (1988) argued that among these groups many different political and social 
attitudes are to be found. However, the ulama (religious scholars) are the primary bearers and 
transmitters of the traditional world-view and are thus mostly reactionary, in the sense that they tend to 
oppose reforms (p.2-3). 
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the rich Muslim oil countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and 
Kuwait, asked for Western technology in order to exploit their oil resources. 
Meanwhile, the Western countries who lacked natural resources tried to maintain 
their domination by using their advanced technology, and political and economic 
power in order to secure their domestic demands. As Salmi et al. (1998) argued, the 
colonialism which was imposed by force in the eighteenth century was characterized 
by the exploitation of raw materials in the Muslim lands, later reinforced by 
economic exploitation. Today, the Western domination continues in the form of 
political, economic and cultural domination (neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism). In 
the political arena, the Western countries represented by the super powers of the USA 
and European Union dominate the world’s political discourses and decisions. Few of 
the world’s political directions and conflicts can be solved without their involvement 
even though the United Nations is the International body representative. For example, 
the Balkan and Middle East conflicts, such as the Bosnian war, the Arab – Israel 
conflict, the Iraq – Iran war, the Afghanistan war, or the Iraq annexation of Kuwait 
ended only after their involvement.  
 
In the view of some Muslim leaders of the conservative groups, by setting up the 
International agencies for economic development, such as: World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Western countries 
have played ‘games’ in order to maintain the domination of West upon East or the 
developed countries upon the developing countries, of which large numbers are 
Muslim countries. These agencies, with full political support from the super powers, 
have played an active role as ‘World Charity Organizations’ by offering packaged 
loans as funding aid for conducting economic development. At the beginning and for 
a short time, such financial programs seem to be useful and effective ways of 
achieving a new material standard of living; but in the long term, they become an 
‘economic trap’ that can destroy the Muslim countries’ economic foundation. This 
was evident when a financial crisis occurred in 1997 in Asian countries, including the 
Muslim countries Malaysia and Indonesia, causing the level of social welfare to 
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decrease dramatically. However, the leaders of the ‘modern’ Islamic group, 
particularly those who were educated in Western educational institutions, presented a 
different view. For them, the Islamic world could not be isolated from the influence 
of Western economics, because the waves of globalization have created a mutual 
dependence between north and south, West and East, poor and rich countries. Thus, 
the Muslim countries cannot escape from the influence of the economic globalization 
(Hoveyda, 1998).   
 
In the cultural field, Western culture, particularly, represented by the American life 
style, came to dominate not only the Muslim countries but also the entire world. With 
their advanced technological information and communication systems such as CNN, 
BBC, and many others; the Western countries have tried to create a strong view that 
the Western culture, particularly the American life style should be the leading world 
culture. The introduction of the Western life style including, individualism, feminism, 
materialism, homosexuality, and even atheism have brought a strong challenge for 
modern Muslim society. For some Muslims of conservative groups, these notions 
were seen as a ‘death poison’ which had the potential to destroy their true faith and 
social religious attitudes. As Azra (1999) argues, Western hegemony in the field of 
information technology has not only led to the emergence of cultural globalization 
but also to the penetration of Western values into the life of Muslim society. For 
example, the American soap opera ‘Dynasty’ is not only pure ‘entertainment’ but 
seems to legitimate permissive relationships between men and women, which is a 
‘taboo’ in Muslim society. On the most significant level, there is the ever-increasing 
bombardment of Islamic society, and especially its youth, with the products of 
Western culture, particularly American pop culture and the hedonistic aspects of 
Western life (Nasr, 2002). 
 
But for some Muslims of the modernist group, not all of Western cultural penetration 
had a negative impact on the Muslim society or way of life. The Western attitudes of 
working hard, efficiency, rationality, and democratic politics became highly valued 
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qualities in contributing to the modernization of Islamic countries. And also, in fact, 
Muslim countries cannot protect their society from this cultural infiltration, because 
they lack the ability and skills to create a balanced counter attack. They also cannot 
blame Western countries for creating cultural penetration, because as the holder of 
cultural hegemony they cannot prevent themselves from ‘selling’ their culture, since 
they cannot see outside it and therefore it permeates the cultural products which they 
sell to the rest of the world – like television programmes, movies etc. This cultural 
penetration has become a significant challenge for Muslim societies. As Nasr (2002) 
points out, modern technology continues to penetrate in an ever greater degree into 
the Islamic world, as elsewhere. This penetration has religious and spiritual 
implications on a vast scale. These have become of critical concern for many Muslim 
leaders and thinkers. The modernist group created a modern Islamic education by 
adopting modern methods whilst still maintaining the spirit of Islam, but the 
traditional groups have created a religious doctrine as a way of protecting their 
members from the negative impact of cultural penetration. 
  
The Terrorist label Pressure 
After the events of 11 September 2001, Islam and terrorism have become 
synonymous. The American war propaganda on terrorism was followed by military 
action on Afghanistan and Iraq, creating a new tension between Islam and the West. 
This propaganda, which was led by US President George Bush and supported by 
former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, has created new pressures on Islam and 
Muslim countries. It also created a new stigma on the Moslem people, particularly the 
Moslem people from Middle East countries and South East Asia, with the potential 
now to be described as “a Terrorist”. Now, Islam and the West seem to stand in 
opposition, both having negative perceptions and strong prejudice towards the other. 
Many violent acts that have occurred in parts of the world are blamed on ‘Muslim” 
terrorist actions. The Bali bombing, Manila Bombing, the Jakarta bombing, the 
Bangkok bombing among others are all understood as ‘Muslim’ terrorist actions. 
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People from Muslim countries, particularly from the Middle East are under suspicion 
when entering Western countries. This phenomenon seems to be leading to a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ between the West and Islam. Samuel P. Huntington predicted that the 
twenty-first century would be a clash of civilizations, as will be discussed more fully 
below.  
 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Walter Laqueur (1987) notes in his book, The 
Terrorist Reader, that the Sicarii, a highly organized terrorist group, was quite active 
in the first century A.D. struggles in Palestine. This form of terrorism inspired other 
violent movements, such as Al-Fattah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, the Front de Liberation du Quebec in Canada, the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) in the Northern Ireland and many elsewhere. Many of these 
movements can be viewed as promoting political terrorism with the aim of creating 
new states. From these violent movements grew up several new militant groups as an 
international phenomenon with international goals and audiences. Examples are the 
Red Brigades in Italy, the Baader-Meinhof Group in Germany, and the Weathermen 
in the USA which were popular during the 1970s and 1980s (Buckley and Olson, 
1980).  
 
Today’s terrorism can be characterized as political and cultural terrorism, as it 
involves mixed political and religious motivations. Two particular groups are Al-
Qaeda with its prominent leader, Usama bin Laden who is regarded as the prime 
suspect for attacking Western, particularly American interests since early 1990. The 
other is its descendent global network Jama’at- al-Islamiyah which is blamed, by 
President Bush and Tony Blair, as the prime suspect for the bomb attack on the 
World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 and other bombings. Although, those 
Western leaders say that the blame is not intended to label (discredit) Islam as a 
‘terrorist religion’, the implication is there and this has upset Muslim countries. As 
Sardar and Malik (2001) have pointed out, Islam cannot be blamed for the actions of 
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the terrorists. By painting all Muslims with the same brush, we undermine their 
humanity and defame over a billion people, their societies, and their histories. 
 
However, the terrorist label given to these Islamic radical groups has created a new 
pressure on the Islamic world. This pressure brings a political dilemma for Muslim 
leaders (and their countries). They have to tread a fine line between engaging with the 
American propaganda of the war on the terrorism, while avoiding American 
allegations that they support terrorists, and at the same time, ensure that they do not 
damage relationships with other Muslim countries. This pressure has created a new 
atmosphere between Islam and the West which is characterized by tension and 
prejudice. From the Western side, a terrorist action is understood as a threat to 
Western civilization. Meanwhile from the Islamic side, the Western allegation of 
terrorism is understood as a threat to Islam. Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard 
University predicted in 1993 that world politics was entering a new phase in which 
the major source of conflict would be neither ideological nor economic but cultural. 
According to Huntington, “the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines 
of the future. It will be ‘the West against the rest’ and especially against ‘resurgent’ 
Islamic fundamentalism. For him, the ‘cultural division’ between Christianity and 
Islam has reemerged. Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic 
civilization has been coming back” (cited in Hoveyda, 1998,p. 159).  
 
However, many intellectual scholars disagree with this notion of clash of civilization. 
Fereydoun Hoveyda (1998) argued that the world debate on the clash of civilizations 
is literally metaphorical. In referring to Islamic civilization, he argues that what we 
call Islamic civilization is something of the past although we can see and appreciate 
its products. But it has produced nothing ‘new’ since the eighteenth century. What we 
call Islamic civilization now is not ‘alive’. Therefore, it is unrealistic to compare 
Islamic civilization and Western civilization. The situation is not like the period of 
the cold war, when the West and the Communist worlds were threatening each 
other’s very existence, for the Islamic world cannot and does not threaten the West 
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militarily, politically, or even economically in any conceivable way. On the contrary, 
the West controls the most vital economic resources of Muslim nations, benefits from 
all conflicts in that world through the sale of vast quantities of arms, and practically 
dictates its wishes in many part of the Islamic world (Nasr, 2002). 
 
3.3 Muslim responses to modernity  
 
Muslims responded to the cultural and political supremacy of the modern West 
through generating three different movements. As Sayyid Husen Nasr has outlined, 
these are: Islamic modernism, Islamic traditionalism, and Islamic revivalism or 
‘fundamentalism’. First, Islamic modernism is a movement that wants to modify or 
reformulate Islam in a manner that would accommodate the norms of modernity. It 
aims to highlight and put more stress on those aspects of Islam which are in accord 
with the norms of modernity, while attempting to moderate those Islamic issues that 
are in direct conflict with modernity (Aslan, 1998). Second, Islamic traditionalism is 
a movement which is inward looking. This movement sees change (modernity) as the 
corruption of original cultural values. They lead the fight against the modern world. 
For them, it is essential to maintain integrity in the face of rapid change (modernity). 
The outside world may change, but traditional ‘man’s’ authentic, original, eternal 
soul (Islam) must be saved (Hopwood, 2000). Meanwhile, the third type, Islamic 
revivalism or fundamentalism9, is a religio-political movement which differs from 
traditionalism in its approach. This movement does not seek wisdom but ‘truth’. The 
fundamentalists ground their views in presuppositions about the poverty and 
shallowness of reason. Only through the divine can humans attain solid, exemplary 
moral worth. From within, fitra (inner power) is enlightened by divine revelation, it 
becomes a force for humankind’s happiness, while from without, the fundamentalist 
assumes the impossibility of knowledge through reason because human knowledge 
cannot comprehend, interact with or act according to ultimate truths (Mousalli, 1999). 
                                                 
9 Although it is in accord with Islamic traditionalism in its acceptance of the authority of the Quran and 
Sunnah, it is a religio-political movement which differs from traditionalism in its approach. 
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In order to give a more explicit account of Muslim intellectual responses to 
modernity, the next section will discuss in more detail these three movements. 
 
3.3.1 Modernist Movement (Moderate and liberal responses) 
The Islamic modernism movement began in Egypt in the mid nineteenth century. 
From Egypt, this movement spread to North Africa, Central Asia, continental India, 
and South East Asia, particularly Indonesia.  
 
In Egypt, this movement was heavily indebted to modernist Muslim thinkers, such as 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Ridla. Afghani represented 
a political dimension of the Islamic modernism movement. He proposed the notion of 
pan-Islamism by cutting across ethnic and tribal affiliation and combining with the 
efforts of the regional movements in order to create an international Islamic force. He 
criticized those who believed in aping the Western model without modification and 
accused them of posing a threat to the sovereignty of the úmmah’(Muslim society). 
For him, the causes of decline in the Muslim world were the absence of ádil (justice) 
and shura (council). One of his main demands was that the people be allowed to 
assume their political and social role by participating in government through shura 
and elections. His discourse attempted to stir up a sense of solidarity and an activist 
stance among all Muslims, to be based on renewed efforts at performing ijtihad10. For 
Afghani, Islam was foremost a belief in the transcendence of God and in reason. 
Therefore, ijtihad is necessity, and the duty of man was to apply the principles of the 
Quran to the problems of the time (Salvatore, 1997). In this context, he advocated a 
return to Islamic sources and the adoption of modern scientific values (Hoveyda, 
1998). 
 
In contrast, Mohammad Abduh and Rashid Ridla represented a cultural, social, and 
educational dimension of the Islamic modernism movement. Abduh and Ridla 
                                                 
10 Ijtihad is the technical term used to refer to the intellectual effort made on questions of jurisprudence 
(McDonough, S., 1984, p. 39). 
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believed that Islam’s relationship with the modern age was the most crucial issue 
confronting Islamic communities. In order to reconcile Islamic ideas with Western 
ones, Abduh suggested that maslaha (interest) in Islamic thought corresponded to 
manfaah (utility) in Western thought. He strongly believed that ijtihad should be 
revived because emerging priorities and problems need to be addressed (Esposito and 
Tamini, 2000). Islam should be the moral basis of a modern and progressive society 
and Muslims should live according to God’s commands and by reasoning (Hopwood, 
2000). Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammad Abduh and Rashid Ridla all played a 
significant role in shaping the Islamic modernism movement in many Muslim 
countries in the next decades. As Sardar and Malik (2001) point out, the movement 
that emerged from their efforts gave a modern identity to Islam, and provided Muslim 
societies with a clear purpose and direction. Since the turn of the nineteenth century, 
Egypt became the center of the Islamic modern movement. 
 
In India, the Islamic modernism movement was led by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-
1898). His ideas about social change did not come from an ivory tower of academic 
contemplation but rather from immediate contact with the real disorders and conflicts 
of his environment (McDonough, 1984). For him, the spread of Western education 
among Indian society, particularly for an Indian Muslim, through the introduction of 
modern science brought the greatest challenge. From his visit to England, he realized 
that the only way to improve the Muslim condition was to provide them with a 
modern education. Toward this end, he established the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental 
College in Aligarth, which, to this day, has been the center of Islamic modernism. 
Then, he adopted the education of the West to his institution. He believed that Islam 
was not opposed to the study of science and had nothing to fear from its impact. In 
this context, like Abduh in Egypt, Sayyid Ahmad Khan believed that Islamic teaching 
was compatible with modern science (Martin et al, 1997). From this perspective, 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan can be seen as a liberal, a modernist, or an acculturationist; even 
some observers have characterized him as a rationalist because he was concerned to 
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convince his fellow Muslims that they must use reason in new ways as a basis for the 
individual and collective aspects of Muslim lives (McDonough, 1984). 
 
Another prominent Indian Islamic modernist was Mohammad Iqbal. He argues that 
dogmatism had debased Islam, territorial and racial nationalism had split Muslims 
into aggressive groups and materialistic philosophy was taking everyone towards 
nihilism. He criticized Western materialism and individualism which, overwhelmed 
by the achievement of physical science, has lost faith in the reality of spirit . 
Therefore, he attempted to assimilate the modern thought of the West and the best of 
Islamic and oriental thought. For Iqbal, in a human life, religion is more central and 
vital than science (knowledge). This was because religion is a system of general 
truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held 
and vividly apprehended (Sardar and Malik, 2001). In this context, he conceived 
Islam as a universal religion which envisaged all humanity as a unity but at the same 
time, he criticized it for becoming narrow, rigid and static. His ideal ‘man’ was a 
‘man’ of intuition as well as intellect, a combination of reason and revelation. He 
argued that Islam needed to re-examine and reconstruct its religious outlook and the 
West needed an ethical and spiritual basis to the modern political and economic 
framework to prevent the latter becoming a destructive force (Hanif, 1997). 
 
In Indonesia, the Islamic modernism movement took place in the lineage of tajdid 
(renewal). It was heavily indebted to the fourteenth century reformer Ibn Taimiyah 
and the twentieth-century Middle Eastern modernists, including Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Ridla. These thinkers made an important 
contribution to the rise of the Indonesian Islamic modernism movement in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. From this time a new Muslim discourse developed 
in Indonesia. The earlier movements concentrated their efforts on purifying Islamic 
thought from what were considered to be historical and cultural influences, which 
were described as bidá (unlawful) and khurafat (superstition). They also advocated 
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the elimination of mazhab (the Sunni legal school) and the exclusive use of 
prominent sources of Islamic law, namely Quran and Sunnah (Martin et al, 1997). 
 
In contrast to Egypt and India, the Indonesian Islamic modernism movement began 
with the educational and social movements rather than a political movement. This 
early movement occurred in the early decades of the twentieth century, during the 
Dutch colonial era. At the beginning, it was characterized informally by individual 
Muslim reformers. It began with Syech Ahmad Chotib (1855-1916) who spread his 
ideas from Mecca and was later followed by his descendents, including Syech 
Muhammad Tahir Djalalluddin, Syech Mohammad Djamil Djambek, Haji Abdul 
Karim Amrullah, and Haji Abdullah Ahmad. They were particularly against the 
Tariqat Naqsyabandiah practices as well as the adat regulation of inheritance (Noer, 
1973). Also they were involved directly in reforming the educational sector by 
adopting the modern method of teaching in their schools and introducing non-
religious subjects, such as math, geography, English, and sciences (Steenbrink, 1986). 
All of these reformists played a significant role in shaping the Islamic modern 
movement in many places throughout Indonesia in the next decades. 
 
But the most important and successful Islamic modernism movement is 
Muhammadiyah11. Concentrating primarily on educational, social and welfare 
activities, it drew hundreds of thousands of Indonesians, particularly from the main 
urban areas, into the fold of a young and vigorous Islamic movement (Benda, 1972). 
Muhammadiyah adopted and developed a form of rationalist thought from both 
sources: Islam and Western culture. From Islam, Muhammadiyah adopted a 
theological conservatism12. From the West, Muhammadiyah adopted several Western 
                                                 
11 Muhammadiyah is one the most important Muslim social organization in Indonesia since pre War 
World I until the present time. It was established in Jogyakarta, Central Java, on 18 November 1912 by 
K.H. Ahmad Dahlan in response to the need for establishing an institution that was concerned with 
building the permanent character through religious education (Steenbrink, 1986,p.90 ) 
12 The Muhammadiyah retains a traditional Asyáriyah understanding of God’s attributes, the Qurán, 
and predetermination. One of the central principles of the Muhammadiyah’s theology is that God and 
Islam can be known only from Qurán and Hadits (Martin et al, 1997, p. 142) 
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notions, such as: democracy, justice and rational thought. Muhammadiyah became a 
leading modernist organization in the field of education and social activities. In the 
field of education, it ran a schooling system from kindergarten level to university 
level by adopting the western method of teaching13. In the field of social activity, 
they established many hospitals or medical clinics, and home care for orphans 
through imitating Christian missionary activities. Muhammadiyah’s interest in 
economic activities earned them credit as a reformist Muslim social organization. 
These activities later brought about a significant contribution in creating a Muslim 
middle class, which later played a significant role in contemporary life in modern 
Indonesia (Noer, 1973). 
 
In the field of politics, the Islamic modern movement was represented by two 
prominent organizations, namely: Sarikat Islam14 and Masyumi. At that time, Sarikat 
Islam became a progressive social political organization in responding to the demands 
of modernization. Its political character was apparent in its Declaration of Principles 
and an Action Plan. This party declaration shows that Sarikat Islam had adopted a 
progressive notion of Western thought. In this context, the Sarikat Islam was heavily 
indebted to its prominent leader: H.O.S. Tjokro Aminoto, who introduced the concept 
socialism Islam in order to eliminate the notions of individualism and materialism 
that had been introduced by the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia (Noer, 
1973).  
 
After the rapid decline of Sarikat Islam, Masyumi became the most prominent Islamic 
modern political movement in the first two decades of the new Indonesian state. Most 
of its adherents were middle class people, such as merchants, traders, landowners, 
                                                 
13 Besides setting up the schooling system that referred to the Dutch colonial schooling system, 
Muhammadiyah also established religious schools, such as Madrasah and Pondok Pesantren 
(Stenbrink, 1986, p. 55). 
14 According to Deliar Noer (1973), Sarekat Islam was the origin of the political movement in 
Indonesia, even though at the same time there was the Persatuan Mulimin Indonesia (Indonesian 
Muslim Party) which was established in 1921. However, its influence was limited to the Sumatera 
Island. 
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small manufacturers, clerks, and schoolteachers, who have been described as an 
urbanized Islam with cosmopolitan and commercial characters. Many of its leaders15 
were modern intellectuals with a realistic and modern view of politics but they took 
Islam seriously as a religious-political and social entity. As Kahin argued, Masyumi 
was the Islamic party considered best able to deal with secular or modern problems, 
because they believed that Islamic doctrine provided the basis for all human action. 
This principle indicates in its statute that the party was based on Islam and its goal 
was the realization of the doctrine and law of Islam in the life of the individual, in 
society, and in the life of the Republic of Indonesia state (Boland, 1985). Hence, 
Masyumi tried to advocate an Islamic concept as the basis of state for the new 
modern Indonesia. This failed because it did not capture the hearts and minds of the 
majority of Indonesians and did not have enough support from the members of the 
Constituent Assembly in its plenary meeting on December 1957.  
 
The failure of the Islamic political approach in advocating Islam as the ideological 
basis of the Indonesian state, led to the emergence of the Islamic cultural approach16. 
The early 1970s saw the emergence of the Indonesian Islamic cultural movement. In 
this group, there are several modernists, such as A. Mukti Ali, Harun Nasution, 
Munawir Syadzali, Dawam Rahardjo, and Amin Rais, but the most prominent 
modernist in this contemporary era was Nurcholish Madjid. In contrast to earlier 
modernists17, such as Tjokro Aminoto, Agus Salim and Natsir; he provides a more 
realistic appraisal of how Muslims should approach modernity. For Madjid, 
modernization meant thinking and working in accordance with the true and inherent 
                                                 
15 Most of the Masyumi leaders, such as Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangun Mangunsasmito, 
Mohammad Roum, Yusuf Wibisono, Syafruddin Prawira Negara, graduated from the Dutch colonial 
educational system. The Masyumi leaders were among the few Indonesians who were given the 
privilege of the highest level of education during the colonial era (Madjid, 1985, p.385). 
16 In the face of continuing government restrictions on political parties, many young Muslim 
modernists in the late 1960s found a need to distance themselves from mass politics in favor of a new 
strategy of Islamic revitalization. They believed that only a long term ‘cultural approach’ would 
revitalize Islam in modern Indonesia (Hefner, R. W., and Horvatich, P., 1997). 
17 Because the early modernism combined scientific and technological rationalism with Islamic 
scriptualism, this meant that the modernist conception of an Islamic society was limited to the literal 
understanding of the social teaching of the Qurán and Hadits (Martin, et al., 1997, p.148). 
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laws of nature. Therefore, to be modern or to be scientific meant to be dynamic and 
progressive for the process of man’s discovery of objective universal truth. He 
recognized that modernity itself possesses a relative nature because it is 
circumscribed by the factors of time and space. In this context, only that whose 
essence is truly absolute is permanently modern and only God possesses that 
attribute. Thus, modernity lies in the process of discovering relative truths in the 
forward movement toward the absolute Truth (God) in which is being the ultimate 
goal of man’s life (Hasan, 1985). 
 
In portraying the Indonesian Muslim condition, Madjid accused most Islamic 
politicians and his fellows of having sacralized profane institutions, such as Islamic 
parties and the Islamic state. He argued that there is no Quranic injunction mandating 
an Islamic state, and in fact that this idea is a human fabrication. Therefore, Muslims 
should secularize their commitment to the profane institutions, while strengthening 
their commitment to tauhid (monotheism) as the most central of Muslim doctrines. 
Madjid argued that Islam itself began with a process of secularization. Indeed the 
principle of tauhid represents the starting point for a much larger secularization. The 
commitment to tauhid requires a vigilant and never ending effort to distinguish what 
is divine from what is merely human in Islamic tradition. By extension, Madjid 
agued, tauhid also implies a commitment to reason, knowledge and science which 
can all be understood as acts of devotion to a Creator whose majesty is immanent in 
the natural laws of the world. Thus, modernity resides in a process of discovery of 
which truths are relative, leading to the discovery of that truth which is absolute, that 
is Allah (Hefner and Horvatich, 1997).  
 
This theological perspective, particularly his comments on tauhid, lay well within the 
tradition of Islamic modernism and neo-modernism, with their emphasis on the unity 
of God and the compatibility of science and progress with Islamic revelation. 
Although this new thinking: secularization was denounced by formidable modernist 
leaders, such as H.M. Rasyidi, Hamka, and Muhammad Natsir; Madjid gained 
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support from leaders of youth organizations, such as Utomo Danadjaya and Usep 
Fathuddin from the Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Islamic Student) and 
from leaders and members of HMI (Islamic Student Association). Critics argued that 
his ideas came from a Westernized interpretation of Islam. By understanding tauhid 
as the desacralization of all but God’s oneness, Madjid was seen to ignore the Islamic 
Sunnah, the tradition of the community as sacralized by the example of the prophet. 
The Sunnah provides a clear normative precedent for how society should be 
organized (Hefner and Horvatich, 1997). 
 
From the discussion above, it can be seen that the modern perspective had developed 
significantly since the early part of the 20th century, which was essential in creating 
the Indonesian Moslem middle class. Many Western notions, such as equality, equity, 
humanity, democracy etc have been adopted by Islamic organizations. One of the 
impacts of modernity appears in the Indonesian education system. The mainstream of 
Indonesian education has adopted the Western educational system, for instance in the 
schooling system. For many years, “school” has been an indicator of modern life and 
achievements. More recently, there is not a big distinction between school and 
madrasah. Therefore, there is not a significant conflict between Islamic principle and 
the life of modernity, because Islam will accept modern values as long as they are not 
in conflict with the main principles of Islam, that is the principle of “tauhid” 
(monotheism) and “akhlak” (morality). It is evident that many Islamic doctrines are 
compatible with modernity, particularly in the educational, social and cultural aspects 
of modernity (Hasan, 1985).  
 
3.3.2 Islamic Traditionalist movement (conservative responses) 
Montgomery Watt (1988) in his book, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity, 
argued that the great masses of ordinary Muslims are still dominated by the standard 
traditional Islamic worldview and the corresponding self-image of Islam. This 
standard world-view could be said to have had its main lines established by about 
year AD 950. These were expressed by the traditionalist reformer Abu Hasan al-
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Asy’ariyah18, who argued that the comprehension of unique nature and characteristics 
of God were beyond human capability, while humans had free will but no power to 
create anything (Sardar and Malik, 2001). These were strengthened in the thirteenth 
century by Ibn Taymiya19 (1263-1328), a theologian who raised his voice against 
innovation, the worship of science, vows, and pilgrimages to shrines (Hoveyda, 
1998). Both of these traditional theologians played a significant role in inspiring the 
next traditionalism movement.  
 
The responses of the earlier Islamic traditional movement, that is, the conservative 
responses to modernity, were represented by the Wahabiah movement in Saudi 
Arabia, and later by Syech Waliullah in India. This movement was founded in Saudi 
Arabia by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab (1703-1787). He became convinced of the 
necessity to apply Hanbal’s interpretation of the sharia strictly to the letter of the 
revelation, as taught by Ibn Taimiya. His doctrine emphasized a simple return to faith 
and obedience to the fundamental teaching of Islam, that is Qurán and Hadits; and 
later it became the official theology of Saudi Arabia as the first Wahabiah state. His 
theological project was to rid the Muslims, particularly of the Najd cultic practices 
that he identified as non-Islamic accretions in Muslims religious practices. Therefore, 
the term ‘Puritanism’ is often applied to the Wahabiah movement (Martin et al, 
1997). The Wahabiah movement had significant influence in some Muslim areas, 
such as India, Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia.  
 
In India, the Wahabiah movement was led by Shah Waliullah. He was born in 1703 
in Delhi. His pivotal concern, as well as that of Muhammad Ibn Wahab, was to call 
the Muslim back to the teaching of Islam. He consequently put all his energies toward 
purifying Islamic ideals of unhealthy influences and providing them a fresh 
intellectual ground to meet the challenge of the time. According to him, the decline of 
                                                 
18 A conservative theologian who set up an orthodox sect in the tenth century which was in opposition 
to Mu’tazilah theologian or rationalist views (Sardar, 2001) 
19 A traditionalist reformer who proposed his reform on the basis of a literal interpretation of the 
Qur’an and the Hadits (Hoveyda, 1998). 
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Muslims was the direct result of their apathy toward Islam. He made clear that Islam 
is not religion in the usual sense of the term but a complete code of life which aims 
not only at individual righteousness but provides a framework for all individual and 
social activities (Hanif, 1997). The Wahabiah movement was one of the earlier 
movements that attempted to reverse the decline of Islam through returning to the 
fundamental teaching of Islam, combined with discipline, piety and sense of sacrifice 
(Sardar and Malik, 2001). 
 
In Indonesia, the Wahabiah movement, adopted by Kaum Paderi in Minangkabau, 
West Sumatra, was later better known as the Paderi movement (see chapter 2). It was 
brought by a group of three hajjis (pilgrims) who returned to Minangkabau in 1803. 
The Paderi movement was deeply influenced by the initial success of the Wahabiah 
movement in Saudi Arabia at that time. Like the Wahabists, the Padri also directed 
their attacks first of all against what they saw as deterioration, such as gambling, cock 
fighting, the use of opium, and the matrilineal inheritance law. In Minangkabau, this 
movement became the inspiration for a dynamic force in transforming its 
environment, aiming at the destruction of what it considered a djahiliyah (syncretic 
and unenlightened) society and at the creation of an Islamic one. As Abdullah (1985) 
argued, the most significant impact of the Paderi movement was the greater 
assimilation of religious doctrine within the Minangkabau adat (custom) as the ideal 
pattern of behavior. Adat was recodified, and the position of religion as the system of 
belief was strengthened. In the new codification, religious doctrine became more 
clearly identified as the only basic standard of behavior. Unfortunately, the progress 
of this movement declined when the Paderi became involved in the civil war with the 
Dutch colonial government.  
 
However, this movement had a significant impact for the beginning of Islamic 
enlightenment in Indonesia, particularly in the Minangkabau area. Later, it also 
spread to other areas throughout Indonesia. Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia in East Java, 
Nahdlatul Watan in NTB, Al Washliyah in North Sumatra, and PUI (Islamic Scholars 
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Association) in West Java became prominent agents of the traditionalist movement in 
Indonesia. They made a significant contribution in establishing an Islamic 
traditionalist perspective. One of their doctrines is that every Moslem must give full 
obedience and fight for the fundamental teaching of Islam, that is, Quran and Hadits. 
Islamic education should be based on the Quran and Hadits. For them, the most 
important aim of education is to educate a young person to be a righteous being who 
can contribute to the spiritual and physical welfare of their family, community and 
mankind. Therefore, the ultimate aim of Islamic education lies in the realization of 
complete submission to Allah (God) (Husain and Ashraf, 1979).  
 
4.3.3 Fundamentalism movement (Radical responses) 
The last decades have seen a rise in fanaticism, and a related intolerance among 
certain types of traditional Muslims. This highly visible and vocal group can be 
described as ‘fundamentalist’ in that they insist on a single interpretation of Islam. In 
this framework, the integrated, holistic and God-centered world-view of Islam is 
transformed into a totalitarian, theocratic world order and a persuasive moral God is 
replaced by a coercive, political one (Sardar and Malik, 2001).  
 
A fundamentalist looks at tauhid as essentially an instrument of political government 
and empowerment. It becomes a justification for being or not being dominated by 
others. Thus, when the fundamentalists call for implementing sharia (Islamic 
jurisprudence), they are not calling for re-instituting traditional sharia but are instead 
empowering people to redirect the course of political life. Fundamentalists perceive 
that modernity has favored not Islam but their enemies. The use of the language and 
forms of Quránic text in the process of building modern fundamentalist discourse 
serves to provide legitimacy to their economic, social, and political claims against the 
state and the world (Mousalli, 1999).  
 
The general modern Islamic fundamentalist discourse in the older tradition includes 
Hasan al Bana and Sayyid Qutb who founded Ikhwanul Muslimun in Egypt, Abu al-
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A’la al-Maududi who founded Jamiat al-Islamiyah in India and Pakistan, and 
Ayatullah Khomeini with his Islamic revolution in Iran. From these prominent 
traditions, the fundamentalism movement spread into other Muslim countries and 
inspired contemporary radical Islamic groups. The next section will discuss in more 
detail these groups. 
 
Ikhwanul Muslimun: Hasan al Bana and Sayyid Qutb 
Ikhwanul Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) was the earliest of the Islamic 
fundamentalism movements in the contemporary era. It was founded by Hasan Al 
Bana, a 22-year-old schoolteacher in March 1928 in Egypt with the purpose of 
promoting true Islam and launching a struggle against foreign domination. It became 
the twentieth-century’s most influential movement for reorienting Muslim societies to 
a pure Islamic order (Commins, 1994). At the beginning, this movement focused on 
Islamic education as the main aim, but later became involved in politics (Watt, 1988). 
The two prominent leaders of Ikhwanul Muslim were Hasan al Bana and Sayyid 
Qutb. Most of the form of the movement of Ikhwanul Muslimun was strongly 
influenced by these two leaders (Hasan Al Bana ,1906-1949 and Sayyid Qutb, 1906-
1966). 
 
For Bana no other system of life provides nations with the necessary tools needed for 
renaissance as Islam does. Islam must act as a regulator of behavior of both 
communities and all human societies. Its general goals are designed to fit all societies 
through reinterpretation of texts to suit different times and ages. Thus, Islamic aims 
are to establish a moral nation with a message of unity and sacrifice (Mousalli, 1999). 
In responding to the influence of Western culture, Bana argued that European 
civilization consisted of atheism, immorality, individual and class selfishness, and 
usury. He characterized European culture as a materialistic one that offered Muslims 
loans in order to gain control of Muslim economies. The harmful effects of European 
culture had resulted in Muslims misunderstanding their own religion. They thought it 
consisted only of the rituals of worship and the moral and spiritual aspect of life. 
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Bana was acutely aware of the challenges to Islam from Western ideologies, such as 
capitalism, and communism. He argued that Muslims did not need to borrow from 
foreign ideologies because they already had a perfect system in Islam. For Bana, a 
conception of true Islam required the purification of existing religious belief and 
practices. Muslims had to ground their worship in scripture and abandon superstitious 
beliefs in the efficacy of amulets, charms, soothsaying, and fortune telling (Commins, 
1994). 
 
Compared to Hasan al Bana, Sayyid Qutb can be seen as a radical fundamentalist. For 
Qutb, tauhid (the oneness of God) is the essential component and the main 
characteristic of the universal Islamic concept. For him, Islam means submission to 
tauhid which requires following God’s path in every aspect of life, such as spiritual, 
political, economic, and law and order. In these contexts, he treats every system of 
life as a religion.20 Qutb’s interpretation of religion focuses on praxis rather than 
theory for the deepening and the developing of belief - action being the sign of true 
belief. He used religion for encouraging activism in social and political matters and 
rejecting non-Islamically derived systems, like philosophy or other ways of life. For 
Qutb, Islam is the only valid source for knowledge and action. He further denies the 
methodological and substantive legitimacy and the validity of modern as well as 
medieval and classical philosophers. For him, there is no special discourse dedicated 
to any elite, be it religious or philosophical; the Qur’anic discourse is directed at and 
should be adhered to by all the common people and the elite (Moussalli, 1999). 
 
With respect to modernity, Qutb argued that the Qur’an as the basic text can be read, 
interpreted, and understood differently. The Qur’an cannot be contradicted by past or 
present human discourse but only by another text. To do this, we need to reread the 
Qur’an text in the light of modernity and developing a modern Qur’anic discourse 
suitable to modernity. Human thought is imperfect, lacks permanence, is incapable of 
transcendence, and fall victim to paganism. Thus, Western thought is not universal 
                                                 
20 This view is based on the idea that a religion or a system is the method that organized life. 
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but the by-product of specific political, economical conditions. Qutb believes that he 
could easily dismiss ancient and modern Western culture and philosophy and exclude 
it from the development of modern Islamic discourse. To Qutb, the Western concept 
of development has done away with any stability for humankind and has replaced the 
innermost, constant human feelings with the interest of material progress (cf. the 
discussion of neo-liberalism above). In this context, the relationship between God and 
humans has been reduced to fluctuating issues, like human’s position in the universe, 
their fate, their relation with this universe and their relationship with their creator, 
whereas in Islam these basic issues provide Muslims with positive constancy that 
allows them to enjoy a peaceful and stable life. This kind of constancy provides 
harmony between the Qur’anic discourse and human life (Mousalli, 1999). 
 
Qutb appears to have abandoned the idea of rational exchange or argument as the 
chief means of spreading the truth of Islam. He seems to advocate an end to reason or 
philosophical argument. His apprehension of the truth of Islamic faith is more likely 
to come about subjectively through a direct appreciation of the inevitability of Islamic 
way than through intellectual conviction (Tripp, 1994). However, we can see that the 
main character of this movement is that its members should lead upright lives 
according to Islamic principles (Watt, 1988). 
 
Jama’at-i Islami: Sayyid Abul A’la al-Maududi 
From the Indian subcontinent, the prominent fundamentalist leader was Sayyid Abul 
A’la al-Maududi, who founded Jama’at-i Islami in 1941. Like the Ikhwanul Muslimin 
in Egypt, the Jama’at-I Islami was involved in politics but its political influence was 
less, because later it focused more on da’wah (Islamic teaching). Maududi’s early 
general views are presented in his work Towards Understanding Islam21. The basic 
proposition in Maududi’s theory is God’s exclusive possession of sovereignty. 
According to Maududi, this exclusive possession covers all aspects of political and 
legal sovereignty. In this context, no monarchy, no royal family, no elite class, no 
                                                 
21This book emphasizes the finality, superiority and self-sufficiency of Islam (Watt, 1988).  
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leader of any religious groups, no democracy vested in the sovereignty of the people 
can participate in God’s sovereignty. For him, Islam, which means ‘total submission 
to God’, represents a whole civilization, a complete culture, and a comprehensive 
world order. Muhammad and his companions developed and established a complete 
model of Islam on this Earth for mankind to follow (Hoveyda, 1998). 
 
Abul A’la al-Maududi has become a central figure in the revival Islamic movement in 
recent decades. His notion of Islamic ideology, one of the most prolific and 
systematic articulations of its kind, has been highly influential in giving shape to 
Islamic revivalism. For him, the Islamic state must be ruled by a single man whose 
tenure of power and of office is limited only by his faithfulness to Islam. He is 
elected because of his wisdom, ability, and conduct. He is assisted by a legislative 
council composed of men who have knowledge of the Qur’an and the Hadits. There 
will be no political party, for Islam constitutes the only ideology of the state. This 
conception rejects any Western model. In Muadudi’s view, everything about Western 
civilization is wrong and harmful because it is not God-given but elaborated by 
political leaders on the basis of false beliefs22. Therefore, everything Western is 
constructed as unacceptable (Hoveyda, 1998).  
 
However, in defining the shape of the Islamic state, Maududi ironically borrowed 
widely and indiscriminately from the West. The Islamic state would be run by a 
modern machinery of government: an elected president, parliament, an omnipotent 
judiciary. The success of the Islamic state would hinge on its legitimacy in the eyes of 
society. Therefore, the Islamic state would not be able or would have the difficult task 
of reconciling the rigid demands of Islamic laws and the ideal of democracy. For him, 
the Islamic state should not be the enforcer of the sharia but the implementation of 
the will of the people. With the agenda for the Islamic state in mind, Maududi 
advocated a view of Islam which mobilized the faith according to the needs of 
political actions. He rationalized Islam into a stringent belief system, predicated upon 
                                                 
22 In his view, the Western people had long ago denied the sovereignty of God. 
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absolute obedience to the will of God, amounting to a command structure which 
aimed to transform society and politics. By reinterpreting such key concepts as ilah 
(divinity), rabb (God, Lord), ibadah (worship) and din (religion), he recast the 
meaning of the Muslim faith such that social action became the logical end of 
religious piety and religion became the vehicle of social action (Nasr, 1994).  
 
Much like Bana and Qutb in Egypt, Maududi is extremely critical of the West, which 
he regards as entirely atheistic and materialistic. He does not blame the West for all 
the trouble of the Islamic world, but thinks that Muslims themselves are partly to 
blame. Maududi argued that Muslims are devoid of Islamic character and morals, 
ideas and ideology, and have lost the Islamic spirit. The true spirit of Islam is neither 
in their mosques, schools, private lives nor in the public affairs. Their practical life 
has lost all its association with Islam. The law of Islam does not now govern their 
private or social conduct. For Maududi, Western civilization is of course no match for 
Islam. Instead, the individual of the West has only conquered the useful practical 
scientific knowledge and technology that had enabled him or her to achieve 
remarkable progress. Hence, Muslims should have sought to fit these instruments of 
progress, in keeping with the principles of Islam, into their educational system and 
social life (Watt, 1988). 
 
The Iranian revolution: Ayatullah Khomeini 
The basic belief of Shi’ism is that the rightful successor of Muhammad as ‘Imam’ 
(leader) of all the Muslims was his cousin and son in-law Ali. Imamite Shi’ism has an 
image of itself which differs from that of Sunnism in important ways. It regards itself 
alone as the true Islam since the Sunnites fell into error when they accepted Abu 
Bakar and rejected Ali as the rightful successor to Muhammad. For several centuries, 
the Imamite Shi’ites were scattered throughout the Islamic lands in small groups, 
including Arabs as well as Iranians. A great opportunity came in 1501 when Shah 
Ismail conquered much of Iran and made Imamism the official religion. The dynasty, 
known as Savavids, was founded by Shah Ismail and Shi’ites ulama became an 
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essential feature of the state. The coming to power of Reza Khan (1921) and Reza 
Shah (1924) led to a serious deterioration in the power of the religious institutions 
(Watt, 1988).  
 
The Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 became the most dramatic event in the Islamic 
world in the twentieth century. It was a major source of inspiration for Muslims 
everywhere. It was considered the first serious victory of the traditionalists over the 
Westernized elites who were the main beneficiaries of the departing colonial powers 
(Sardar, 2001). There have been many analyses of the conditions which led to the 
success of the revolution and the downfall of the Shah. It can be accounted for by the 
Shah’s modernizing policies after the great increase in oil revenues, the increasing 
numbers of poor people or unemployed in the shantytowns round the cities. But there 
was also wide agreement that the root of troubles was modernization or 
Westernization. People began to speak of a disease which they called 
‘Westoxication’, as the danger felt by Muslims everywhere of losing their Islamic 
identity (Watt, 1988). 
 
This Islamic revolution was led by Ayatullah Khomeini, an Islamic puritanist and 
theologian who put forward his idea of an Islamic state in the modern world. Before 
the Iranian revolution, Khomeini depicted the Shah’s government, the USA, and the 
West in general as enemies. He believed the divine Islamic law to be progressive and 
comprehensive in all periods of history. For Khomeini, government can only be 
legitimate when it accepts the rule of God, which means the implementation of the 
sharia (Islamic law). All laws that are contrary to the sharia must be abandoned 
because only the law of God will stay valid and immutable in the face of changing 
times. With these beliefs, Khomeini campaigned against the Western influence in 
Iran. In exile, he gained popular support and successfully led the revolutionary 
movement of 1977-1979 that toppled the late Shah of Pahlavi (Moaddel and Talattof, 
2000).  
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For many, especially for Western people, he is the dark side of Islam, the arch-Caliph 
of religious orthodoxy, but for others he is the defender of the faith, the man who 
restored power and puritanism to Islam in the face of decadence, corruption and 
Western hegemony. For the militants who seek to challenge the established order in 
the name of Islam, Khomeini’s success with his Iranian revolution remains an 
inspiration (Moin, 1994). 
 
The Iranian Revolution constitutes the most powerful and significant movement 
within the Islamic world for more than a century. It certainly marks a turning point in 
the history of twentieth century Islamic fundamentalism. It seems to be a new kind of 
aggressive militant Islamic fundamentalism which revives the idea of jihad against 
the infidel. One of the prominent consequences of the Iranian revolution was the 
emergence of a new breed of terrorist. Until the late 1970s, hijackings, abductions, 
assassinations, and bombings were carried out by groups of extensively trained 
mercenaries or well-disciplined professionals, but since Khomeini, terrorists are more 
likely to be bands of believers who devote their entire lives to the advancement of a 
cause. Such terrorists do not fear death, because they have been taught that the 
sacrifice of their earthly existence will open for them the ‘gates of paradise’. The 
Iranian revolution also became a model for all the power seekers of Muslim countries 
or other fundamentalist groups (Hoveyda, 1998).  
 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that Islam has many possible responses in 
facing modernity. The form of response: moderate, conservative, liberal or radical, 
will depend on the type of Islamic strands (Islamic groups), which have influenced 
their world-view. The form of response cannot be generalized into one perspective. 
Every strand has its own basic perspective thinking. Therefore, it is unfair to make a 
generalization in looking at Islam’s response to modernity, because the Qur’an, as the 
immutable source of the fundamental tenets of Islam, provides its followers with 
many choices of perspective in comprehending and using its principles, ethics and 
culture for understanding the world.  
 86
 3.4 Debate on two main contemporary issues: Secularism and democracy 
According to Hussein and Ashraf, traditionally Islamic education was not an activity 
separated from other aspects of Muslim society23. Islamic education has a long 
history. It developed along with the emergence of Islam in the seventh century. In this 
stage, it was administered informally and focused on socializing Islamic teaching, 
particularly on the process of embedding the tauhid (Islamic faith) and ibadah 
(Islamic ritual). In the beginning, Islam did not differentiate between the religious 
sciences and the general sciences. During the first two hundred years of Islam, or the 
classic era, particularly within the era of the Abbasid dynasty, the Islamic world 
attained a high level of scientific knowledge and a refined civilization. Many Islamic 
scientists emerged during this time, including Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibnu Sina, Ibn 
Maskaweh, Ibn Rusd, and Al-Razi. Most of them were also religious scholars who 
were expert in several branches of Islamic knowledge such as ilm kalam (theology), 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), hadith (traditions), tafsir (Qur’an exegesis). For 
example: Al-Kindi (d.866), known as the philosopher of Arabs, wrote books on 
mathematics, physics, music, medicine and geography. The work of these men made 
a significant contribution to the development of world knowledge and civilization 
(Sardar and Malik, 2001). 
 
But, with the destruction of Greek philosophy or rational movement and the shift to 
irrational movement or orthodoxy, particularly under the influence of Al-Ghazaly 
(d.1111) who stood against the Mu’tazilite philosophy or liberal thinking, the ulama 
(religious scholars) were in a position of dominance. They began to conceive of the 
written word as an independent realm of representation and truth apart from life. To 
some extent, they reduced the concept of ilm (knowledge) from meaning ‘all 
knowledge’ to mean only ‘religious knowledge’. As a result, formal teaching focused 
on religious subjects; and the general subjects, such as physics, sciences, mathematics 
                                                 
23 Hussein, S.S., and Ashraf, S.A. (1979) Crisis in Muslim education, Jeddah, Hodder and Stoughton – 
King Abdul Azis. 
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were regarded as marginal subjects. After the fall of the Mu’tazilah regime (the 
Islamic rationalism group), a majority of the orthodox Islamic scholars argued that 
the general sciences could corrupt and disturb the level of Muslim faithfulness. 
Therefore, the general subjects had to be eliminated from the Islamic curriculum. 
This view is caused by the religious belief that religion is a direct connection to God. 
The supremacy of religious subjects has had a substantial impact not only on the 
development of Islamic knowledge but also on Islamic civilization (Azra, 1999). 
 
In contrast, for the West, religious education has never been the central feature of 
school or university education. The branches of knowledge have no central 
integrating force. In Western education, knowledge is divided into three branches: 
Humanities, Natural Sciences, and Social sciences. This modern education 
emphasizes reason and rationality and ignores the value of the spirit (spiritual 
dimension). Western education is based on a core curriculum designed to build an all-
round ‘democratic personality’ in each student. Western people believe that 
‘democracy’ provides a complete solution for society (Husein and Ashraf, 1979). 
This ideology has entered Muslim society because many Muslim students have been 
educated in the West and returned to their countries with ideas in conflict with 
traditional assumptions, particularly regarding faith. Hence, a cultural duality has 
appeared everywhere in the Muslim world because of the dual education system. The 
traditional Islamic education created traditional Islamic groups; and the modern 
secular education created the secularists. In some Muslim countries, the secular 
education system has gradually replaced all other forms of education. In other 
Muslim countries both systems still exist but the secular system has become the more 
dominant (Husain and Ashraf, 1979).  
 
The question of integrating Western modes of learning into the Islamic perspective 
and creating a single educational system which would be “Islamic” and yet able to 
include modern disciplines, began to occupy the mind of many Muslim intellectuals 
from the 1950s and 1960s onward. This effort led to the establishment of several 
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universities, the preparation of integrated curricula and the emergence of the 
‘Islamization of knowledge’ movement. Although these efforts have not been 
successful to date, they remain a major Islamic agenda. How to make educational 
institutions imported from the West more Islamic or how to expand existing 
traditional Islamic education (madrasahs) to embrace modern disciplines is debated 
among the Islamic world. Nasr (2002) illustrated this situation by arguing that a jet 
plane can land in any airport around the world; but an education system cannot be 
simply imported; the education crisis in the Islamic world is of a different nature to 
that in the West. The next section will discuss two main contemporary issues relating 
to Islamic education. 
 
The Issue of Secularism 
The notion of secularism becomes a sensitive issue for those Muslim societies which 
are dominated by traditional Islamic groups. Ulama (religious scholars), the primary 
bearers and transmitters of a traditional worldview, are mostly reactionary in the 
sense that they tend to oppose reforms in the form of secularization. The reforms they 
are interested in are nearly all social and political, and leave the traditional world-
view unchanged and unchangeable. For them unchangeability is an ideal both for 
human individuals and societies. This unchangeability of human nature justifies 
Muslim scholars in asserting the finality of the rules and law for human conduct 
which are expressed in the Qur’an and the Sunna of the prophet. As long as human 
nature does not change, essentially there can be no new problems, and therefore no 
need for any fundamental revision of the Sharia’ (Islamic law). Thus, the idea of 
social reform, including secularization, is virtually unthinkable for traditional minded 
Muslims (Watt, 1988).  
 
However, scientific inventions and technological advances of the West, especially 
during the last two centuries, have altered the nature of human society. The invention 
of television and other modern technologies makes it possible for a few people to 
control the thinking of vast populations, and makes it difficult to insulate any part of 
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the world, including the Muslim world, from what is happening elsewhere. 
Consequently, even if it is admitted that human nature has not changed essentially, 
there have been changes in human society which require changes in law. Thus, the 
traditional assumption by Muslims of the unchangeable nature of the human being 
blinds them to the new problems created for human society by technological and 
cultural advances (Watt, 1988). In facing these challenges, some Muslim reformists 
such as the Egyptians Tahtawi and Taha Husein, the Algerian Kateb Yassin, the 
Tunisian Bourguiba and so many others who have traveled to the West believed that 
it was enough to take the ‘prescriptions’ for the success of Western civilization and 
apply these to Muslim countries. In this context, secularism was perceived as an 
effective prescription to be applied to societies where religion controlled all the 
happenings and gestures of daily life (Arkoun, 1994).  
 
Although the notion of secularization was strongly resisted by almost all the 
traditional Muslim groups, it was adopted in the medium term by some modernists, 
particularly in the field of education. After coming to power in 1805, Muhammad Ali 
in Egypt set about creating an army school based on the European model. To achieve 
this, he realized that he would require officers with particular training in various 
European subjects, rather than the traditional Islamic curriculum. He invited 
European teachers to Egypt to instruct the potential officers and followed this by 
sending these young Egyptian officers to study in Europe. This initiative was 
replicated by Sultan Mahmud II of Turkey who revived the engineering schools and 
sent students to Europe. He also set up a medical school by imitating a Western 
model. These initiatives are among the first effective reform schemes in Muslim 
countries and inspired the next phase of educational reform in the other Muslim 
countries (Watt, 1988).  
 
In India, Sayyid Akhmad Khan (1817-1898) founded the Muhammadan Anglo-
Oriental College in 1877, which later became the University of Aligarh. To improve 
the quality of Muslim India, he believed that Muslim India must engage with modern 
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science and the more productive aspects of Western thought. For him, the spread of 
Western education through the introduction of modern sciences brought the greatest 
challenge, and he also believed that Islamic teaching was compatible with modern 
sciences (Martin, 1997). At the beginning, his liberal view on education was opposed 
by the ulama (religious scholars), who had their centers in the Dar al-Ulum at 
Deoband and the Nadwat al-Ulama at Lucknow. But later he had more support from 
an increasing number of Muslims who had had a Western-type education, such as 
Amir Ali and Mohammad Iqbal. He also gained support from a modern traditional 
leader, Sayyid Abu ‘Ala al-Maududi who critized the ulama for still living in the 
eighteenth century and giving youth no effective guidance for participation in the 
contemporary world (Watt, 1988). 
 
As one of the leading Muslim thinkers in the Indian continent, Maududi was aware of 
how the two parallel systems of education had produced two opposing groups among 
the more intellectual members of community. In examining this situation, Maududi 
(1980) argued: 
This explains why everywhere in the Muslim world we find two groups and schools of thought 
diametrically opposed to, and often at loggerheads with each other. One of these is the standard-
bearer of Islamic learning and culture, but is un-capable of leading and guiding the Muslims in 
all spheres of life. The other group is controlling the intellectual, literary and political affairs of 
the Muslims, but is ignorant of the principles and essential features of Islam, alien to the spirit 
of Islamic culture and unware of the character of the communal organization of Islam and its 
social laws.  
 
Secularism also became a debatable issue in Indonesia, particularly when Nurcholis 
Madjid, a prominent Muslim reformist, launched the notion of secularization in early 
1970. In contrast to earlier modernist movements, such as Muhammadiyah and 
Sarikat Islam which emphasized rationality in their denunciations of traditional 
religious practice, the Nurcholis Madjid movement is a combination of the empirical 
and historical approaches they employ in formulating a vision of an Islamic society. 
Madjid’s most important contribution to the development of Indonesian Islamic 
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discourse is his attempt to decouple modernism from scripturalism. As Fachry Ali 
and Bactiar Effendi point out, Madjid provides a more realistic appraisal of how 
Muslims should approach modernity24. In his controversial speech delivered on 2 
January 1970, Madjid argued that Indonesian Muslims are again experiencing inertia 
in thought and in the development of Islamic teachings. He explained that the need 
for the renewal of thought was more pressing that the need for maintaining the 
intellectual consensus of the community. He accused his fellow Muslims of having 
‘sacralized’ profane institutions, such as the Islamic political party and an Islamic 
state. Noting that there is no Qur’anic injunction mandating an Islamic state, Madjid 
criticized Indonesian Muslims for sanctifying an idea that was in fact a human 
fabrication25. For him, Muslims should have ‘secularized’ this commitment while 
preserving Islam’s lasting values (Hefner and Horvatich, 1997). 
 
In the aftermath of the controversy, Madjid himself expressed some misgiving at his 
choice of terms, commenting publicly that his reference to ‘secularization’ had 
invited misinterpretation. In fact, much of the detail of Madjid’s argument was lost in 
the sound and the fury of the subsequent debate. However, this effort at ‘new 
thinking’ (secularization) was one of several related developments in the Indonesian 
Muslim community at this time. Their significant influence lies in their sanctioning of 
a shift of Indonesian Muslim energies out of formal politics and into social and 
educational activities. Since this time, the modern movement has developed gradually 
and in the form of a cultural approach, particularly in the social and education fields. 
On this point, Indonesia was unusual among Muslim societies during the tumultuous 
decade stretching from 1978 to 1988. There was a general decline in the influence of 
                                                 
24 Ali, F., and Effendi, B. (1986) Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Masa 
Orde Baru, Bandung, Mizan. 
25 Nurcholis Madjid and other modern Indonesian Islamic thinkers argue that the social and ritual 
system is the products of human culture. In this context, Madjid states that except for the fundamental 
value of taqwa (fear of God), which grows out of faith in God and Worship of Him, there is no fixed 
value. Most values are cultural values which have, of necessity, to develop continuously in accordance 
with the laws of change and development. Therefore the values of Islam are those which conform to 
humanity’s true nature or to universal truth and are supported by taqwa towards God. Those values are 
Islamic if they do not contradict iman or taqwa, and are good according to humanity and its 
development (Richard C. Martin, et al., 1997, p.150). 
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Muslim parties but a great leap forward in the social and intellectual vitality of the 
community (Hefner and Horvatich, 1997). 
 
It is important to note that Muslim civil associations were not the only agencies 
involved in the renewal. The New Order government also supported a number of 
cultural-Islamic programmes under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. One important 
feature of this effort was the enormous expansion in the State Institute of Islamic 
Studies (IAIN) which began in the 1960s and which, during the 1970s and 1980s 
produced a large number of graduates trained in Islamic theology, law, arts, and 
education. These efforts in higher education were accompanied by an impressive 
program of infrastructural development, focusing on the construction of mosques, 
prayer halls, and madrasahs (Islamic schools). These efforts continued in the 1990s 
when international agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank became involved in providing financial and programmes assistance in order to 
improve the quality of madrasahs or the Islamic schooling system (Rahim, 2000). 
 
Many initiatives had been implemented for reforming the madrasah educational 
system, from an introduction of general subjects, such as math, science, social 
sciences, and English to setting up a structural change in the madrasah system by 
making it identical with a ‘sekolah’ (general schooling system), although maintaining 
its character as an Islamic educational institution. However, these initiatives have not 
been enough to make the madrasah system equal with the general schooling system in 
Indonesia. The Madrasah system has faced critics from many groups of Muslim 
society who argue that the madrasah educational system is not ready to face social 
change. Their graduates are not prepared to compete with the graduates from the 
general schooling system in term of training and skills for middle rank jobs. Even 
their dominance in religious subjects has decreased significantly (MORA, 1999). 
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The issue of educational democracy  
This has become an interesting debate in the last two decades, particularly when 
Khomeini launched the Iran Revolution in the end of 1978. For many Muslim 
countries, this revolution became a model for all power seekers. It demonstrated how 
the use of ‘Islam’ can become a highly effective approach for mobilizing the masses; 
meanwhile this revolution changed the way in which Western countries, particularly 
the United States, was perceived by the Third World, especially Muslim countries 
(Hoveyda, 1998). 
 
This revolution also created a negative image of Islam, as it triggered a new kind of 
aggressive militant Islamic fundamentalism and revived the idea of ‘jihad’ against 
infidels. The Islamic terrorist movement and suicide bombers as a new strategy and 
tactic in encountering opponents increased rapidly after this revolution. It also created 
a strong negative sense about Islam in which Islam has become peculiarly traumatic 
term for Western societies (Said, 1981). This negative picture of Islam has created a 
big question in many aspects of contemporary life. For example: Is Islam compatible 
with democracy? Is democracy not an important need for Muslim countries? What 
kind of education system can meet the needs of welfare, knowledge and democracy in 
the modern Islamic world? 
 
Finding answers to these questions is not easy. There are two main perspectives when 
democracy is discussed. They divide into an Islamic and Western perspectives. From 
the Islamic perspective, education is still dominated by the traditional Islamic groups 
to whom the nature of teaching is still firmly focused on the memorization of texts 
without much comprehension of their meaning (Watt, 1988). The form of teaching is 
characterized by one-way direction in which the teacher is a dominant party, and 
students are a passive party or ‘good listeners’. In the learning process, the teacher is 
the only owner of knowledge and a student is an ‘empty box’ to be filled. The 
learning process occurs in the narrative way in which a teacher gives a teaching 
instruction that needs to be accepted and memorized by students in order to pass their 
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examinations. This ‘Banking Concept of Education’ has significant consequences, 
not the least being a strong barrier against developing critical skills and creativity in 
students. As a result, most graduates from Islamic schools have lacked self-
confidence and are unable to create a valuable response in term of resolving their 
daily problems (Azra, 1999).  
 
This Islamic educational system, of course does not provide a situation conducive to 
creating a democratic climate. Orthodox theology (Asy’ari thought), which 
emphasized the scriptural and textual and dominated the life of Muslim societies, 
created the legalistic, formalistic approach and even feudalistic attitude in almost all 
Muslim countries. Much of the Islamic educational system until now has been 
dominated by the orthodox climate in which the students are required to show respect 
and obedience towards teachers without reserve. 
 
But from Islamic principles, with reference to the Qur’an and Sunna, the modernist 
Islam doctrines encourage every Muslim to be a democratic people. Within the 
Islamic framework, there is a principle of shura as an ethical principle which should 
prevail in all conditions, taking different forms in different historical contexts. At this 
point, Mohammad Abduh argued that the readiness of the people to follow the 
method of shura is not contingent on their training, research, reflection or principles 
of disputation. It is sufficient that they seek truth and the establishment of a system 
where public interest is maintained26. From this view, many scholars and modernists 
made a direct association between shura and democracy. However, not all Muslim 
scholars agreed with this view. Mohamed Talbi27, for example, rejects this direct 
association between shura and democracy. He argues that shura is from a time and 
place which had no conception of democracy as we know it. Indeed, neither Islam nor 
Western civilization had this democratic conception before the modern period. For 
                                                 
26 Haddad, I. (1994) Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform. In Ali Rahnema (Ed.) Pioneers of 
Islamic Revival, London and New Jersey, Zed Books Ltd.  
27 Mohamed Talbi is a leading contemporary modernist Muslim from Tunisia, North Africa 
(Marquand, D., and Nettler, R.L., (2000). 
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Talbi, democracy means the voice of the many determining who rules, and how they 
rule with the associated notions of universal human rights, freedom of expression, 
religious pluralism and equality before the law. True democracy is the proper political 
form for our age, as it embodies those values which constitute part of the original true 
Islam. Therefore, shura is not really similar to the notion of democracy. As Islamic 
identity, shura remain true but in a somewhat reduced and less unique manner than 
democracy (Marquand and Nettler, 2000). 
 
From the Western perspective, the notion of democracy has become the essential and 
most valuable principle constructing Western civilization and modern society. This 
notion was imported to Muslim countries through introducing the Western political 
system or embedding it in the form of education introduced by colonial governments 
or by some Muslim modernist leaders. The notion had a significant impact upon these 
Muslim societies. There were two forms of response to democracy. For Muslim 
modernists, it was seen as a useful ‘tool’ for conducting social reform in order to 
modernize a Muslim society. Muslim modernist leaders such as Muhammad Ali 
Pasha, Sultan Mahmud II and Kemal Ataturk, Jamal Abdul Nasser adopted the notion 
without reserve, but some other leaders including Jamal al-Din al- Afghani, 
Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Ridla, Mohammed Iqbal accepted this notion 
conditionally. As far as it did not appear to abandon Islamic principles, particularly 
the concepts of tauhid (monotheism) and ‘adil (justice), it could be accepted. But for 
Muslim traditional or conservative groups, such as Sayyid Qutub, Hasan Al-Bana, 
Sayyid Abu ‘ala al-Maududi, Khomeini, the notion was not compatible with Islamic 
doctrine. For Qutb and al-Bana Islam, the West (including democracy) were 
incompatible. There could only be a struggle between believers and non-believers, 
between secularism, capitalism and Islam. They believed that the West, with its 
emphasis on science and technology, was obliterating the validity of religion. For 
them, Islam is a complete social system catering for all people’s needs and differing 
fundamentally from all other systems (Hopwood, 2000). Later this view gained 
support from Ali Shariati ---a modern fundamentalist who argued that democracy and 
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Western liberalism are in practice nothing but the free opportunity to display 
liberalism and to create more speedily an arena for the profit-hungry forces that have 
been assigned to transform humans into an economic, consuming animal (Shariati, 
2000).  
 
Both these views still exist in almost all Muslim countries and influence the nature of 
Islamic society. In the educational sector, this situation is embedded in the dichotomy 
in Islamic educational institution between religious and secular orientation. On the 
one hand, there is a need to keep the Islamic perspective, but on the other hand, there 
is a need to adopt the advances of Western methodology. This situation creates a new 
dilemma: It is preferable to integrate Western modes of learning into the Islamic 
perspective which would then result in the creation of a single educational system 
which would be both Islamic and secular. This problem is debated in the Islamic 
world (Nasr, 2002). However, since the traditional group leaders have lost their 
power in conjunction with the decline of traditional Islamic educational institutions, 
almost all Islamic countries have a Western-type educational system up to university 
level. One outcome has been the creation of a new class of Western-educated people 
who are more tolerant to Western notions, such as democracy (Watt, 1988). 
 
As global issues, the notions of secularization and democracy will continue to affect 
Islamic education. Islamic education cannot escape from those demands. Therefore, 
governing bodies in Islamic education should have an appropriate way to develop 
their educational system in accordance with the needs of a developing democratic 
society, as is the case in the West. Meanwhile, the West needs to have a strong 
sensibility when they want to talk about Islam. Hence, there is the need to develop a 
close working and mutual understanding between Islamic culture and Western 
culture, which is aimed at reducing the current suspicion and misunderstanding 
between Islam and the West. As Nasr (2002) points out, Islam and the West must 
recognise that they need to have mutual understanding and that they share many 
fundamental principles in their respective worldviews on the human level. To achieve 
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this end, the negative atmosphere must be cleared through earnest effort on all sides. 
To do this, terms such as fundamentalism, extremism, and radicalism must be 
restudied and defined not in the light of political interest but in light of the need to 
create a mutual relationship in terms of maintaining peace in the world.  
 
Islam and modernity should not be put on opposite sides to each other, because each 
of them has their own historical, philosophical, methodological and educational 
world-views. Islam, as well as modernity, is a universal ideology, which is based 
upon revealed religion. It is a complete way of life for the individual and for society. 
In this context, the Quran and Sunnah are fundamental sources for developing 
Moslem society; meanwhile modernity is primarily a Western way of thought, which 
is based on the political, economical, social and cultural approach for understanding 
contemporary life. The first originates from Allah, as Moslem societies believe, 
meanwhile the latter is created from human thought (intellectual creation of Western 
traditions), even though at the beginning inspired by religion. We do not need to put 
Islam and modernity in an equal and parallel line, because they have a different 
perspective in looking at the world’s problems. In the Indonesian context, Islam 
played a significant role in embedding a moderate view of Islam in relation to 
modernity. The form of the Indonesian state as a “national state” and Pancasila as 
“State Philosophy” is clear evidence of how Indonesian Moslems have outworked 
their moderate views. 
 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that Islam in Indonesia seems to be of a 
moderate strand, which has its own particular approach in facing the effects of 
modernity. The mainstream of Indonesian Moslems are generally the followers of 
“Ahlisunnah Waljamaah”28, that is, they share a theological conservatism, which is 
oriented towards focusing on the balance between the profane and transcendent life. 
This theological perspective has been successful in creating a Moslem with moderate 
                                                 
28 This is the name for the Moslem group which has adopted the conservative theology, called 
Asy’ariyah Theologian. 
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world views. Political, economical, social and cultural activities of most Indonesian 
Moslems are underpinned by this theological perspective. In a similar sense, Western 
modernism, through its universal principles such as the democratic system, principles 
of justice, equality, equity and human rights, has played a significant part in modern 
life, including the life of Moslem countries. Many Moslem countries have adopted 
those Western world views as basic principles for the formulation of their state 
activities, with some adjustment. As Rahman has stated, ‘syura” (democracy) is not 
originally from Islam, because it is an eternal obligation of all people as a human 
social actor (Quoted in Maarif, 1985).  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE INDONESIAN ISLAMIC EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section presents the historical 
background of the Indonesian Islamic Education system. This section describes the 
history of Indonesian Islamic education, including the types of its educational 
institutions, and the emergence and development of the Madrasah system. The second 
section examines the Indonesian Islamic education reform movement from the end of 
the 19th century until the New Order era. The third section describes the nature of 
government policy with respect to Islamic education, from the Dutch colonial era 
until the New Order of the Soeharto regime. The fourth section presents current 
developments in Islamic education, particularly since the mid-1970s onwards. The 
fifth section outlines some reasons for repositioning the Islamic educational system, 
including the need for an appropriate educational paradigm, for a suitable policy and 
strategy approach in governing the Madrasah system, and the need to reposition the 
Madrasah educational system in ways commensurate with modernity. 
 
4.1 The Historical Background of Indonesian Islamic Education. 
 
There is still debate about when first Islam entered Indonesia (see chapter 2 for 
further discussion). One prominent theory believed that Islam entered in the 13th 
century. It was brought by Arabian and Gujarat traders who came to the Indonesian 
archipelago seeking goods. They spread Islam to Indonesian local people during the 
conduct of their business. However, it is difficult to ascertain when the first Islamic 
education institution was established in Indonesia. Most Islamic educational 
historians believed that Islamic education institutions emerged and developed 
simultaneously with the spread of Islam in the Indonesian archipelago (MoRA, 
1999). 
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Basically, there are two types of Islamic educational institution in Indonesia: 
Pesantren (Traditional Islamic Boarding School) and Madrasah (Islamic School).  
 
Pesantren  
Pesantren is the indigenous and the oldest system. It comprises five prominent 
elements: Pondok (dormitories), Masjid (Mosque), Santri (Students), Pengajaran 
buku-buku Islam klasik (teaching of Classic Islamic books), and Kiyai (Islamic 
religious leader). Thus, Pesantren can be defined as traditional Islamic boarding 
schools in which students live and study together under the supervision of a religious 
leader (Dhofier, 1982). This institution is influenced by the Hindu tradition. Before 
the spread of Islam, it was a very common institution for teaching Hinduism, but later 
was adopted by Islam. The Pesantren school still keeps the typical pattern and 
positive elements of Hindu tradition, such as its teaching method, called “Sorogan”, 
although there have been changes in the content of teaching, the language used, and 
the background of pupils (Maksum, 1999).  
 
At the first stage, the students learn Al-Quran and Arabic language; and the next stage 
they study religious subjects, such as: Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), Tauhid (Islamic 
Theology), and Tafsir (Al-Quran Exegesis). In this system, there is no restrictive time 
for studying. The period of learning depends on the ability and progress of individual 
students. Students can study as long as they need to. They can start and stop studying 
according to their needs and there is no limitation of time spent at the school. The 
period of learning runs on a yearly basis and is only interrupted by fasting in the 
month of Ramadan. The daily life of Pesantren is penetrated by religious values, 
which every person can learn, and model, particularly from Kiyai (religious leader) or 
teachers (Dhofier, 1982). As Steenbrink (1986) has argued, the Pesantren was not 
only a place for academic learning, but also a place for educating young Moslems 
with Islamic values and attitudes. The Pesantren has three prominent functions: First, 
transmission of Islamic knowledge. Second, maintaining of Islamic tradition, and 
third, the reproduction of Ulama (Religious leader) (Rahim, 2000). As a result, 
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Pesantren had been successful in playing a central role as the Islamic cultural forces 
(Azra, 1999). 
 
Madrasah  
The second type of Islamic schooling system is the Madrasah system. This differs 
from the Pesantren in many ways. It follows the same classical system as the general 
schooling system and has an administration standard and a set curriculum although at 
the beginning this is focused on Islamic studies (Mudzhar, 1981). The term 
‘Madrasah’ is not originally Indonesian but is an Arabic term. There are also several 
theories about when the Madrasah entered Indonesia. One version suggests that this 
system was imported from the Islamic tradition (Middle East tradition). It was 
brought by some Indonesian students who had finished their study in Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt at the end of 19th century (Zakaria, 1998). Another idea is developed from 
Hindu tradition (Maksum, 1999). One prominent Islamic scholar argued that 
educational institutions which were similar to Pesantren or Madrasah were already 
found in the Hindu or Buddhist Kingdom era of Indonesia. Therefore, Islam simply 
appropriated the system, but changed the content of the teaching1.  
 
However, most Islamic educational historians believe that the development of the 
Madrasah system cannot be separated from the Islamic reform movement that 
occurred in the early 20th century. As Azra (1999) point outs, the modernization of 
Islamic education cannot be separated from the rise of the Islamic modernization 
programmes. The development of Islamic education runs parallel with the 
modernization of Islamic thought and related cultural movements. With respect to 
this Islamic modernization movement, Steenbrink (1986) identified four important 
factors which motivated its development in the early of 20th century: (1) the passion 
for back to basic principles: Quran and Hadits (tradition); (2) nationalism and the 
motivation to oppose the colonial government; (3) the need to strengthen the basis of 
                                                 
1 Nurcholish Madjid (1997) Pesantren’s Room: A snapshot of journey, Paramadina, Jakarta.  
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related social, economic, cultural and politic movements; and (4) the need to reform 
Islamic education in Indonesia (p.37). 
 
From these perspectives, at least, there were two significant motivations that 
underpinned the emergence and development of the Madrasah system. The first was 
the need to create a religious enlightenment based on the principles of Islam: the 
Quran and Hadits, because the religious practical life of the Indonesian Moslem 
society had become confused with local beliefs and traditions, many of which were 
contrary to Islamic truths. In this context, the main purpose of the religious 
enlightenment is purification of Islamic beliefs through bringing back the religious 
practice to original sources, Quran and Hadits. The second is the need to provide an 
appropriate educational institution for Indonesian Moslem society in which the 
system will provide a balance between a religion and science (general) orientation. 
Some Moslem reformers consider that the old system, particularly “Pesantren” is too 
focused on the religious studies and not enough on social, economic, and cultural 
problems (Azra, 1999). 
 
During the colonial era, the Dutch government introduced a schooling system, which 
focused on secular subjects. It was recognized as the only system, meanwhile the 
Islamic educational system was isolated and allowed to operate autonomous private 
institutions2. From this time, we can see that the educational dichotomy – a secular 
and religious education – has been created (Zakaria, 2002). After the Indonesian 
proclamation, particularly during the Old order and New Order, the dichotomy policy 
still continued and the Indonesian government expressed a preference for adopting 
the secular schooling system rather than the Islamic schooling system.  
 
As a result, the relationship between the Government and Islam in the first two 
decades of the New Order was poor and there was high tension between them. 
                                                 
2 This policy background led to the status of Pesantren or Madrasah as predominantly private 
institutions. 
 103
Through the President Decision No.34 of 1972 and President Instruction No.15 of 
19743, the Government tried to reduce the role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
(MoRA). This regulation became a sensitive policy that brought strong reaction from 
Moslem society, because of the concern that the Government wanted to abolish the 
Madrasah educational system which MoRA administered. In 1975, in order to cool 
down the protest, the Government released the Decision Letter of Three Ministries, 
which stated that that the Ministry of National Education (MoNE), the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (MoRA) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) would all take 
responsibility for the development of the Madrasah educational system. This 
regulation became a fundamental policy for strengthening the Madrasah educational 
system, because it was the first time the Government recognized the existence of the 
Islamic educational system. Also, it became the next step in integrating the Madrasah 
educational system into the National Educational System (MoRA, 2004). This 
became evident in 1989 when the Government created the Educational Act No.2 of 
1989. Since this time, the Madrasah educational system has been part of the national 
educational system. Now, there is an equal status between the Madrasah and Sekolah 
(Secular Schooling system) in which both use the same curriculum. In this context, 
the Madrasah educational system is understood as schooling with an Islamic character 
(Tilaar, 2000). 
 
In 2003, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and House of Representatives launched 
the Educational Act No.20 of 2003 about the Indonesian National Educational 
System. The objective of this act is, on one hand, to revise the Educational Act No. 2 
of 1989 in order to accord with the current Government policy in education, 
particularly with respect to the issue of educational decentralization (for further 
discussion of decentralization, see 4.4 below). On the other hand, it brings a strong 
reconfirmation that the Madrasah educational status is and remains and important sub 
                                                 
3 These regulations stated that the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) had full responsibility to 
administer all types of schooling system. Implicit in this regulation was that the Ministry of Religious 
Affair (MoRA) had to hand over the management and administration of the Madrasah educational 
system to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE). 
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component of the national education system. Also, this Educational Act gives a clear 
confirmation that the other form of Islamic educational system, such as Pesantren 
(Traditional Islamic Boarding School), Madrasah Diniyah and Majlis Taklim (Non 
formal religious education) also become part of the national educational system. This 
Act also provides MoRA with the challenge of setting up a comparable vocational 
education component in MoRA’s vocational school, namely: Madrasah Aliyah 
Ketrampilan (Islamic Vocational Senior Secondary School), in parallel with 
vocational education in MoNE’s school (MoRA, 2004).  
 
The implementation of the Education Act No. 20 of 2003 provides a clear opportunity 
to develop the Madrasah system as a viable “educational alternative” for the future of 
Indonesian society. With its comparative advantage, that is: Islamic characteristic 
(moral education), Madrasah education also becomes a strong and attractive 
alternative to the state (secular) system for parents4. However, Madrasah now face a 
new significant challenge, which is how to improve the quality of graduated 
Madrasah students that is equal with those students who have graduated from general 
school (Umar, 2005).  
 
 
4.2 The Indonesian Islamic Education Reform Movement 
 
The development of the Madrasah system has been strongly related to the Islamic 
movement. The early movement began at the individual level, brought by Moslem 
students who had finished their study in Arabia and Egypt. They brought a form of 
Madrasah to Indonesia at the end of 19th century (as described on chapter 2). The first 
initiative was established by reformers from Minangkabau (West Sumatra), such as 
Abdullah Ahmad, who established Madrasah Adabiyah in Padang Panjang West 
Sumatra in 1907, which later changed to be the Adabiyah School. In many aspects 
                                                 
4 On average, the increasing number of students registered in Madrasah is about 3.4% every year. 
Those increasing numbers of Madrasah’s students are higher than the growth of the school population. 
It also indicates a growing willingness in the wider community to send children to study in Madrasah 
rather than general school (Rahim, 2005). 
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this Madrasah adopted the Dutch school curriculum but included Islamic education 
for two hours a week. This initiative was followed by Abdul Karim Amrullah who 
established Surau5 Jembatan Besi, later known as Madrasah Sumatra Thawalib. At 
the same time, Zainuddin Labai El Yunusi established Madrasah Diniyah in 1916 in 
the same city. In these Madrasahs, the form of learning was based on a classical 
system and the curriculum did not merely focus on Islamic studies but also taught 
general subjects, such as, history and geography (Steenbrink, 1986).  
 
The next reform movement was at the organizational level. The first initiators were 
the Islamic modern organizations, such as: Jami’atul Khair, Al-Irsyad, and the most 
well known, Muhammadiyah6 (furthermore discussion see chapter 2). This was 
founded by K.H.Ahmad Dahlan at Jogyakarta, Central Java in 1912. As with 
Abdullah Ahmad in West Sumatra, Muhammadiyah also adopted the Schooling 
system (the Dutch colonial system) plus religious education as an additional subject. 
But it also established a Madrasah model, called: Madrasah Mu’alimin (for boys) and 
Madrasah Mu’allimat (for girls). These initiatives were followed by Jamiatul 
Washliyah in North Sumatra, Nahdlatul Ulama in East Java and Madura Island; and 
later developed throughout Indonesia (Azra, 1999).  
 
This movement had a strong commitment to reform Islamic education through 
adopting the Dutch schooling system, alongside Islamic tradition. The aim of reform 
was not merely to modernize Islamic education institutions, but also to develop 
Islamic education to be more functional for educating the young Indonesian 
generation to be good Moslems (Insan Saleh), able to face the future challenges of 
modern Indonesia. By “Insan Saleh” meant that is to be a Moslem who has a strong 
commitment to worship Allah (God) (Langgulung 1988). In facing this challenge, 
                                                 
5 According to Azra (1999), the term “Surau” refers to a small Mosque, which is not used for Friday 
Prayer, although it is used to hold many religious activities, such as: teaching Quran, religious 
ceremonies, and so on (p.117). 
6 Muhammadiyah is the second biggest Indonesian Moslem group after Nahdlatul Ulama. It was 
founded by K.H.Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta, Central Java in 1912. 
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there have been two basic trends in modernizing the Islamic education. The first is 
based on the Dutch schooling system, introduced by the Dutch colonial government 
in the early 20th century. The second is based on the Islamic tradition but adopting 
some positive aspects of the Dutch schooling system, such as: curriculum contents, 
teaching and administration methods (Azra, 1999).  
 
Referring to its character as a religious education, the function of Islamic education is 
to create a high quality of human resources in terms of knowledge and technology, 
and moral behavior. To achieve this, Islamic education should emphasize a balance 
between science and technology on the one side, and religious and moral education 
on the other side. As Tilaar (2000) points out, there is the need to have a good 
administration in order to create a balance between the Islamic character and the 
quality of education. Based on this perspective, most Islamic reformers want to 
develop the Islamic education system at both the individual and the organizational 
level, to be an effective and functional system for educating Indonesian young 
people. By adopting the schooling system and maintaining Islamic tradition, the 
Indonesian Islamic education system has been successful in educating the Indonesian 
Moslem people in a form of moderate, modernist (rather than fundamentalist) Islam. 
It is evident that the exposure to general subjects such as Algebra, geography, 
English, and reading while still keeping the Islamic tradition of teaching religious 
subjects, has led Moslems to be involved in modern society. Many of the Indonesian 
national Moslem leaders have emerged from this type institution (Azra, 1999). 
 
In terms of the process of modernization of Islamic education, there were two trends. 
The first modernization was forced by the Dutch Colonial Government in introducing 
the schooling system. Since this time, the Madrasah system has adopted some 
positive aspects of the modern educational system or the schooling system. The 
Pesantren also followed the same pattern, albeit somewhat more slowly. For example, 
in 1906 the Pesantren Mambaul Ulum in Surakarta Central Java adopted several 
general subjects, such as reading, algebra, and accounting into its curriculum. The 
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same initiative was followed by the Pesantren Tebu Ireng (1916), Pesantren Modern 
Gontor (1926) in East Java, and the Pesantren Santi Asrama (1932) in West Java. 
Since 1950, some Pesantrens have introduced vocational training and a classical 
system in the form of the Madrasah into their system. Others Pesantrens have 
introduced the Dutch schooling system into their system (Azra, 1999). 
 
The nature of Islamic education has thus shifted from an exclusive system to an 
inclusive system or from an orthodox education to a more open and liberal system. 
This shift has lead to diversity in the Islamic education system. Now, as well as the 
Pesantren and the Madrasah, there is a third form of Islamic education, that is: the 
general Islamic school, first established in the 1960s. These schools in many aspects 
are based on the model of the general schooling system and they are administered by 
the Ministry of Education, but also include religious education. To accommodate this, 
the school day is longer and the learning takes place until late in the afternoon (Azra, 
1999). This development has led to the new perspective that Islamic education does 
not need to be limited to Pesantren and the Madrasah form, but it could be in another 
form, such as: the general Islamic schooling form. Since, 1990, some of the Islamic 
schools have become an “Excellent School”, which in some respects offer higher 
quality education than that provided in a General school (Public school) or Madrasah 
school. Therefore, the Islamic school form has become a popular school for many 
Indonesian Moslem communities, particularly those who live in city or urban areas 
(Azra, 1999). 
 
Each type of Islamic educational system makes a significant contribution towards 
educating the Indonesian people. It is also clear that the Islamic education system has 
played an important role in creating the Indonesian Moslem people as moderate 
Moslems, because the Indonesian Islamic educational system has been developed on 
the basis of a balance between the commitment to create good conduct on the one 
side and good knowledge and skill on the other side. As Husain and Ashraf (1979) 
point out, education should aim at the balanced growth of the total personality, 
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intellect, the rational itself, feelings, and bodily sense. Therefore, it should cater for 
the growth of humans in all aspects. 
 
Meanwhile, the growth in recognition of the Islamic education system by Indonesian 
society has brought new challenges for the Indonesian Islamic institutions and all 
stakeholders of Islamic institutions, particularly the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
(MoRA) to improve the quality of the Islamic educational system in order to face the 
current demands of modern Indonesian society (Azra, 1999). This challenge has 
become significant, particularly in responding to the re-Islamization of Indonesian 
Moslem society in the last two decades. This trend is apparent in that an increasing 
number of Muslim families are sending their children to the Islamic schools or 
enrolling them in the Madrasah system rather than in the general school system, 
because they believe the latter system does not provide a “good learning 
environment” for their children, and also is an ‘unsafe’ place for developing a good 
character. In contrast, some excellent general Islamic schools and Madrasahs, besides 
offering a good quality of education also provide a good religious education by 
practicing basic rituals and moral education, such as, collective prayer and reading 
the Quran (Azra, 1999). 
  
4.3 The Nature of Government Policy with respect to the Islamic Education 
System  
 
During the colonial era, the Colonial Government did not support Islamic educational 
institutions. Pesantren and Madrasah were isolated from the mainstream of colonial 
government policy. Several policies were enacted that made it difficult for Islamic 
schools to operate. One example is the ‘School and Teacher Ordinance of 19057, 
which required registered schools and religious teachers to get a “Teaching 
                                                 
7 According to Rahim (1999) this policy had been understood by Moslem society as the principal 
Government policy to reduce the development of Islamic teaching (p.23).  
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License”8. According to Steenbrink (1986) the main reason that the colonial 
government ignored the Islamic education system was because it was seen to lack an 
appropriate didactic-method. However, Maksum (1999) argues that the character of 
Islamic education put more emphasis on Islamic doctrine, which provided a strong 
stimulus and motivation to challenge and critique unacceptable government practices. 
In the early 19th century, the colonial government introduced a formal schooling 
system, which was recognized as the only system. However, by the end of the 19th 
century some Indonesian Moslem students who had finished their studies in Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt brought a form of Madrasah to Indonesia (Zakaria, 1998). Since 
this time, the Pesantren and the Madrasah system have become an alternative choice 
for Muslim society.  
 
As discussed earlier, we can see that the educational dichotomy --- a secular and 
religious education – has been in co-existence since the colonial era (Steenbrink, 
1986). After the Indonesian proclamation on August 17, 1945, the dichotomy still 
continued and the new Indonesia government adopted the secular schooling system as 
the mainstream national form of schooling system and allowed the Islamic education 
to operate the Madrasah and Pesantren as autonomous private institutions belonging 
to Moslem society. This policy was not well received by many Indonesian Moslem 
leaders who wanted the Indonesian government to adopt the Islamic education system 
as part of the national educational system. As a compromise, the government 
established the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), which took responsibility for 
administering the Madrasah educational system. The main reason for establishing this 
ministry was to recognize the contribution of Islamic education to educating 
Indonesian society (Steenbrink, 1986; see also Chapter 2).  
 
During the Old Order (1945-1968) or Soekarno regime, the educational system was 
centralized in order to maintain the national integrity as a new nation. The first two 
                                                 
8 Maksum (1999) in his book, Madrasah: History and Development, observes that the Colonial 
Government set up a strict policy which required every religious teacher to have a teacher license. 
With this policy not every religious teacher can teach at any educational institutions.  
 110
decades of the Old Order (1945-1965), the attention of the new government on the 
Islamic educational system was poor. There was no strategic policy for the Islamic 
educational system, particularly at the basic education level. But there were several 
fragmented educational policies. In 1945, the new government founded the Sekolah 
Tinggi Islam (the Islamic Higher School) in Jakarta in order to accommodate Muslim 
aspirations and to balance policy. One year later, in 1946 this school was changed to 
become the Indonesian Islamic University (UII) in 1946 with four faculties: Religion, 
education, law, and economics. In 1950, based on the Government Regulation No. 34 
of 1950, the faculty of religion of the UII became the State Islamic Religious School 
(PTAIN) in Yogyakarta. It was proposed to create a central higher education for the 
development of Islamic sciences (Rahim, 2000).  
 
Meanwhile, in 1957 based on the decision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
(MoRA), the government also founded the Academy of Religious Education (ADIA) 
in Jakarta. The proposal was to train public servants who had an academic 
background in religious education. In 1960 both these institutions, PTAIN and ADIA, 
based on the President Regulation No. 11, integrated to became the State Institute of 
Islamic Studies (IAIN) which took place in Yogyakarta and Jakarta (Azra, 1999). In 
2003, the IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta became a university, called: State Islamic 
University (UIN) and it was followed by IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta in 2004. 
An increasing number of these institutions were created from 1960 to 1975. The IAIN 
and UIN showed a broad orientation in their curriculum and educational approach, 
they were inspired by the Middle Eastern tradition of Islamic higher education and 
the Western academic tradition (Meuleman, 2002). 
 
At the secondary education level, the only prominent educational policy was the 
establishment of the Madrasah Compulsory Learning (MWB) by the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (MoRA). The establishment of the Madrasah Compulsory Learning 
by Ministry of Religious Affairs was in order to elaborate the Educational Act no.4 of 
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1950 section 10 point 29. This model of schooling was implemented in the school 
year 1958-1959. The aim of this policy was to build the national character for the 
progress of the economic, industrial and transmigration sectors. In this school, 
students not only studied religious subjects but also general subjects and vocational 
subjects. Unfortunately, this type of school was terminated in 1970 through lack of 
government funding (Rahim, 2000).  
 
There was thus no strategic policy for the Islamic education system until the end of 
the 1960s. This failure was not only caused by the weaknesses of government policy 
but was also caused by the real condition of Islamic education. Most of the Islamic 
schools are private institutions with a strong autonomous system, which has a strong 
commitment to Islamic traditions. Further, the situation was also influenced by the 
discriminatory policies of government - established during the Dutch colonial 
government and continued during the Indonesian government. The Soekarno 
government (Old Order), later followed by the Soeharto government (New Order), 
seemed to be emulating the old Dutch policy of emasculating political Islam while 
outwardly promoting its spiritual health (Vatikiotis,1998). Hence, the Islamic 
educational system, particularly the Madrasah system, was isolated from the 
mainstream of the national educational system (Tilaar, 2000). 
 
The centralized approach of administering the educational system continued during 
the New Order (1968-1998) or Soeharto regime. Most government policies in 
education had a top down approach. Planning, managing and controlling were 
centralized. On behalf of the stabilization of the development of the national 
economy, politics and security, the New Order government used education as a 
political tool for maintaining its power. During this era, there was no chance to create 
a different pattern of administering an educational system (Tilaar, 2000). In this 
context, the development of Islamic education depended on the nature of the 
                                                 
9 This regulation mentioned that learning at the Madrasah educational system, which is recognized by 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), had been successful in meeting the needs of the national 
compulsory learning. 
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relationship between the Government and Islam which, as discussed earlier in relation 
to the President Decision No.34 of 1972 and President Instruction No.15 of 1974, was 
often fraught.  
 
However, since the early 1990s there has been a radical shift of the New Order 
Government politics, from secular strands to religious strands. This shift began after 
the new order government gave the ‘green light’ and concrete ‘support’ to founders of 
the ICMI (The Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association) in December 1990. 
Politically, it was a concrete manifestation of change in President Soeharto’s attitude 
and approach to Islam in Indonesia. In this context, he appeared more prepared to 
accommodate Muslim interests in order to get political support from the Muslim 
community. Meanwhile culturally, the establishment of ICMI provided a ‘voice’ to 
Islam in national discourse (Ramage, 1995). The establishment of ICMI became a 
second wave in the political and cultural revival of Islam, because this institution 
gave a greater opportunity to Indonesian Muslim groups to articulate their views 
through being involved directly with the power of state. At the micro level, this 
development also has had a positive impact on the development of the Islamic 
educational system. During that time, several important policies on Islam had been 
released. The Law no 7 of 1989 concerned ‘religious court law’ and lead to a 
clarification and reaffirmation of the independence and equality of religious Islamic 
court of law and the law no 2 of 1989 on the national educational system affirmed the 
continuance of religious education in public schools and recognized religious 
education as a formal subsystem of the national educational system (Ramage, 1995; 
see also earlier discussion). 
 
Since this time, the Madrasah system has received strong support from all 
Government levels. In 1991, the Government offered private madrasahs the 
opportunity to become public madrasahs. The number of these institutions grew 
significantly from 1,095 to 3.310, during 1991 to 1997. This policy has been 
continued to the present day. Also, more assistance and funding were provided for 
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developing the Madrasah system. Since the mid-1980s, the Madrasah system also 
received assistance from International agencies, such as: Unesco, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), World Bank and Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
(Zakaria, 1998).  
 
The involvement of International agencies in the development of the Islamic 
educational system became a strategic policy for improving the quality of the Islamic 
educational system. This policy also provided an opportunity for the Islamic 
educational system to come in contact again with modernity, particularly western 
knowledge and technology. During the last two decades, the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs (MoRA) has successfully developed an educational relationship and 
educational assistance programmes with international agencies. It began in the early 
1980s when the Directorate of Religious Tertiary Education was successful in 
developing an educational relationship with the University of Leiden, in the 
Netherlands, and with McGill University, Canada in the mid 1980s. In the early 
1990s, it was followed by the Directorate of Islamic School Development within the 
Directorate General of Islamic Institution, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) 
through the Junior Secondary Education Project (JSEP) in 1994, Basic Education 
Project (BEP)`in 1996 and Development of Madrasah Aliyah Project (DMAP) in 
1997 which successfully created a major training programme. Many hundreds of 
Madrasah teachers and staff have followed in domestic and overseas training. Some 
of them have been involved in short courses and others have followed degree 
programmes both in Indonesia and overseas. As Meuleman (2002) argues, for at least 
two decades it has been the policy of the MoRA to send specialists in Islamic 
sciences for graduate studies to both Middle Eastern and Western countries, such as 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, in the Middle East, and the USA, Canada, 
Australia, Malaysia and New Zealand. 
 
However, these policies have not as yet had a significant impact on the quality aspect 
of the Madrasah system, such as curriculum and management quality. As Tilaar 
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(2000) argues, the centralized approaches of implementing these policies have created 
several anomalous policies in the educational sector. Centralizing administration, 
curriculum, funding and recruiting of staff has created distortions and dislocation in 
many aspects of education. In summary, the concept of education has been reduced to 
‘schooling’, that is the education process is limited to the teaching and learning 
within the classroom activities. 
 
4.4 Current Developments in Islamic Education 
  
In 1998, the New Order government collapsed as a result of a successful political 
movement. Since that time, a new government, called the ‘reformation government’ 
has committed itself to developing real democracy through changing government 
policy from a centralized approach to a decentralized approach. To achieve this, the 
new government, together with the House of Representatives, created the Acts No. 22 
and 25 of 1999. Under these acts, the central government has to share its power and 
responsibility with the provincial and the district governments through giving more 
autonomy to local governments (Tilaar, 2000). 
 
The total reformation of many aspects of Indonesian government and society has led 
to fundamental changes in politics, economics, law and education. Before the 
reformation era, the centralized approach in administering the education system was 
apparent in policy development, such as the centralized curriculum, the bureaucratic 
administration and a top down mechanism approach. Therefore, the Acts No. 22 and 
25 of 1999 have brought about significant impacts on the nature of the future 
Indonesian education system, including the Islamic educational system. They have 
decentralized education so that local government and individual schools are free to 
administer and manage schools based on their own local and society needs. This 
decentralized education requires a new educational paradigm that will affect the 
nature of curriculum, administration and management systems, school income and 
spending, and other aspects of the educational system. Therefore, the decentralized 
educational system will require all social institutions, from the central level to the 
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provincial and district level, to have significant input in order to implement these 
policies effectively (Tilaar, 2000). 
 
In this context, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) has also transferred some 
of their educational responsibilities to the local Government, particularly to district 
government. Now, the local Governments have responsibilities to administer and 
manage schools from Kindergarten to Senior High School. For this need, almost of 
Local Government, both provincial and district levels, already have set up a new 
educational body – that is, “Dinas Pendidikan” (Educational Office), which has 
responsibility to administer education at the local level. This development based on 
the Act No. 22 of 1999 about Local Autonomy and the Act No. 25 of 1999 about 
Financial Balanced between Central Government and Local Government have also 
had implications for the Madrasah system. The provision of the Act No. 22 of 1999, 
article 11 (2), for example, stated that: “The Local Government must have a strong 
concern with the development of madrasah as a sub-system of national educational 
system. Therefore, the Madrasah should be decentralized”. (Tilaar, 2000).  
 
However, the implications of decentralization for the Madrasah system still remain 
hotly debated. Some official and Muslim scholars have agreed to hand over the 
administration of Madrasah to MoNE or Local Government; but some others want to 
refuse this provision, keeping Madrasah under the centralized control of MoRA, as 
currently. For this latter group, a policy of decentralization will have a negative 
impact on the Madrasah system. One important reason here is the view that the 
Madrasah will lose its special character as an Islamic institution if administered and 
supervised by ‘unsuitable’ agencies. Meanwhile for the former group, the principal 
reason for their advocacy of decentralization is the view that the quality of education 
provided by the Madrasah will improve significantly as a result. However, the latest 
educational policy from MoRA seems to suggest that they still want to keep the 
centralized approach, because the Madrasah system is not yet ready in their view to 
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face the impact of a decentralized policy, particularly the need for maintaining the 
Islamic characteristic of Madrasah into the future (Basyuni, 2005).  
 
In the light of this issue, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), which has 
responsibility for improving the quality of the Islamic educational system, needs to 
develop a new paradigm for constructing the future of the Islamic educational system 
that can face up to the current needs of Indonesian Muslim society, and within a 
growing framework of decentralization. To achieve this, MoRA, together with its 
apparatus from central to district levels, needs to reformulate a new vision and 
mission for administering the Islamic educational system to take account of current 
developments. As Malik Fadjar reminded us in 1997:  
every policy on the development of the Islamic educational system needs to accommodate 
three problems. These are: (1) how those policies provide a natural growing space for the 
aspiration of Islamic society, (2) how those policies clarify and solidify the Islamic schooling 
system parallel to the secular schooling system, as a means of developing educated, 
knowledgeable, and productive people with morality and integrity, (3) and how those policies 
can establish an Islamic educational system prepared to respond to the future of Indonesian 
Muslim society (Fadjar in Rahardjo, 1997, p.153-154). 
 
For MoRA, this issue, on the one hand, may not be too problematic because the 
Islamic schooling system since its genesis has been autonomous and less bureaucratic 
compared with its counterpart, the secular schooling system, which has been strongly 
dependent on central government policy and funding (the Ministry of National 
Education). But on the other hand, it provides a serious challenge for the Islamic 
educational system – how to create new strategic educational policies that will lead to 
improving the quality of the Islamic schooling system to become a strong system 
within the broader decentralized national educational system. This is further 
highlighted by actual recent experience which reveals that there is a different attitude 
of local government towards Madrasah compared to general schools. The local 
government attention is more accommodating to general schools rather than to 
Madrasah because the administration of schooling is already now part of local 
government; while the administration of Madrasah remains, via MoRA, still part of 
central government, at least for now. For example: most local governments have put 
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forward educational budgets for supporting the schooling system which ignore 
madrasah. If this is not solved, the Islamic educational system will face a serious 
problem – that is, a lack of sufficient financial support from local government. To 
address this, MoRA should demonstrate a strong commitment and willingness to fight 
for enough funding at the central level in order to ensure the effective, ongoing 
administration of Madrasah at the local level. As Malik Fadjar, the former head of 
Ministry of Religious Affairs argues, Madrasah cannot be replaced with other 
institutions, since it has its own special vision, mission and characters which are 
embedded within a social life of the Indonesian society, particularly in Indonesian 
Muslim society (Fadjar, 1997).  
 
4.5 Some reasons for repositioning the Islamic educational system 
 
The need for a new educational paradigm 
The radical change in the nature of Indonesian government, from an ‘autocratic 
regime’ (under Soekarno and Soeharto) to a ‘democratic regime’ (under the 
Reformation government) has lead to a shift in the nature of the Indonesian education 
system from a centralized to a decentralized one. During the New Order, education 
was separated from society and belonged to the bureaucracy. Education became a 
bureaucratic business and was reduced only to the level of schooling. This is the old 
paradigm of the past Indonesian government in administering the educational system. 
Changing the nature of the educational system from a centralized approach to a 
decentralized approach means that government is bringing back education to society. 
This change will require a new paradigm to administer the educational system, one 
that will also need to empower the traditional social institutions. The social 
institutions of the old system need to be replaced with the social institutions which fit 
the present day Indonesian society (Tilaar, 2000).  
 
With respect to Islamic education, especially the Madrasah educational system, there 
is no problem in principle with school as a part of society, because most of the 
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Madrasah belong to Moslem society or are private schools10. This means that there is 
already a strong relationship between the Madrasah institutions and the Moslem 
communities. This relationship is a manifestation of their faith in Islam in one sense 
and maintaining Islamic culture in another sense (Zakaria, 2002). However, in 
practice, the Madrasah educational system now faces a number of educational 
problems resulting from lack of policies and strategies in the past, from ongoing 
inequities of management and funding, and from a lack of material and human 
resources. There is a need for empowering and enlightening the Madrasah 
educational system. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) as a formal 
stakeholder needs to develop a new educational paradigm for the development of the 
Madrasah educational system. The Madrasah education system should be a center of 
excellence for creating Indonesian young people who have a strong belief and 
commitment to God, who are educated and nationalistic but who have global views. 
Also, this paradigm will create an educated people who have a strong concern and 
awareness of democracy, peace, competitiveness, and the need for social welfare. 
Malik Fadjar (1999), as Director General of Islamic Education, proposed his view 
that there is now a need to conduct a comprehensive reform of the Madrasah 
educational system, such as: reformulating its educational philosophy (vision and 
mission), school culture (the nature of relationships), administration and management 
system, and funding system.  
 
The need for a suitable policy and strategy approach 
  
The shift of the Indonesian educational system to a decentralized approach has 
discarded the old centralized approach. In the old system, the educational system was 
characterized by a top down approach in which every initiative came from the top 
(central government) while the local governments and schools followed the 
instructions rigidly. To implement its policy, the central government had support 
from its central body at the level of provinces and districts. Before 1999, ‘Kanwil’, 
                                                 
10 A number of private Madrasah at primary level is 95,2 %, at Junior Secondary level is 75,7 %, and 
at Senior Secondary level is 70 % (Rahim, 2000). 
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the central body that represented and acted on the central policies and strategies 
became a strong agency of the central body at the provincial level. Under the Acts 
No.22 and 25 of 1999, however, a new pattern and structure of educational policy and 
strategy for administering the educational system was required. Now, every province 
and district has its own agency, called Kantor Dinas Pendidikan  (Office of 
Educational Board). However, there is not always yet a clear distinction between the 
functions of provincial and district boards. 
 
To solve this current problem, Tilaar (2000) proposed that the Provincial Board of 
Education coordinate several aspects not handled by the District Board of Education, 
such as: providing teacher staff, educational management, teacher training (pre-
service and in-service training) or upgrading teachers that will meet the needs of the 
local community. Meanwhile, the District Board of Education will run day-to-day 
activities, such as: school administration and management support (from planning, 
organizing, coordinating and evaluating), school and teacher supervision, and 
equipment and financial support. This proposal has been adopted by Government 
which is apparent in Educational Act No. 20 of 2003 in Chapter 14, part one, on 
article (4) and (5)11.  
 
However, these are not simple tasks for either board and require professional 
knowledge and skills. It appears that there is still a need to set up several new 
educational institutions and educational boards which fit into the new decentralized 
educational approach. To achieve this, the Provincial Board needs to work with a 
local tertiary education and educators to develop educational management institutions 
which fit within the new decentralized paradigm. For this need, empowering of 
                                                 
11 The Educational Act No. 20 of 2003 chapter 14, part one, article (4) and (5) states: (4) Provincial 
government has responsibility in making coordination over educational administration, the 
development of educational human resources, providing educational facilities for district area; (5) 
District government has responsibility for administering a basic and secondary education level, and 
another educational form with local advantages (BP. Panca Usaha, 2003, p. 26). 
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district government, local school and community has become an emergent policy in 
administering the current Indonesian educational system.  
 
With respect to the nature of Act No.22 of 1999, the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
(MoRA) also needs to set up a new pattern of educational policy for administering the 
Madrasah educational system. To achieve this, Muhaimin (1999) proposed two 
recommendations. These are: 
 
First, the administering of the Madrasah should be conducted by society. 
Local Government should have responsibility for several aspects, such as 
budgeting, administration and management support, and institutional 
development and MoRA should be responsible for preparing and developing 
several essential policies (providing curriculum guidelines, assessment 
guidelines) and subject matters (such as: English and Arabic subjects, Science 
and Math subjects). 
Second, in giving the local government autonomy to administer the Madrasah 
educational system based on local aspiration, the provincial and district 
government needs to establish a Religious Education Board within their 
structure to ensure the local government still maintain the Islamic character of 
the Madrasah educational system. 
 
Adopting these recommendations, the Madrasah system will be open and democratic. 
The community as main stakeholder will have direct access to every step of the 
Madrasah’s activities and progress. Also, MoRA as a formal stakeholder will have 
the opportunity to monitor the ongoing development of the Madrasah. With this 
pattern many elements of Indonesian society will have the access and opportunity to 
be involved in developing the Madrasah educational system. 
 
The Madrasah educational system should also respond to the new nature and 
demands of the Indonesian society. The Madrasah educational system should be 
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developed with a balance between a religious and national orientation, and 
individualistic and socialistic orientation, and also be ready to accommodate the 
essential needs of contemporary and future Indonesian society. Therefore, MoRA, as 
the formal stakeholder of the Madrasah educational system, needs to create a suitable 
policy approach in order to develop the Madrasah educational system to become an 
alternative schooling system to this end. The Madrasah system should develop its 
own positive values, such as egalitarianism flexibility, moral education, and 
community-based education, and reformulate them to strengthen the quality of 
community. Also, there is the need to empower the Madrasah institutions and local 
government through giving them full autonomy to administer their own Madrasah, 
based on the needs of the local community and the future challenge of Indonesian 
society, especially the challenge of addressing modernity within an ongoing moderate 
Islamic tradition and knowledge system (Tilaar, 2000).  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION  
 
5.1. Religious base of Islamic education.  
Islamic education is based on the principles and cultural climate of Islamic values and 
norms. Both the Quran and Hadits as fundamental sources create a conducive climate for 
developing knowledge by placing teaching and learning as the priority in Moslem life. 
Teaching and learning is the central theme of Islam and a sacred mission. Every Moslem is 
required to teach Islam, even if it is only one word, particularly to their children. This edict 
obliges an adult Moslem (teacher) to construct the character and morality of the learners 
according to Islamic values and conducts. Hence, Islamic education institutions are 
established by Moslem religious leaders when they come and settle in one place.  
 
As religious obligations, teaching and learning, particularly the teaching and learning of 
Islamic values and norms, have become an essential part of Moslem social life. In the 
beginning, the teaching and learning process focused on religious education to provide 
children with a moral education. The form of teaching and learning were characterized by a 
simple non formal education through teaching Quran at the house of  a religious teacher or 
at the Mosque, but later developed an educational system such as we find it now. The 
Islamic teaching institutions, Kuttab (non-formal religious teaching), Masdjid Khan 
(Mosque non-formal religious teaching), Halaqah (circle study), Madrasah (Islamic school), 
and Pesantren (Islamic Traditional Boarding School) have made a significant contribution to 
maintaining the intellectual and moral tradition of Islam through a tradition of teaching as a 
religious obligation.  
 
In the Indonesian context, the Madrasah and Pesantren have become an educational tradition 
for Indonesian Moslem society. Many Indonesian Moslem families send their children to 
study at Madrasah or Pesantren even though they also attend the mainstream school. 
Children of primary age (between 7-12 years) send their children to the Madrasah or 
Pesantren in the afternoons after studying at a school in the morning. This became an 
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educational tradition for many Moslem families; because it provides a religious base for 
developing a family or community with a good moral and conduct. 
 
This Islamic teaching (education) provides a religious intellectual perspective from which to 
look at human problems when Islam developed into a discourse of world knowledge. This 
intellectual tradition emerged during the classic era of the development of Islam from the 7th  
to the 10th century, which saw the emergence of many Islamic scholars in many major 
disciplines as Al-Kindi (philosophy, math); Al-Farabi (philosophy, Art); Ibnu Rusd 
(Philosophy, Medicine), Al-Ghazali( Theology and Mysticism) until Ibn Chaldun (History 
and Sociology) in the 14th century. All these scholars played a significant role in setting in 
place a religious base for Islamic education. Most of  classic studies of Islam refer to their 
disciplines, and also their innovations in the field of knowledge, as an essential foundation 
for developing a modern(ist) Islamic knowledge. 
 
Islam provides another perspective for looking at a human problem. As a complete way of 
life, Islam can contribute to the spiritual, moral and physical welfare of family, community 
and mankind. Also, as a world ideology Islam has provided some principles, such as 
mankind’s need for teaching and learning, for understanding God’s creation, and using 
natural resources appropriately. Islam also provides the principles for social organization, 
such as justice, honesty, fairness, and responsibility. The natural and social principles of the 
Qur’an provide a knowledge base to develop a new knowledge form, based on religious 
values and norms. Both the Qur’an and the Sunnah are the fundamental sources for 
developing Islamic education as an alternative institution for the future. 
 
Accordingly, it is recommended that every initiative for developing a new model of Islamic 
education should take into account the religious base of Islamic education in order to ensure 
that the process of teaching and learning reflects the values and ethical aspects of Islamic 
knowledge. However, there is a need to formulate an appropriate religious base for 
developing effective Islamic education. This would involve negotiation between STAIN, 
IAIN and UIN and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA).  
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2. Knowledge base of Islamic education  
 
The social setting of the emerging of Islam is Arabic culture and civilization, but the values, 
norms and teaching methods of Islam came from the Qur’an through the prophet 
Muhammad S.A.W. Within two hundreds years, Islam has spread from Andalusia (Spain) in 
Europe in the West; Dutch Hindia (Indonesia) in the South East Asia; and Kazakhstan in 
Central Asia. Islam is accepted by many nations, because its teaching values and norms are 
compatible, adaptable and relevant to the local people’s needs. In this sense, we can see that 
Islam can accept local values and norms as long as they do not destroy the main faith of 
Islam, that is belief in one God and the prophet Muhammad. Within Islam, there are many 
perspectives. In Islamic jurisprudence (Islamic Law), there are four dominant Madzhabs 
(sects), the Madzhab of Maliki and Hambali (Conservative and Orthodox strand), the 
Madzhab of Hanafi (rationalist), and the Madzhab of Syafii (moderate strand). Theology 
strands comprise the Asyariah/Ahlussunnah Waljamaah (Conservative and orthodox strand), 
Syiah (rational and puritan strand), Mu’tazilah (Rational and liberal strand), and Khawarij 
(radical strand). The Islamic law (Fiqh) and Islamic theology strand determine the type of 
Islamic political perspective, of which there are three types; the moderate strand (Egypt, 
Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia); the conservative strand (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordanian, 
and Qatar); and the radical strand (Palestine and Iran). This political culture is an outcome 
of the perspective adopted.  For instance: Indonesia has been much influenced by the 
Islamic jurisprudence of the Madzhab of Syaffi and Islamic theology of 
Asy’ariah/Ahlissunnah Waljamaah. As a result the perspective of Indonesian Moslem 
society is a moderate one. In comparison, the perspective in Iran is rational and puritan 
because they have been much influenced by the Islamic jurisprudence of Madzhab Hambali 
(orthodox strand) and the Islamic theology of Syiah (puritan strand).  
 
However, the entire strands are still within the framework of Islamic faith (belief), which is 
based on the Qur’an and the Hadits, however interpreted. This means that substantially 
Islam is one, as Allah (God) stated in the Quran; but in reality, the face of Islam can be seen 
in many forms (pluralism). There is Islamic Arabia, Islamic Palestine, Islamic Pakistan, 
Islamic Africa, and Islamic Indonesia. So, Islam in reality has different faces as a result of 
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adopting different philosophical and methodological approaches.   From the description 
above, we can see that every strand in Islam has it own approach and method of 
understanding Islam and world life. This approach and understanding depend on their 
theology, jurisprudence and political strands. All these strands, particularly the theology 
strand, strongly influence the nature of Islamic education.  
 
In Indonesia, the strand of the Madzhab Syafii (a moderate Islamic jurisprudence) combined 
with the Theology of Asyariyah/Ahlisunnah Waljamaah (a conservative Islamic theology) 
has created a moderate form of Indonesian Islamic education. There are, at least two strands 
of Islamic education. The first is the modernist strand that wants to integrate both the 
Islamic and the Western educational tradition in their educational system. The General 
schools are prominent examples of this strand. The second is the traditionalist strand which 
adopted the Islamic educational tradition in their educational system. The Madrasah and 
Pesantren are examples of this strand. The introduction of the Western educational system 
into the General school during the Dutch colonial era has created a dichotomy in Indonesian 
education between the Islamic education and the General education. Historically, there have 
been some tensions between the systems (Islamic education and the General education). 
Islamic education has largely been isolated from and neglected by the mainstream 
educational system during the Dutch colonial period and the early modern Indonesian 
government. 
 
At the beginning, there was a large difference between the Indonesian Islamic education and 
the Indonesian general education. The curriculums of the Islamic school were more focused 
on Islamic subjects, such as: Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), Hadits (Prophet Tradition), Holy 
Quran, Akhlak (Moral), Arabic, and Islamic History. Most of the teaching and learning 
orientation referred to the Middle East tradition because almost all of the teachers had 
graduated from the Islamic Tertiary education or Islamic College, such as Al-Azhar 
University in Egypt or Mekkah and Madinah University or College in Saudi Arabia. The 
general education system emerged from the Western education tradition, introduced by the 
Dutch colonial government and Indonesian students who graduated from Western 
Universities. Most of the teaching and learning orientation referred to the Western tradition. 
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From both these traditions emerged a dichotomy of education in Indonesia, Islamic 
Education in the form of Madrasah (Islamic school) and the secular education in the form of  
General School (the Schooling system). This became established when the modern 
Indonesian government adopted the secular schooling system as the mainstream of 
Indonesian national education and let Islamic education develop along lines based on their 
own way (tradition). 
 
There are two significant distinctions between General Education and Islamic Education. 
The first is teaching orientation. The main purpose of General education is transferring 
intellectual knowledge and skills, whereas Islamic education is more focused on embedding 
a moral outlook in learners. To bridge this gap, the Indonesian government has developed 
several educational policies that require the teaching of religious subjects in the general 
school and introducing general subjects, such as maths, science, and English into the 
Madrasah. It has not been easy to integrate the two traditions because each has its own 
historical, philosophical, epistemological and methodological dimensions. However, it is 
clear that it is necessary in order to enable learners to cope with change and developments in 
knowledge and technology. A new model of Islamic education is being discussed at present 
which integrates the most valuable aspect of Islamic education (moral and religious 
attitudes) with the most valuable of General education (intellectual and methodological 
approach). This is a Model Sekolah Berbasis Pesantren [Model School on the basis of 
Pesantren (the Islamic Boarding Tradition)].  
 
 In looking at this trend, it is suggested that the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) 
should create conducive conditions through giving strong commitment and support for 
developing a knowledge base for Islamic education. One significant issue for MoRA is the 
question as to where Islamic education will fit in the future. 
 
3. The Structural form of Islamic Education  
 
Before 1999, the administration of the Indonesian educational system was highly 
centralized. The main responsibilities were shared between the Ministry of National 
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Education (MoNE) who administered the Schooling system and the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs (MoRA) who administered the Madrasah system, which made up 17% of the 
National Education. The new Educational Act of No. 20 of 2003 as the requirement of the 
Act of No. 22 of 1999 about Autonomy of Local Government shifted educational 
administration from a centralized to a decentralized approach in which the central 
government (Ministry of National Education) shares its power and responsibilities with local 
governments, particularly at the district level. This obligation would apply also to Islamic 
education. However, the Madrasahs (Islamic schools) cannot yet implement this because 
MoRA is still a central body of government, with  responsibility for administering  Islamic 
education.  
 
This “confusing” situation has had a significant impact on the Islamic education system, 
particularly the public schools, such as State Madrasah, STAIN, IAIN and UIN. Most of the 
local governments are “afraid” to fund Islamic education, even though the Educational Act 
encourages them to do so. Hence, the budget allocation for Islamic education comes from 
the religious sector rather than the educational sector. This limited funding has made it 
difficult to improve the quality of Islamic education. This situation is apparent, particularly 
in Madrasah and Pesantren, whose lack of educational facilities, educational resources, and 
funding support clearly affect the quality of education they offer.   
 
There have been two responses to this situation. The rational and modern groups want to 
encourage the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) to place Islamic education under one 
system administered by the Ministry of National Education. In the decentralized educational 
system, the Islamic school would gain the educational advantages associated with access to 
resources to improve the quality of Islamic education.  However, the conservative groups 
are concerned that, in such an integration, the character of the education offered in Islamic 
education will be compromised. This group considers that the Madrasah and the Pesantren 
have their own characteristics, which could not be maintained in an appropriate way unless 
the education is based on the Islamic teaching and learning traditions. 
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In looking at the future, the decentralized approach would seem to be the best policy for 
administering and improving the quality of Islamic education. This approach means that 
Islamic education would be administered by the local Moslem community and local 
government. The benefit for the Islamic schools would be moral, educational, and funding 
support from the community. This means that Madrasah and Pesantren education would 
report back to their community as a key stakeholder. This change in educational policy will 
require several educational programmes. The highest priority is to develop an effective 
Islamic Teacher Education institution in order to produce appropriately trained religious 
teachers for Islamic and General schools. Therefore, changing government policy on  
Teacher Education institutions to give such institutions more autonomy would provide a 
significant opportunity for developing a new model of Islamic teacher education based on  
local educational needs. 
 
A new model of Islamic Teacher education should aim at producing teacher graduates who 
have holistic and comprehensive competencies. These are academic competencies to 
transfer knowledge and science according to ethical principles; professional competencies to 
be an effective teacher and learner; personal competencies to be a positive role model for 
their students; and social competencies, to enable him/her to understand the social dynamics 
and the social contexts at play.  To achieve this, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) 
as the main stakeholder needs to decide what kind of Islamic teacher education is needed for 
the future of the Islamic education, particularly for the Madrasah and Pesantren system. 
There is a need to encourage a clear vision about what kind of Islamic teacher education is 
needed for the future demands of the Moslem society in Indonesia, as well as the associated 
need to develop a strategic programme for implementing effective Islamic teaching and 
learning.  
 
To create a new model of Islamic teacher education with a focus on such holistic and 
comprehensive competencies requires that the institutions develop an appropriate policy 
framework. This can be achieved by developing several programmes, as formulated below:   
First, set a clear vision about the role of Islamic teacher education institutions and the kind 
of outputs expected from the institutions; Second, strengthen the Islamic Teacher Education 
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institutions through giving them autonomy and flexibility to administer their own 
institutions and to develop their own programmes based on local needs; Third, restructure 
the current teacher education curriculum to meet current society’s demands. This would 
require some further research work. Fourth, update teaching methods in order to improve the 
quality of teaching and learning in Islamic Teacher Education institutions. Fifth, set up 
appropriate criteria for selecting new student teacher trainees. 
  
4. Pedagogical Approach  in Islamic education 
 
There are two dominant educational approaches within Indonesian Moslem society. First, 
the traditional form of education, which focuses on studying the classical knowledge of 
Islam using traditional teacher centered methods. At present, in both the General school and 
the Islamic education institutions this teaching approach is the most common form.  The 
teacher is a person who has all the knowledge and students have to accept what the teacher 
tells them. The second educational approach, secular education, focuses on the modern 
knowledge of the West using learner centered methods. This presupposes scientific, rational 
methods. The dichotomy in the educational system between a religious educational system 
and a secular educational system has also created a knowledge dichotomy, namely a 
religious knowledge and a secular knowledge. This knowledge dichotomy has had a 
significant impact on the outputs of education. The Islamic educational system creates a 
graduate who has a strong religious knowledge base and moral attitudes but lacks a 
methodological approach. General education creates graduates who are strong in 
methodological approaches but lack a religious knowledge base. There is a need to integrate 
these two traditions, the Islamic and Western tradition, in order to develop an effective 
pedagogical approach in the process of teaching and learning in both strands of Indonesian 
education.  
 
Three teaching approaches have been developed to date. The first is to put both religious 
and general education under one roof (faculty). The general subjects are institutionalized 
within the general faculty and the religious subjects within a religious faculty. Some Islamic 
Teacher Education institutions have adopted this model, such as: The University of Al-
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Azhar, Egypt; The University of Muhammadiyah, and Indonesian Islamic University. The 
second model is the Islamization of knowledge, which integrates a religious subject and a 
general subject in one domain of knowledge through introducing a new form of knowledge 
institutionalism via faculties and departments, such as a Faculty of Revealed Knowledge and 
Faculty of Non Revealed Knowledge. This model has been adopted by International Islamic 
University in Islamabad Pakistan and Kuala Lumpur Malaysia. In the third model, the 
religious subjects are the main core and the general subjects are integrated supplementally 
into the curriculum. In this context, the general subject plays a role as a knowledge assistant 
to understanding a normative framework of Islam. This model has been adopted by the State 
Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Indonesia. 
 
Each of these approaches has its own epistemological background and methods to contribute 
to a new form teaching and learning, which will meet society’s demands and the challenge 
of modernity.  It is suggested that the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), together with 
the Islamic Teacher Education institutions, should develop an effective approach of teaching 
and learning for further developing Islamic Teacher Education programmes. Strengthening 
the Institutional capacity and teaching approach of Indonesian Islamic teacher education 
would be a strategic move in producing an effective Islamic teacher education for the 
Madrasah and Pesantren in contemporary Indonesia. 
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